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Future of Humanity Institute, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford
Our world today is remarkable. We have a level of health, prosperity, freedom, and education of which our forebears could only dream. 
And we have the ability to do things of which they could not even 
dream – exploring the surfaces of other planets with robotic servants; 
or searching through archives larger than the library of Alexandria while 
waiting in a queue for lunch.
Yet we did not create this remarkable world. We stand on the shoulders 
of the 100 billion people who came before us: the ten thousand generations 
of humanity who each inherited their culture, institutions, and knowledge 
from their parents, made their own small improvements, and passed this 
legacy on to their children. Ten thousand links in an unbroken chain.
Individuals, groups, and nations made choices that echoed across the 
generations. Choices like whether to limit the power of kings, to pursue 
industrialisation, to end the slave trade, or to recognise the rights of 
women. Some choices helped us progress more quickly; some held us 
back; and some changed the very direction in which we were headed. 
Indeed some choices, such as the development of atomic weapons, have 
threatened the very existence of a future at all. And many of these choices 
were made with little regard for the people of the long-term future – the 
distant generations whose entire ways of life they would shape.
We too make choices that will shape the future – over decades, centuries, 
or millennia. We have every reason to believe that the effects of our 
choices upon the people of the future will be just as profound as those 
which shaped our own time. And we owe it to the people of the future 
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to make these choices with care and thought; to take their interests as 
seriously as we take our own. Especially on issues like climate change, 
where one needs no great powers of prediction to see that most of the 
people who stand to win or lose do not yet exist.
The essays in this book are some of our first steps towards an under-
standing of how to make today’s choices in ways that take the people of 
tomorrow seriously. This is not an easy undertaking. It requires the space 
to look beyond the news cycle, the election cycle, the business cycle, and 
to see the bigger picture. It requires new ways of thinking about policy, 
politics, and even political systems. It requires adjustments to our economic 
tools for evaluating future outcomes, and to our ways of forecasting long-
term effects and trends.
But we need to rise to these challenges. And if these early attempts are 




The most remarkable thing that ever happened occurred between 445 and 541 million years ago, during a period that is known, in 
geological time scale, as the Cambrian period: matter became aware. 
By this time period, a rocky composite of gas and stardust had been 
visited by interloping asteroids carrying one unusually stable, drinkable 
molecule that would conspire together with inorganic elements to form 
cells – membrane-bound structures that fight to maintain an equilibrium 
with their environment in an effort to survive. As these cells achieved 
sufficient complexity and began to intermarry, their intimate unions created 
organisms capable of forming representations of their environment. The 
birth of complex organisms brought with it awareness, goals, and the 
capacity for matter to organise itself towards these goals. From lifeless 
gas, rock, and water: purpose.
According to modern science, the pale blue dot is the only region in all 
of the observable universe that is home to this kind of matter. And for all 
of the thirteen billion years that preceded the emergence of awareness on 
earth, and the billion trillion stars that make up the observable universe, 
our planet appears to be the only region of space that has ever developed 
a sense of purpose.
Cosmologists tell us that our universe is still in its infancy. The last stars 
by 
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will be born in over a trillion years’ time. But the coals of the universe 
will remain warm for a million times as long, due to a steady stream of 
brown dwarfs fusing to keep the cosmos illuminated.1
We do not yet know if we can say the same for sentient life. In principle, 
purposive creatures could last as long as the heat remains on, until the 
last lumen has faded from the world’s final supernova. But if the void 
of space is to be our guide, then the future of our universe may instead 
look much like its past: beautiful, but with no one to look upon it; vast, 
but with no one to explore; wondrous, with no one to wonder.
That is what this volume is about. Conscious experience is uniquely 
precious. In our universe, it is far scarcer than gold,2 and it is valuable 
beyond any price. And remarkably, what we do today may determine 
the entire future of conscious life. Will we allow the light of awareness 
to fade into oblivion? Or will we fill the stars with matter that matters, 
for the eons that are to come? And should our descendents survive, 
will we bequeath upon them a bleak, grey crypt under the thumb of a 
bloodless tyrant? Or will we leave a jubilant world rich in art, in culture, 
and in splendour?
Such concerns lie at the core of the philosophy of longtermism, the 
idea that it is particularly important that we act now to safeguard future 
generations. How we act today will set the trajectory for the entire future, 
for all sentient beings who are yet to come. So how will we act, with the 
entire future at stake?
It is this imperative that inspires and animates The Long View. The 
volume’s first three chapters articulate and defend the longtermist imp- 
erative at length. First is ‘Expanding the Moral Circle to Future Generations,’ 
wherein Natalie Cargill lays out the history of humanity’s ‘moral circle,’ the 
imaginary boundary between those who are morally included and those 
who are morally excluded. Cargill argues that humanity’s moral progress 
is not inevitable, but that it is possible for a small and dedicated group of 
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philanthropists to permanently transform humanity’s moral circle for the 
better. Given this, philanthropists who want to make the greatest difference 
should work to expand the moral circle to include future generations.
Cargill’s argument is developed and strengthened in ‘The Case for 
Strong Longtermism,’ from Hilary Greaves, William MacAskill, and Elliot 
Thornley. These contributors argue that, if we want to do the most good 
we possibly can, we should take whatever actions we expect to have the 
most positive effects on the distant future, rather than taking those actions 
that are only beneficial in the short term. This is due to the vastness of 
the future: if future generations matter as much as present ones, then 
given how many future people may exist, anything we can do to put the 
future on a better long-term trajectory is vastly more important than 
anything we can do to improve the world today.
Lord Martin Rees, Astronomer Royal, offers a distinct justification for 
longtermism in ‘Navigating the Next Century’s Challenges’. Lord Rees argues 
that the twenty-first century is the very first in which one species has the 
power to determine, for good or for ill, the future of the entire biosphere. 
We will do so as we navigate together several crucial challenges to the 
long-term future, including population growth, biodiversity, climate 
change, and advanced artificial intelligence. Humanity can navigate these 
challenges successfully, Rees argues, but only if we prioritise projects 
with a long-term political perspective.
The next four chapters take this thought as their point of departure. 
In ‘Longtermist Institutional Reform,’ Tyler M. John and William MacAskill 
articulate a number of key reasons why political institutions around 
the world are so rarely able to adopt a long-term perspective, including 
uncertainty, bias, time inconsistency, and election incentives. They then 
propose and defend four institutional reforms that promise to substantially 
increase the time horizons of governments, so that they may rightly 
prioritise projects with long timelines: 1) government research institutions 
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and archivists; 2) posterity impact assessments; 3) futures assemblies; 
and 4) legislative houses for future generations. 
Next are Lords John Bird and Robert Kerslake, who in their chapters 
outline the failures of long-term government planning in the UK and 
call for us to do better. In ‘Lessons from the British Welfare State for Future 
Generations Legislation,’ Lord Bird hones in on the failure of the British 
welfare state, arguing that we could do much better in the future if we 
institutionalise future-oriented thinking in governments around the globe. 
It concludes with some reflections on the future we could achieve if we 
ensure that laws are fully and forensically assayed on their long-term future 
impacts, and an introduction to the Well-Being of Future Generations 
Bill put before the UK Parliament which may help to get us there.
In ‘The challenge of effective long-term thinking in the UK Government and 
the critical role of philanthropy,’ Lord Kerslake compares the government’s 
shortcomings with some of philanthropy’s successes in adopting a long 
view. He tells the story of George Peabody, a philanthropist whose 
positive impact on the housing of the UK poor has outlived him for over a 
century, and argues that by supporting, working with, and learning from 
philanthropic actors, the government can achieve comparable successes.
Sam Hilton adopts a more optimistic angle on longtermist policy in 
the UK, telling the recent success story of the All-Party Parliamentary 
Group for Future Generations in his chapter, ‘A Little Bit of Funding Goes 
A Long Way: The APPG for Future Generations’. With only one year of a 
full-time staff equivalent, the APPG supported the creation of Lord Bird’s 
Well-being of Future Generations Bill, launched an ongoing Inquiry on 
Longtermism in Policymaking, pushed the UK Parliament to set up a 
Select Committee on Risk Assessment and Risk Management and swelled 
membership to seventy-five UK parliamentarians. And the work of the 
APPG has only just begun to push for the fair inclusion of all future 
generations in government decision making.
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The three chapters that follow explain cause areas of particular 
concern to policymakers and philanthropists wishing to protect future 
generations. One area concerns pandemics. The ongoing COVID-19 
pandemic should prompt global leaders to take bold action to reshape 
international institutions and significantly invest to reduce future globally 
catastrophic biological risks. So Jaime Yassif argues in her chapter, 
‘Biosecurity, Longtermism and Global Catastrophic Biological Risks’. To do so 
effectively, Yassif argues that we must maintain a broad perspective about 
the potential sources of such risks, addressing both naturally emerging 
pathogens and synthesised ones, and explains how we can do this.
A second area concerns extreme climate change. In ‘Utilising Insurance 
for Climate Risk Reduction in the UK,’ Lord Des Browne charts a path forward 
for insurers to play a larger role in climate risk adaptation and mitigation. 
As Browne shows, insurers have an abundance of expertise, money, 
and perspective which they might bring to bear on this challenge, by 
serving as shock absorbers, risk engineers, and experts in risk modelling, 
pricing, prevention, and behavioral incentives. In this way the chapter 
identifies actions for government, the insurance sector, civil society, 
and philanthropists to take to improve collaboration and increase their 
collective influence.
A third area of concern to longtermists is the risks from advanced 
artificial intelligence. As Amanda Askell argues in ‘Ensuring the Safety of 
Artificial Intelligence,’ artificial intelligence stands out among other forms 
of current technology as having particularly great promise and particularly 
great risk, and our work today to ensure the safety of artificial intelligence 
could have an enormous long-term impact on humanity. Such work 
includes gathering information about AI progress and impacts, investing 
resources into the safe development and responsible deployment of 
AI and working to resolve collective action problems that threaten to 
undermine these efforts.
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The challenges facing future generations are enormous, and humanity 
is not currently well-suited to dealing with them. For this reason, Hiski 
Haukkala argues in the volume’s final chapter that human society is in 
need of deep cultural change that stitches long-term thinking into the 
very fabric of our lives. In ‘Traversing the garden of forking paths more 
wisely: The challenges of taking the long term into account in decision making,’ 
Haukkala surveys the obstacles to long-term thinking and proposes a 
new set of cultural traditions, which together will remind we who live 
today – along with all of our descendents – to be custodians of this planet 
and its long-term potential; to ensure a viable, open, and aspirational 
future for all generations.
Together, these contributions embody our heartfelt conviction that 
philanthropy need not relegate itself to an ameliorative practice of mere 
alms-giving. Every moment our entire future is at stake, and today’s 
philanthropists uniquely possess the power, the opportunity and the 
moral obligation to protect posterity and maximise the flourishing of 
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Throughout most of recorded history, horrors such as chattel slavery, feudalism, and 
nationalist genocide were almost universally accepted. Today, we live in unusual times. 
Chattel slavery is abolished, half of all countries are democracies, and violent conflict is 
in decline. We have made a stunning amount of moral progress, in these domains and 
others. But, as this essay explores, this was not because the arc of the universe tends towards 
justice. On the contrary, our brains are hard-wired for prejudice and the universe is replete 
with examples of moral rise and fall, progress and collapse. Instead, a surprising amount 
of the advances we have made can be attributed to the work of a few moral pioneers – 
philanthropists and activists who took on audacious projects to not only help the needy, 
but to successfully challenge conventional wisdom on whose needs matter in the first place. 
In doing so, they expanded humanity’s moral circle, benefited countless individuals who 
might otherwise have been neglected for centuries, and left today’s moral pioneers with 
lessons in impact that we can learn from immensely. 
The first person to be described as a ‘philanthropist’ in English2 was the son of a Bedfordshire upholsterer, who failed to thrive as an 
apprentice grocer, and – like so many disaffected youths of his generation 
and ours – set out to sea in search of inspiration. Instead, he found pirates. 
The Hanover had barely begun it’s journey to Portugal when it was 
hijacked by state-sponsored militia from France. John Howard and his 
shipmates were stripped of their clothes, thrown into a dungeon, and left 
with nothing to eat for six days but a single joint of mutton, tossed onto 
the rancid floor for the prisoners to fight over.3 Two further dungeons 
and untold torment later, Howard was released to the British in exchange 
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for a French officer. No sooner had he set foot in London, than Howard 
begged Commissioners of Sick and Wounded Seamen for help freeing 
his fellow captives that had been left behind. He described conditions 
in French prisons so barbaric that ‘many hundred had perished’,4 and he 
was successful in securing their release.5
This was in 1755, when Howard was thirty. For nearly eighteen years 
afterward, his life returned to normal. Howard managed his estate, 
developed a reputation for unusual benevolence towards his tenants and 
the unemployed, and was eventually asked to serve as High Sheriff of 
Bedfordshire. His duties as a sheriff, however, included managing the local 
prison. What he saw on his first visit there left him shocked, horrified, 
and transported back to his nightmare as a French prisoner of war:6
Prisoners were chained by their neck, waist, hands and feet in heavy 
irons. Many were almost naked without shirts, shoes or stockings. They 
slept on the floor on dirty straw which was often so old it had turned to 
dust, unless they could afford to pay for a bed at 3s. 6d. a week (nearly 
two days’ wages). If those on the floor wanted fresh straw, it cost them 
a penny a day. The walls were filthy and had not been whitewashed 
for years. Gaol fever killed prisoners regularly; so did hunger and cold. 
Boys as young as thirteen were confined along with hardened felons.
Worst of all, jails throughout England were held privately, and instead 
of being financed by the state they stayed in business by charging the 
prisoners in their care for their time spent in jail. Given that prisoners 
had almost no way to make a wage, they were regularly held long after 
they had been acquitted by the state.
Appalled, Howard spent the next year visiting nearly every county 
jail in England and Wales. He scrupulously gathered evidence of the 
mistreatment at every prison and brought it before the House of Commons, 
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who were persuaded to pass two penal reform acts. The first required 
jails to be financed by the county, and the second required changes to 
‘improve conditions with measures for adequate clean water and sewage 
systems, better hygiene, and an upgraded diet.’ Howard had copies of 
both acts printed at his own expense and sent to every prison in England.
But Howard didn’t stop there. After the laws were passed by the parl-
iament, he visited English jails a second time to see whether the laws 
were being enforced. They were not. So Howard decided to visit prisons 
elsewhere to see how English jails might be improved, traveling to Scotland, 
Ireland, France, Switzerland, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands.7 
He travelled relentlessly on horseback, averaging more than forty miles 
per day. Howard grew enormously disciplined in his project. Each day 
he rose at 3 a.m. to work. He disguised himself as a Parisian gentleman 
to evade arrest in Toulon, and as a doctor to gain entry to prisons. He 
became a vegetarian. By his own calculations, John Howard travelled 
a total of 42,033 miles in his pioneering efforts to reform European 
prisons.8 He made over 350 visits to over 230 different jails and assembled 
an enormous amount of detailed evidence on these institutions, and 
published his findings in a 500-page volume entitled The State of the 
Prisons in England and Wales.
Howard befriended the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham, and 
together they made a great deal of noise about Howard’s book. The book 
was widely read, in no small part due to Howard’s financing of it from 
his own wealth. In total, Howard spent £30,000 (an inflation-adjusted 
£3.5m) of his own money on his travels and the distribution of his book.
John Howard’s life ended in 1790, when he died of jail fever while 
traveling the world seeking a cure for the plague.9 But his influence would 
outlive him for centuries. Howard’s efforts led to his recognition as the 
pioneer of prison reform and a father of social science. His ideas took 
root in the minds of Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton and Joseph John Gurney, 
EXPANDING THE MORAL CIRCLE TO FUTURE GENERATIONS
6
the brother and brother-in-law of Elizabeth Fry, ‘the angel of prisons.’10 
When Fry wanted to expose the prison system she followed Howard’s 
example of compiling data in a book and bringing it to parliament, 
and her efforts eventually led to the passing of the Gaols Acts of 1823 
and 1835.11 To this day, criminals have extremely few legal protections, 
facing ‘medical neglect, sexual abuse, lack of reproductive control, loss 
of parental rights, denial of legal rights and remedies, the devastating 
effects of isolation, and arbitrary discipline.’12 But the pioneering work 
from John Howard and Elizabeth Fry paved the way for powerful criminal 
justice reform efforts continuing into the present day. Their successors in 
the UK abolished flogging, penal servitude, hard labour, and the death 
penalty, and passed prison sanitation, hygiene, diet, and health care 
reforms. Across the Atlantic, the ACLU’s National Prison Project has won 
lawsuits on behalf of prisoners in more than twenty-five states, and 95 
per cent of US citizens now support prison reform efforts.13
Conditions in prisons are slowly improving. But this was never in- 
evitable. The vulgar conditions in European prisons had lasted for 
thousands of years, and were highly profitable, utterly accepted, invisible 
to the public eye, and subjected upon poverty-stricken and immigrant 
populations, who face great discrimination. Without Howard’s pioneering 
efforts our own prisons today might yet look like those forced upon him 
by eighteenth century French pirates.
1. The Expanding Moral Circle
The work of the philanthropists who pioneered criminal justice reform 
dramatically improved the world for many millions of people – and 
perhaps for billions over the coming generations. They did so by extending 
the concern of reformers, of government, and of the public to the well-
being of prisoners; by expanding humanity’s ‘moral circle.’
We all have a moral circle: an imaginary boundary that we draw 
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around various objects in our world, or even around objects we might 
dream up.14 Many things sit inside of that circle – your family and friends, 
probably all human beings, and likely all sentient animals – and many 
things fall outside of that circle – your car and furniture, your father’s 
Roomba, and the insentient shambling dead of horror films. The objects 
inside your moral circle are the ones that you think deserve substantive 
moral consideration, in their own right, and which you would like to see 
flourish, for their own sake. Objects outside of your moral circle might 
still matter to you quite a bit – no one is eager to set fire to their savings 
account – but they mostly matter to you as instruments to benefit the 
things that are inside of your moral circle.
Today, nearly everyone would regard the conditions of eighteenth 
century prisoners as a moral atrocity. Thanks to the work of numerous 
advocates like John Howard, we regard all human beings as members of 
our moral circle rather than as mere instruments – even prisoners. But, as 
the example of British prisons shows us, things were not always this way.
We all know the idiom ‘an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.’ We’re less 
familiar with the origins of that phrase. It’s Babylonian penal code from 
the Code of Hammurabi, dated to 1754 BCE. But this is just the penalty for 
harming Babylonian citizens. As repugnant as the old adage is, the next 
line is far worse: ‘If one destroys the eye of a man’s slave or breaks a bone of a 
man’s slave he shall pay one-half his price.’ This was compensation to be paid 
not to the slave, but to the slave’s owner, to make up for their lost profit.
Although the Code of Hammurabi is the oldest known slave code, 
historically speaking it represents the norm rather than a deviation from 
it. Since the height of the Babylonian Empire, and probably much earlier, 
and until the eventual abolition of slavery in Western nations between 
1794 and 1981, nearly every agrarian civilisation has accepted the practice 
of taking one group of people or another as chattel property.
All civilisations, at some time or another, have identified some group 
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of morally worthy individuals as undeserving of even basic moral con-
sideration, treating them as mere instruments or things rather than as 
ends in themselves. 
When we look at the world today, it is clear that we have a long way 
to go to secure the moral consideration that everyone deserves. It is 
incumbent on us to expand the moral circle of all human beings from 
its cruel and conceited beginnings to eventually include every sentient 
individual who lives today or who will live in the future. And yet, we 
live in a world where Black Americans are incarcerated at more than five 
times the rate of whites,15 where five million people die from a lack of 
adequate medical care annually,16 and where over one hundred billion 
animals are confined in factory farms at any given moment.17
But history gives us cause for optimism about the ability of dedicated 
philanthropists and activists to expand humanity’s moral circle until all 
sentient individuals, present and future, are rightly considered. Our 
world has progressed from a period of universal chattel slavery to its total 
abolition; from widespread feudalism to nearly one hundred democracies.18 
And today, nearly half of women, globally, are paid for their labour.19 The 
benefits of past efforts to expand the moral circle continue to cascade 
into the future, as we build on the work of our forebears to pursue a just 
world for marginalised communities. In this way, moral circle expansion 
is the ultimate movement-building project: today’s movements for prison 
reform, and for racial, gender, and species justice simply would not exist 
were it not for the efforts of early pioneers like John Howard.
This is the key takeaway from Section 2: when we look at the history 
of human civilisation’s first ten thousand years, we see that our moral 
circle is remarkably plastic, and can both expand and contract in different 
environmental conditions. The moral progress we’ve achieved was not 
inevitable, nor is our continued moral progress. But the past few centuries 
reveal that it is possible for a small and dedicated group of philanthropists to 
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transform humanity’s moral circle for the better, as we will see in Section 3. 
The lessons from the previous sections are synthesised in Section 4: it is 
both possible and necessary that today’s philanthropists act to expand 
the moral circle to future generations.
2. The History of Humanity’s Moral Circle (300,000 BCE to 1800 CE)
It is commonly believed that the moral arc is long, but that it ineluctably 
bends towards justice. On this view, moral progress is simply inevitable, 
something that happens to humans rather than something that humans 
ourselves are doing, and could choose not to do. But this picture is wrong, 
for at least two reasons.
First, recent findings in developmental psychology show that human 
beings are hard-wired to make in-group, out-group distinctions, and to 
mistreat people who are different from them. In fact, our innate disposition 
to decide who is ‘other’ is one of the earliest cognitive faculties to develop 
in childhood. A study in PNAS last year showed a group of one-year-olds a 
vignette involving a victim being harmed by an aggressor, and a bystander 
coming to help. They found that the infants expected the bystander to 
help the victim when the two wore the same outfit, but the infants were 
shocked by the bystander’s altruism when the bystander wore the same 
coloured outfit as the aggressor.20 More unnervingly still, a 2013 study 
of 9-to-14-month-old infants watching a puppet show found that these 
infants preferred the puppets who shared their snack preferences to those 
who didn’t, and they even preferred the puppets who punished other 
puppets who didn’t share their same choice of snack.21
Evolution has innately primed us to like those who are similar to us, 
and even to wish harm on those who are different from us, beginning 
when we are mere infants. Without ongoing socialisation into a moral 
world-view where everyone is equal, we’ll simply fall back into our native 
tendency towards prejudice.
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Second, the history of humanity’s moral circle does not reveal a simple 
picture of a moral circle ever expanding outward towards universal 
inclusion. Instead, it presents a messy picture of expansion and contraction, 
with no clear overall direction until the last three centuries.
Humanity’s moral circle evolved as an early psychological trait to sustain 
cooperation in small communities and gain an advantage over competing 
human tribes. Early hominids survived by hunting together in groups 
and using their strength in numbers to ward off predators, and for this 
group altruism and group cooperation was essential.22 Helping one’s own 
tribe came at an evolutionary advantage: if the whole group cooperated 
together, provided aid when necessary, and punished uncooperative 
defectors, each cooperating member would reap the rewards of group 
cooperation, including safety, success hunting large mammals, and 
some resilience against the misfortune that might come from an unlucky 
week of hunting and gathering. But helping another tribe came at an 
evolutionary disadvantage, whether due to competition over resources 
and the control of the homo ecological niche, or simple opportunity 
cost. We don’t know whether relationships between tribes were plagued 
with violence and resource scarcity or instead peaceable but distrustful,23 
but we do know that early human communities were closed and close-
knit, and that moral concern was at first a scarce resource reserved in 
exclusivity for one’s 150-500 closest friends.
For better and for worse, this small and unpromising beginnings of a 
moral circle proved to be remarkably plastic.24 As ecological pressures 
and technological development transformed many hunter-gatherers into 
farmers during the Neolithic Revolution (c. 12,000 – 8,000 BCE), many 
humans began to develop large and highly-organised agrarian societies. 
Hunter-gatherers constantly on the move couldn’t afford to have many 
children, but farmers could, so societies grew considerably. Agrarian 
societies required greater cooperation to store and disseminate surplus 
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goods when farming proved fickle, leading to more regimented social 
organisation and stratification.
Agricultural development led many human societies to expand, and 
with it, our moral circle: from small bands of up to five hundred to the 
entire local region. But it also led humanity’s moral circle to contract in a 
number of ways.25 The control and dissemination of surplus goods gave rise 
to class hierarchies with the creation of managers overseeing agricultural 
production. The availability of surplus goods led to the militarisation of 
human societies and an increase in violent conflict over property. And 
the benefits of upper-body strength for ploughing along with an increase 
in the number of children led to the origination of gendered labour and 
gender hierarchies, with males dominating the more highly-valued labour 
of farming and females relegated to childcare responsibilities. 
The existence of warring city-states kindled stark moral tribalism 
between societies throughout the Bronze Age, the Iron Age, and Classical 
Antiquity. One of these warring city-states was Athens, where there 
remains a tombstone from the fifth century BCE that reads:26
This memorial is set over the body of a very good man. Pythion, from 
Megara, slew seven men and broke off seven spear points in their bodies 
... This man, who saved three Athenian regiments ... having brought 
sorrow to no one among all men who dwell on earth, went down to the 
underworld felicitated in the eyes of all. 
Such radical exclusion of tribal outsiders from one’s moral circle is 
representative of the attitudes of ancient human societies. According to 
Peter Singer, the Greek moral reformer Plato suggested an advance on 
this morality: ‘he argued that Greeks should not, in war, enslave other 
Greeks, lay waste their lands or raze their houses; they should do these 
things only to non-Greeks.’
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Around this time, and in the coming centuries, moral radicals such as 
Mozi, Jesus, Shantideva, Pythagoras, and Seneca advocated expanding 
the moral circle to every human being, or even to every sentient being. 
Many of these radicals had philanthropic sponsors – a group of three 
women funded Jesus’s travels, and Shantideva was supported by monks 
– and they were doubtlessly influential: on reformers, scholars, religious 
communities; and eventually on their later followers, such as the Calvinist 
John Howard. But it was Plato who first got his wish, as tribalism gave 
way to nationalism, fuelled by imperial ambitions of mass colonisation. As 
agricultural societies grew and conquered neighbouring cities for resources, 
they expanded their ambitions of imperial conquest and began to form 
empires. Some of these empires enslaved their captives and formed feuds, 
while other empires allowed their colonies to self-govern, whilst extracting 
taxes and military might. The transition from localism to nationalism was 
an advance in human morality, but imperial expansion came at a dramatic 
human cost. In addition to more and larger-scale wars, at the zenith of 
imperial expansion came the colonisation of Africa, the extraction of 12.5 
million slaves for forced labour,27 and the advent of modern racism. The 
carnage of sixteenth century nationalism echoes into the present day. The 
economies of African countries colonised by Europeans continue to grow 
much more slowly than those of their neighbours, and the anti-Black 
racism initiated by imperial conquest persists through the centuries.28
3. The Civil Rights Era
Until the civil rights era the history of humanity’s moral circle had been 
quite a disheartening mix of successes and failures. Far from a moral arc 
that bends gradually but inescapably towards justice, the first ten thousand 
years of human civilisation saw moral circle expansions – beyond the 
clan to the nation-state – but also enormous contractions – along lines 
of gender, race, and class.
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But this all changed during the Civil Rights Era. The eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries would see a dramatic change in the pace at which 
humanity’s moral circle would enlarge. John Howard and Elizabeth 
Fry would successfully work to expand the moral circle to prisoners. 
Fearless Benjamin Lay would persuade the Quakers, and later William 
Wilburforce, to rail against slavery, using dramatic ‘guerilla theatre’ tactics 
– splattering fake blood on slave holders who came to Quaker meetings, 
and even briefly kidnapping the son of a Quaker family who kept a six-
year-old girl as a slave, to show them what it felt like to have their child 
taken from them.29 Mary Wollstonecraft would write A Vindication of the 
Rights of Women, decrying the status of marriage as a property relation, 
and calling for adequate women’s education.
To this day we cannot be certain why philanthropists have been so 
much more successful at expanding humanity’s moral circle during 
the last three centuries. Perhaps like dominoes, one successful social 
movement spurred on and energised another. Or possibly it was the 
gradual development of liberal individualism and the biological and 
cultural development of universalist morality that made it possible for 
these movements to take root. (This in turn might be explained by the 
medieval church’s opposition to cousin marriages, which broke apart 
the family clan structure and paved the way for individualist societies.30) 
It might have been due in part to economic and technological changes, 
including increasing literacy rates to make movement-building possible. 
Or maybe it was all of these things.
Regardless of the reason, today’s background conditions clearly make 
it possible for dedicated philanthropists to have an enormous positive 
impact by working to expand humanity’s moral circle. For we have seen 
them do precisely this, throughout the 19th, 20th, and 21st centuries. 
Arthur and Lewis Tappan and Gerrit Smith funded the American 
Anti-Slavery Society, along with many small donors mobilised by women 
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fundraisers, which would within two years become larger than the 
NRA or the Chamber of Commerce, relative to population, and turn 
abolitionism into a national crusade.31 The Tappan brothers were nearly 
killed for their support of the society. Slavers placed a bounty of $50,000 
on Lewis Tappan’s life, if his head could successfully be delivered to New 
Orleans. But the threats to their lives only heightened their fervour, and 
the advocacy of the American Anti-Slavery Society stretched humanity’s 
moral circle with a one-million tract civil information campaign that 
would be central to the movement to abolish slavery.
During the subsequent civil rights movement, Madame CJ Walker, a 
nineteenth century Black woman self-made millionaire philanthropist, 
would help seed the NAACP and fund numerous economic empowerment 
projects for Black women with the profits of her hair care empire. Andrew 
Carnegie and Julius Rosenwald would find inspiration in the work and 
life of Booker T. Washington, and contribute their fortunes to the cause 
of civil rights: with Carnegie funding Washington’s Tuskegee Institute 
and Rosenwald providing fellowships to Black artists, scholars, and 
leaders such as Maya Angelou, W.E.B. DuBois, and Marian Anderson.32
In the 1960s and 70s, philanthropists would fuel numerous moral-circle-
expanding legal victories around the world. The Albany Trust drove the 
1967 passing of the Sexual Offenses Act, legalising consensual gay sex in 
the UK33 In the US, the ACLU would win numerous anti-discrimination 
cases with their philanthropic funding. The Ford Foundation’s major 
support for the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project, led by Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, would lead to victories in Califano v. Goldfarb, which struck 
down discriminatory elements of Social Security, and Craig v. Boren, a 
key litigative victory in the battle to establish gender discrimination as 
on a legal par with racial discrimination, and which entrenched a higher 
standard for evaluating sex discrimination claims that remains in place 
to this day. The Edna McConnell Clark Foundation became the majority 
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funder for the ACLU’s National Prison Project, whose monumental 
victories we have already seen.
So while it can be tempting to believe the moral arc of the universe 
ineluctably bends towards justice, we are now in a place to see just 
how wrong this picture is. The moral arc of the universe is steamed 
and bowed by the work of philanthropists, litigants, and activists, who 
give selflessly of their time and their resources to find the most effective 
solutions to overcome marginalisation and oppression. Without the work 
of these moral pioneers, our world could be stuck permanently in an 
era of Athenian nationalism, putrid dungeons, and chattel slavery. These 
travesties persisted for thousands of years, and were highly profitable 
and widely accepted. It was far from inevitable, then, that we should 
have moved beyond them today.
4. Expanding the Moral Circle to Future Generations
The historical record shows the devastating effects that a contracted 
moral circle can have on the world. The past was truly terrible, marked 
by profound nationalism, militarism, and exclusion, and people literally 
owning each other as property. While humanity still has a long way to 
go, the present is a much nicer place to live, and this is due in very large 
part to the expansion of humanity’s moral circle in recent centuries. 
What lessons might we take away from our forebears, who fought 
courageously and effectively so that we might live in a more just and 
humane world?
First is the importance of taking on audacious, world-shaping projects 
with a long view of what we can accomplish. The work of John Howard, 
Benjamin Lay, and Mary Wollstonecraft took centuries to pay off in full, 
but they advocated on behalf of millions of their contemporaries and 
billions who would come after them, and a direct consequence of their 
work is that billions have and will continue to benefit from the immense 
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scale of their projects. This idea is echoed in the words of today’s greatest 
philanthropists, such as Warren Buffett who writes that ‘the only way 
you do significant things is by taking on tough things.’
Second, given the enormity of the projects that effective philanthropists 
take on, we cannot be put off by a need to take risky bets on huge 
successes. We don’t know how many advocates before John Howard 
tried and failed to reform the world’s prisons, but Howard’s one success 
would have been worth the time of literally millions of advocates. Bill 
Gates writes similarly that ‘philanthropy should be taking much bigger risks 
than business … If there are easy problems, business and government can come 
in and solve them.’ If philanthropists are to successfully shape the moral 
arc of the universe, doing what governments and markets are unable or 
unwilling to do, we need to take on daring projects to shape humanity’s 
moral circle for generations to come.
Third, the greatest philanthropists think ahead of the moral curve, 
taking on neglected projects that no one else is willing to embrace. The 
philanthropists of the civil rights era railed against ‘common sense,’ 
fighting on behalf of individuals who no one else cared about. This meant 
that they were taking on the very largest problems, with the most need 
for reform, and it also meant that the problems they addressed may not 
have been solved by anyone else. Had they instead worked on crowded 
problem areas such as charity schools (‘in Fashion in the same manner as 
Hoop’d Petticoats, by Caprice,’ said philosopher Bernard Mandeville in 1714, 
‘And the no more Reason can be given for the one then the other.’ 34), then we 
might still be living with the neglected problems of stinking dungeons 
and chattel slavery today.
And finally, the examples of our forebears shows us the importance of 
expanding the moral circle. We have seen that the expansion of humanity’s 
moral circle is not some supernatural phenomenon outside of the hands of 
individuals; humanity’s moral circle has variously expanded and contracted 
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over the millennia, and our progress as a species has been a result of the 
advocacy of philanthropists and moral radicals striving for a better world. 
We alone have the power to decide between alternate histories for our 
world, by choosing to accept moral exclusion within our societies or by 
advocating to expand humanity’s moral circle to all who should rightfully 
be included. Given the opportunity before us to shape humanity’s moral 
circle for the better, we therefore need to ask ourselves who is still being 
excluded, and what we can do to help them. 
Criminals continue to have extremely few legal protections, despite 
the early pioneering work of John Howard, Elizabeth Fry, and the Edna 
McConnell Clark Foundation. In many US states, prisons are regarded 
as an exception to the thirteenth amendment to the constitution legally 
prohibiting slavery, and the treatment of prisoners falls so far below basic 
requirements of human rights that UN human rights documents such 
as the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners have been 
used successfully in legal trials on behalf of prisoners.35 
Non-human animals, particularly those used in agriculture, have even 
fewer legal protections. Factory farming continues to be the dominant 
mode of food production, with over 90 per cent of farmed animals living 
and dying on Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations globally.36 The 
industry standard typically involves confining these animals in cages 
so small that they are unable to stretch or turn around, and spend their 
lives in a state of stress and boredom while sitting in a pile of their own 
excrement. Factory farmed animals number in the trillions.
One further neglected group is of particular concern to this book. Future 
generations are utterly disenfranchised by governments. Only a handful 
of states have even informal representation for future generations, and 
only two nations in the world provide basic constitutional provisions 
for their security. Unlike many other disenfranchised groups, they are 
completely unable to participate in our markets, our movements, and 
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our civil society. In truth, they are entirely powerless today, and will 
live at the mercy of the choices of we who live in the present. Moreover, 
future people are vast in number. If we act wisely in the years ahead, our 
descendants could easily number into the trillions or beyond; given the 
long future that stretches before us, nearly everyone who will ever exist is 
likely to live in the future. And yet, as with the other groups considered 
in this chapter, future generations face exclusion from humanity’s moral 
circle due to the mere circumstances of their lives and births.
Given the astronomical scale of the future, and the opportunity to 
make the future as marvellous compared to the present as the present 
is compared to the past, philanthropists who want to make the greatest 
difference with their efforts should work to expand the moral circle to 
future generations. To do so, we need to advocate for the representation 
of future generations within our legal systems (see John and MacAskill, 
Bird, Kerslake and Wagg, Hilton, this volume), the establishment of 
longtermism within culture (see Haukkala, this volume), and the growth 
of today’s movement to protect future generations (see Rees, Yassif, 
Browne, Askell, this volume), and we need to promote research to inform 
all of our actions to positively shape the long-term future (see Greaves, 
MacAskill, and Thornley, this volume).
As with the moral visionaries before us – from John Howard to Madam 
C.J. Walker, and the philosophers of the ancient period – our efforts to 
expand humanity’s moral circle to the marginalised will echo for centuries 
to come. If we protect our grandchildren, and ensure that our grandchildren 
protect their grandchildren in turn, we can ensure a flourishing future for 
generation after generation: a true sustainable investment to pay dividends 
from now until the end of recorded time.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Moral Case for Long-term Thinking
This chapter makes the case for strong longtermism: the claim that, in many situations, 
our impact on the long-run future is the most important feature of our actions. Our case 
begins with the observation that an astronomical number of people could exist in the aeons 
to come. Even on conservative estimates, the expected future population is enormous. 
We then add a moral claim: all the consequences of our actions matter. In particular, the 
moral importance of what happens does not depend on when it happens. That pushes us 
toward strong longtermism. We then address a few potential concerns, the first of which 
is that it is impossible to have any sufficiently predictable influence on the course of the 
long-run future. We argue that this is not true. Some actions can reasonably be expected 
to improve humanity’s long-term prospects. These include reducing the risk of human 
extinction, preventing climate change, guiding the development of artificial intelligence, 
and investing funds for later use. We end by arguing that these actions are more than just 
extremely effective ways to do good. Since the benefits of longtermist efforts are large and 
the personal costs are comparatively small, we are morally required to take up these efforts.
The future is big. Our planet currently hosts around eight billion people. This century will see the birth of more than ten billion. If 
that number holds steady for just ten more centuries, we have a hundred 
billion people ahead of us. But humanity could last much longer than 
that. If all goes well, we can expect our descendants to outnumber us by 
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an even greater margin. We residents of the twenty-first century could 
turn out to be a drop in the ocean.
It is hard to grasp the size of humanity’s potential. We are not used to 
thinking on the necessary time-scales. Harold Wilson said that a week 
was a long time in politics, and the remark seems true of many other 
domains too.1 Our world changes so quickly that the consequences of 
our actions even a few years from now are tough to predict,2 so it is no 
surprise that we rarely consider how our decisions might affect people 
living hundreds, thousands, or even millions of years in the future.
Nonetheless, we – the authors – believe that this neglect of the long-
term future is a grave moral error. The view recently dubbed longtermism 
serves as a corrective.3 According to this view, we should be particularly 
concerned with ensuring that the long-term future goes well. In this 
contribution, we argue for both longtermism and a further claim that we 
call strong longtermism which states that, in many situations, impact on 
the long-term future is the most important feature of our actions today.
Where exactly the short-term future ends and the long-term future 
begins is not important. We claim that the view is true even when we 
draw the line a surprisingly long time from now – say, a hundred years. 
The claim, then, is that the moral value of our actions depends primarily 
on their consequences arising more than a century in the future. That 
means that the predicted short-run value of our actions should not weigh 
heavily in our decision-making. Instead, our choices should be driven 
mainly by long-run considerations. Short-term effects matter, but they 
matter primarily as mediators of long-term effects.
We believe that strong longtermism has practical implications for 
individuals, charities, and governments. 
Humanity’s future could be extraordinarily valuable, and it currently 
hangs in the balance. If these facts were widely recognised, many of our 
priorities would change.
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The case for strong longtermism
The case for strong longtermism begins with the observation that our future 
could be vast. Astronomical numbers of people could exist in the aeons to 
come. Of course, the exact number is uncertain. The range of possibilities 
is wide. But, for our purposes, we can work with the expected number of 
future people. We calculate this figure in the same way that we calculate 
the expected value of a lottery ticket. Suppose that a ticket offers a 1 per 
cent chance of winning £300. Then its expected value is 0.01 × £300 = £3.
Whether a lottery ticket is worth buying depends on the numbers, 
and the same is true of our argument for longtermism. Here, as below, 
we will endeavour to be conservative in our estimates, erring on the side 
of underestimating the expected number of future people. If the case 
for longtermism is strong on these numbers, it will be even stronger 
on less cautious estimates. In that spirit, suppose that the chance that 
humanity survives until the Earth becomes uninhabitable – one billion 
years from now4 – is just 0.1 per cent. The future is hard to predict, so 
being more than 99.9 per cent confident that we will not make it that far 
seems hubristic. Suppose also that ten billion people live in each century. 
In that case, the expected number of future people is at least 100 trillion 
(1014) – over 10,000 times the number of people alive today.
The size of that number might lead you to think that our estimates were 
not conservative after all. But note that the above calculation leaves out 
many opportunities for further inflation. Perhaps the most significant is 
the chance of space settlement. There are around 250 billion stars in the 
Milky Way, some of which will last for trillions of years.5 If there is even 
a tiny chance that our descendants settle just a small fraction of these 
solar systems, the expected number of future people balloons upward.
Suffice it to say, the expected future population is large indeed. That 
is the first component of our argument for strong longtermism. The 
second component is a moral claim: all the consequences of our actions 
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matter. More specifically, the moral importance of what happens does 
not depend on when it happens. Agony and ecstasy occurring a hundred 
years from now matter just as much as agony and ecstasy occurring ten 
years from now.
This claim rules out what economists call a ‘positive rate of pure time 
preference’: preferring that good things occur at earlier rather than later 
times purely because they are earlier. To be sure, time preferences are 
appropriate in some domains. A pound now is preferable to a pound in 
ten years’ time. But that is because we expect to be richer in the future, 
and pounds have diminishing marginal utility. Features of our lives 
that are intrinsically good or bad – things like joy and sadness – do not 
have diminishing marginal utility, so time preferences concerning these 
things are out of place. Consider an example. Suppose that you can save 
one person from torture ten years from now or two people from torture 
a hundred years from now, and that your decision will have no other 
consequences. It seems clear that, in this case, you should save the two 
people. Their pain should not be discounted simply because it occurs 
further in the future.6
Together, our argument’s two components – the future is vast and all 
consequences matter – push us toward our conclusion: we can have 
a much bigger effect on the value of the future by trying to change its 
long-term rather than its short-term value. That in turn suggests that 
we should devote much more of our focus to considering the long-run 
effects of our decisions. 
This claim is only strengthened by the observation that, so far, few 
people have recognised the importance of this longtermist insight. Most 
people and institutions are biased towards the short term.7 If we direct 
our focus on the next few years, we enter a crowded field in which many 
of the best opportunities have already been taken and further progress is 
difficult. But if we instead cast our sights further, we find fresh ground. 
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Any opportunities here are less likely to have been taken, so we can 
expect to have an outsized impact.
Longtermist initiatives
But can we predictably improve the long-run future? One might think 
not, reasoning along the following lines:
Our world is so complex that it is impossible to foresee what effects 
our actions will have decades from now, let alone centuries. Since the 
long-run consequences of our actions are so uncertain, we cannot rea-
sonably expect that any of our actions will make the long-term future 
better rather than worse. In light of this uncertainty, we should focus on 
the near future where effects are easier to predict. 
We agree that the long-run value of many actions is hard to predict. 
But, importantly, this is not true of all actions. Some actions can be rea-
sonably expected to improve humanity’s long-term prospects, and this 
is enough to make strong longtermism true.
To explain one set of such actions, we first need to introduce an idea. 
Imagine a golf ball blown around a putting green by blustering winds. 
While the ball is on the turf, it will roll back and forth. The state of the 
scene will be constantly changing. But if the ball falls into a hole, it will 
remain there. The ball’s being in the hole is what we call a persistent state. 
It is a state which, upon coming about, tends to persist for a long time.
Our world is like this windy putting green. It too has persistent states. 
Human extinction is one of them. The chances of humanity evolving all 
over again, post-extinction, are tiny. Human survival is another persis-
tent state, albeit to a lesser extent. While the risks of extinction are real, 
there is at least a strong tendency for humanity to endure. These two 
persistent states differ in their long-run value. Our survival through the 
next thousand years and beyond is, plausibly, better than our extinction 
in the near future. So, if we can reduce the chance of human extinction, 
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we can predictably improve the long-term future.8
And it is increasingly recognised that we can reduce the chance of 
extinction. Matheny (2007), for instance, estimates that a $20 billion 
asteroid deflection system could halve the probability of an extinction-level 
asteroid hitting the Earth this century, reducing the risk from one-in-one-
million to one-in-two-million. That decrease may seem small in absolute 
terms, but it makes an enormous difference to the expected number of 
future people. Recall that our calculation from the previous section gave 
us an expected future population of 100 trillion. Increasing the chance 
that this population gets to exist by just one-in-two-million is equivalent 
to saving 50 million lives in expectation. That comes out at $400 per life 
saved. And this is just one example. Combating other extinction threats 
– such as those arising from new or engineered pandemics – might be 
even more cost-effective.9 This we could achieve by funding biosecurity 
work at the Johns Hopkins Centre for Health Security,10 for instance, or 
the Future of Humanity Institute.11
That said, the case for reducing extinction risk hangs on our moral 
view. If we embrace a person-affecting approach to future generations – 
on which we care about making lives good but not about making good 
lives12 – then extinction would not be so bad. It might even be judged 
good.13 An asymmetric moral view – according to which bad lives get 
more weight than good lives – might lead us to a similar verdict.14 And 
even on more standard views about the value of bringing new generations 
into existence, we might worry that future lives will be bad overall, so 
that extinction would be the lesser evil.15
Nevertheless, we argue, those drawn to person-affecting, asymmetric, 
and pessimistic views should still be strong longtermists. That is because 
extinction is not the only persistent state whose likelihood we can affect. 
Artificial intelligence presents another opportunity. Experts judge that 
there is a real chance that we develop advanced AI this century, with capa-
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bilities exceeding our own across a wide range of domains.16 As a result 
of their superior intelligence, these artificial agents may come to exert 
significant control over human affairs: making important decisions on 
behalf of individuals, governments, and other institutions. These agents 
might also endure indefinitely. Since their underlying code could be cop-
ied, they could outlast any given piece of hardware.17 These two features 
of AI systems – their influence and their staying power – mean that they 
are likely to have substantial and lasting effects on the future.18 That in 
turn suggests that we can have a beneficial influence on the long-term by 
increasing the chances that these systems are aligned with the right values. 
Work underway at OpenAI19 and the Centre for Security and Emerging 
Technology20 – to take just two examples – aims to achieve exactly that.
Another set of persistent states relates to climate change. A warmer 
climate could slow long-run economic growth, leaving future civilisation 
worse-off indefinitely.21 It could also lead to the extinction of species, 
the destruction of coral reefs, and other forms of irreversible damage 
to our ecosystem.22 Because these potential harms are near-permanent, 
we can expect that fighting climate change will have enduring effects 
on the future.
In sum, humanity finds itself in a delicate position. Our civilisation is 
currently poised between a range of persistent states. Falling into one of 
these states would likely have immense effects on the long-term future. 
Through the judicious use of time and resources, we can alter the chances 
that these states come about. As a consequence, we have the power to 
make our world better for generations to come.
But, as noted above, the case for strong longtermism hinges on the 
numbers. Not every lottery ticket is worth buying, and the same could 
be true of our proposed longtermist interventions. However, we argue 
that – even on conservative figures – the opportunities we list above are 
well worth the expense. Matheny’s proposed asteroid deflection system 
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is one example. Another concerns artificial intelligence. If £1 billion of 
grants could reduce the chance of a catastrophic AI outcome – in which 
humanity’s future is rendered near-worthless – by just 0.001 per cent, 
then a £10,000 donation can do as much good as saving 10,000 lives.23 
By contrast, it is widely agreed that the best available human-centric 
short-term interventions save roughly 4 lives per £10,000.24
And there is still much we do not know. Even if, at present, we cannot 
reasonably expect any of these longtermist initiatives to have better con-
sequences than the most effective short-term actions, it remains possible 
that extra information would tip the scales in favour of a longtermist 
option. In that case, funding research into the long-run effects of vari-
ous initiatives may be our best move. Since future people would likely 
take note of this research, we can expect our donations to increase the 
effectiveness of humanitarian efforts for many years to come.
Another option is to save our money.25 We could set up a foundation 
or donor-advised fund with an explicitly longtermist mission. This fund 
would pay out if and when a good opportunity to shape the long-term 
future arises. The phase before the widespread deployment of advanced 
artificial intelligence would be one such opportunity. Since both the value 
of this longtermist fund and our knowledge about the efficacy of various 
actions is likely to grow over time, we can expect its impact to be especially 
substantial. The upshot is that we have a whole array of opportunities to 
benefit the generations who could exist in centuries to come. Even on 
the most cautious estimates, we should expect longtermist initiatives to 
do many times as much good as it is possible to do in the short term. So, 
if our aim is to do good, we should focus on the long term.
Are we morally required to be longtermists?
The argument above will motivate many people to set their sights on 
the long term. But others might want to hear more about the precise 
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moral status of longtermist initiatives. For even if longtermist actions 
like reducing extinction risk have the best effects on the future, that does 
not immediately imply that we are morally required to reduce extinc-
tion risk. For those people motivated mainly by a desire to avoid acting 
immorally, and not by a more wide-ranging desire to do good, this last 
step is important.
Let us expand on this point. On some moral views, doing what has 
the best effects is not always morally required.26 Consider an example. 
Suppose that you are walking by a shallow pond, and a child asks you 
to wade in and get her football. You judge that the joy the child would 
feel in getting her ball back outweighs the frustration you would feel in 
ruining your clothes, so wading in would have the best consequences. 
Nevertheless, one might well claim, you are not morally required to wade 
in. You need not feel bad about staying dry. Similarly, one might argue, 
we are not morally required to do what has the best effects on the long-
run future. We can instead devote our time and resources to other things.
Perhaps there are cases where we need not do what is impartially best.27 
We can allow that. But even so, we maintain that longtermist actions are 
morally required. This conclusion is implied by the following plausible 
claim: When the action with the best effects has effects much better than other 
available actions, and any difference in personal costs is comparatively small, 
we are morally required to perform the action with the best effects.28
This claim is compatible with the judgement that you need not wade 
into the pond. Although wading in would have better effects than staying 
dry, the effects are presumably not much better. The claim also makes 
sense of our judgements in an amended version of the case. Suppose 
instead that the child is drowning in the shallow pond. Then it seems 
undeniable that you are morally required to wade in and save her. Precisely 
because the stakes are high and the cost to you is small, you must do 
what is best.29
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Our situation is closer to the drowning case than it is to the football 
case. Longtermist initiatives like preventing future pandemics are not 
merely slightly more effective than the best short-term initiatives. They are 
many times more effective.30 Since the consequences of longtermist efforts 
are so much better in expectation, and the personal costs of a long-run 
focus are small, we are morally required to take up longtermist efforts.
Conclusion
Humanity’s potential is vast and yet fragile. We could be on the verge 
of a long and magnificent future in which our descendants flourish for 
aeons to come. We could also be headed for an untimely end, or a drop 
into a permanent rut. Our fate is as yet undetermined. Influencing the 
chances that these futures come to pass is within our power.
These facts, in combination with a couple of plausible moral claims, 
have led us to a surprising conclusion: in many situations, effects on the 
long-run future are the most important feature of our actions today. This 
shift to a strong longtermist perspective is of no small importance. It directs 
us to spend significantly more of our time and resources on reducing 
extinction risk, preventing climate change, guiding AI development, 
improving institutional decision-making, fostering international coop-
eration, researching the long-run efficacy of various initiatives, investing 
funds for later use, and – almost certainly – many other things besides.
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CHAPTER THREE
Navigating the Next Century’s Challenges
by 
Martin Rees
 Astronomer Royal and Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge
The twenty-first century is a crucial one. The Earth has existed for 45 million centuries but 
this is the first period in which one species, ours, is sufficiently dominant and empowered 
that it can determine, for good or ill, the future of its entire biosphere. This chapter provides 
an overview of the crucial challenges that humanity must navigate together to ensure that 
our long-term future lives up to its burgeoning potential, and introduces some promising 
solutions. First are challenges of population growth: by 2100, Africa’s population could 
double twice, to 4 billion, creating a portent for disaffection and geopolitical instability. 
Second are threats to biodiversity  –  a crucial component of human wellbeing  –  from 
humanity’s collective ecological impact. Third are problems of climate change and our 
necessary civilisational segue to a low-carbon future. Fourth are the promises and perils 
of AI. The lifestyle enabled by advanced AI seems benign, but may be imperiled by its 
threats to privacy and global economic equality. Humanity can yet navigate these crucial 
challenges successfully, but to do so it is imperative that we realise that we’re all on this 
crowded world together and prioritise projects that are long-term in political perspective.
First, the good news. For most people in most nations, there’s never been a better time to be alive. The innovations driving economic 
advance  –  IT, biotech and nanotech  –  have boosted the developing 
as well as the developed world. Creativity in science and the arts is 
nourished by a wider range of influences  –  and is accessible to hugely 
more people worldwide  –  than in the past. We’re becoming embedded 
in a cyberspace that will soon be able to link anyone, anywhere, to all the 
world’s information and culture, and to most other people on the planet. 
Twenty-first-century technologies, in the coming decades, could offer 
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everyone a lifestyle that requires little compromise on what Europeans 
aspire to today, while being environmentally benign, involving lower 
demands on energy or resources.
This bright future is possible. But there is a gap between the way the 
world could be and the way it is actually heading  –  and that gap is 
growing. It’s an ethical indictment of our world that its benefits are so 
unequally shared, that the wealth of its richest two thousand inhabitants 
could more than double the income of the ‘bottom billion’  –  people 
struggling to live on only two dollars a day and with minimal access to 
health care, adequate diet, or education.1 Equally, it’s shameful that failures 
of governance lead to humanitarian disasters and conflicts.
The twenty-first century is a crucial one. The Earth has existed for 45 
million centuries but this is the first period in which one species, ours, is 
sufficiently dominant and empowered that it can determine, for good or 
ill, the future of its entire biosphere. We’ve entered what some have called 
the ‘Anthropocene’ era. This chapter provides an overview of the crucial 
challenges that humanity must navigate together to ensure that our long-
term future lives up to its burgeoning potential: challenges of population 
growth, mass extinctions, climate change, and advanced AI. To do this, it 
is imperative that we realise that we’re all on this crowded world together 
and prioritise projects that are long-term in political perspective.
A crowded world
Humanity’s heavy collective footprint will get heavier still. Fifty years 
ago, world population was about 3.5 billion. It’s now about 7.7 billion2 
The growth’s been mainly in Asia; it’s now fastest in Africa. The number 
of births per year is now going down in most countries.3 Nonetheless, 
world population is forecast to rise to around 9 billion by 2050.4 That’s 
partly because most people in the developing world are young. They 
are yet to have children, and they will live longer. The age histogram in 
NAVIGATING THE NEXT CENTURY’S CHALLENGES
31
the developing world will become more like it is in Europe. Moreover, 
despite welcome falls in infant mortality, the demographic transition 
towards a low fertility rate hasn’t yet occurred in much of Africa.
The implications of population growth seem under-discussed. That’s 
partly, perhaps, because of associations with eugenics in the 1920s 
and 1930s, and subsequently with Indira Gandhi’s policies, and with 
China’s drastic but effective one child policy. But also because doom-
laden forecasts in the late 1960s  –  by, for instance, the Club of Rome 
–  proved off the mark. As it’s turned out, food production has kept pace 
with rising population; famines still occur, but they’re due to conflict or 
maldistribution, not overall scarcity.
To feed 9 billion by mid century shouldn’t be an insurmountable 
challenge. It will require further improvements in agriculture  –  low 
till, water conserving, and GM crops  –  and maybe dietary innovations, 
such as replacing energy-intensive beef with nutritious artificial meat.
To quote Mahatma Gandhi  –  ‘enough for everyone’s need but not for 
everyone’s greed’.
Demographics beyond 2050 are uncertain  –  it’s not even clear whether 
there’ll be a global rise or fall.5 Declining infant mortality, urbanisation 
and women’s education trigger the transition towards lower birthrates 
–  but there could be countervailing cultural influences. If, for whatever 
reason, families in Africa remain large, then that continent’s population 
could double again by 2100, to 4 billion. Nigeria alone would by then 
have as big a population as Europe and North America combined.
Optimists say that each extra mouth brings two hands and a brain. But 
the geopolitical stresses are surely worrying. Those in poor countries now 
know, particularly via the internet, what they’re missing  –  and they’re 
not fatalistic about the injustice. Moreover, the advent of robots, and the 
‘re-shoring’ of manufacturing, mean that still-poor countries won’t be able 
to grow their economies by offering cheap skilled labour, as the Asian 
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Tiger states did. It’s a portent for disaffection and instability  –  multiple 
mega-versions of the tragic boat-people crossing the Mediterranean today.
Africa’s predicament is aggravated by the loss of talent. Around half of 
its health workers want to leave6 and their departure can be ill afforded; it’s 
doubly tragic if, after moving to a developed country, they find they’re not 
accredited, and doctors become cab drivers. It’s just as bad in agricultural 
science, engineering, and all the other specialities that African countries 
require if they are to develop their potential. The poorest countries need to 
engage their diaspora communities, encouraging those with expertise to 
at least make regular visits back home. But wealthier nations should take 
some responsibility too. A cost-effective form of aid would be to establish, 
in Africa and elsewhere, centres of excellence with strong international 
links where ambitious scientists could work in less dispiriting conditions. 
They could then fulfil their potential without emigrating, and strengthen 
tertiary education in their home country.
There are encouraging initiatives. My distinguished former colleague 
Neil Turok spearheaded the African Institute of Mathematical Sciences in 
Cape Town  –  a pioneering institution that offers postgraduate courses 
to students from all over Africa (at far lower cost, incidentally, than could 
be achieved in Europe or the US). This is a model that has now been 
replicated in Senegal, Ghana and elsewhere. It would seem equitable, 
too, that for each skilled person ‘drained’ to the developed world, the 
receiving country should feed back sufficient resources to train two more.
Wealthy nations, especially those in Europe, should adopt policies 
like these. It’s urgent to promote prosperity in Africa, and not just for 
altruistic reasons. Amidst the coming population boom, a thriving Africa 
is key to international cooperation and geopolitical stability.
Mass extinctions?
The risks of global population growth don’t stop here: if humanity’s 
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collective impact is too hard, the resultant ecological shock could cause 
mass extinctions.
Already, there’s more biomass in chickens and turkeys than in all the 
world’s wild birds. And the biomass in humans, cows and domestic 
animals is twenty times that in wild mammals. Overall, the biomass of 
wild land mammals is down 85 per cent in the last fifty thousand years 
due to the activity of humans, and plant biomass is down 50 per cent7 
Meanwhile, the rate of wild biomass depletion continues to accelerate.
Biodiversity is a crucial component of human wellbeing. We’re clearly 
harmed if fish stocks dwindle to extinction. There are plants in the 
rainforest that might be useful to us. And insects are crucial for the food 
chain and fertilisation. But for many environmentalists, preserving the 
richness of our biosphere has value in its own right, over and above what 
it means to us humans. To quote E.O. Wilson: ‘mass extinction is the sin 
that future generations will least forgive us for’.
Moreover, these pressures are aggravated by climate change  –  an issue 
that’s not under-discussed, though still under-addressed.
Energy and climate
Despite the uncertainties  –  both in the science and in population and 
economic projections  –  there’s a consensus that ‘business as usual’ scenarios, 
with continuing dependence on fossil fuels, could, by the end of the century, 
induce really catastrophic warming, and tipping points triggering long-term 
trends like the melting of Greenland’s ice cap.8 The updated IPPC report 
issued late in 2018 added urgency.9 The pledges made at the 2015 Paris 
COP conference, with a commitment to renew and revise them every five 
years, are a positive step; the Glasgow follow-up conference in 2021 will 
be crucial, though the auguries are rather depressing.
Many still hope, nonetheless, that our civilisation can segue smoothly 
towards a low-carbon future. But the requisite policies are a hard sell for 
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politicians: they won’t garner much enthusiasm for a bare bones approach 
that entails unwelcome lifestyle changes  –  especially if the benefits are 
far away and decades into the future. Indeed, it is easier to gain support 
for adaptation to climate change rather than mitigation because the 
benefits of the former accrue locally.10 For instance, the government of 
Cuba, whose coastal areas are especially vulnerable to hurricanes and a 
rise in sea level, has formulated a carefully worked-out adaptation plan 
stretching for a century.11
Nonetheless, there is one measure to mitigate climate change that 
seems politically realistic  –  indeed, almost win-win. Nations should 
expand Research and Development (R&D) into all forms of low-carbon 
energy generation (renewables, fourth-generation nuclear, fusion, and 
the rest), and into other technologies where parallel progress is crucial 
–  especially storage and smart grids. In all these areas, China could 
lead the world  –  deriving environmental benefit for itself, as well as 
economic benefit by dominating the international market for zero-carbon 
energy generators. And the UK, which contributes only about 1 per cent 
of global emissions, could do more for the world if it had a successful 
‘blitz’ on relevant high tech  –  which should be prioritised as highly as 
medical or defence research.
The impediment to decarbonising the global economy is that, although 
renewable energy is getting cheaper, its intermittence means it has to be 
supplemented by some kind of storage, and that is still expensive. But 
the faster these ‘clean’ technologies advance, the sooner their prices will 
fall and become affordable to developing countries such as India, where 
more generating capacity will be needed, where the health of the poor 
is jeopardised by smoky stoves burning wood or dung, and where there 
would otherwise be pressure to build coal-fired power stations (burning 
cheap coal from Australia) .
If the Sun (or wind) is to become the primary source of our energy, 
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there must be some way to store energy, so there’s still a supply at night 
and on cloudy days, or when the wind doesn’t blow. There’s already a 
big investment in improving batteries and scaling them up. Other energy 
storage possibilities include thermal storage, capacitors, compressed air, 
flywheels, molten salt, pumped hydro, and hydrogen.12 The transition to 
electric cars has given an impetus to battery technology (the requirements 
for car batteries are more demanding than for those in households or 
large ‘battery farms’, especially in terms of weight).
We’ll need high-voltage direct current grids to transmit efficiently over 
large distances. In the long run these grids should be transcontinental. 
They should transmit solar energy from North Africa and Spain to the 
less sunny northern Europe. More importantly, they should transmit 
energy east-west across the whole of Eurasia, to smooth peak demand 
over different time zones. This could surely be a globally-beneficial 
element of the Belt and Road initiative.
It would be hard to think of a more inspiring challenge for young 
engineers than devising clean energy systems for the world. Despite the 
ambivalence about widespread nuclear energy, it’s worthwhile to boost 
R&D into a variety of ‘4th generation’ concepts, which could prove to be 
more flexible in size, and safer than existing nuclear power plants. The 
industry, world-wide, has been relatively dormant for the last twenty years, 
and current designs date back to the 1960s or earlier. In particular, it is 
worth studying the economics of standardised small modular reactors 
which could be built in substantial numbers and are small enough to 
be assembled in a factory before being transported to a final location.
Attempts to harness nuclear fusion  –  the process that powers the 
Sun  –  have been pursued ever since the 1950s, but we’re still very early 
in that story. Despite its cost, the potential payoff from fusion is so great 
that it is worth continuing to develop experiments and prototypes. The 
largest such effort is the International Thermonuclear Experimental 
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Reactor (ITER) in France. But there are now ten other smaller prototypes 
being built elsewhere in the world.
Why do governments respond with torpor to climate change, despite 
acknowledging it as the most prominent and pervasive environmental 
threat? Concerns about future generations (and about people in poorer 
parts of the world) tend to slip down the agenda. Indeed, the difficulty of 
impelling CO2 reductions (by, for instance, a carbon tax) is that the impact 
of any action not only lies decades ahead but is also globally diffused.
The imperative for early action is stronger if we don’t discriminate on 
grounds of date of birth, and value the life-chances of today’s children, who 
can aspire to still be alive in 2100. Policymakers typically discount future 
benefits at a rate of 1-7 per cent per year. If we care about today’s children, 
and the generations beyond them, we can’t continue to discount future 
benefits (and  –  more importantly  –  future risks) at this rate. If there’s no 
willingness to pay an insurance premium to safeguard against worst-case 
climatic scenarios, then the welfare of future generations is jeopardised.
Computers and AI
We owe the dramatic advances in computers to the fast-advancing ability 
to manufacture electronic components on the nanoscale, thereby allowing 
almost biological-level complexity to be packed into the processors that 
power smartphones, robots, and computer networks.
Thanks to these transformative advances, the internet and its ancillaries 
have created the most rapid penetration of new technology in history 
–  and also the most fully global. Their spread in Africa and China 
proceeded faster than nearly all ‘expert’ predictions. Our lives have 
been enriched by consumer electronics and web-based services that are 
affordable to billions.
Machine learning, enabled by the ever-increasing number-crunching 
power of computers, is a potentially stupendous breakthrough. It allows 
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machines to gain expertise  –  not just in game-playing, but in recognising 
faces, translating between languages, managing networks, and so forth 
– without being programmed in detail. But the implications for human 
society are ambivalent. There is no longer a programmer who knows 
exactly how the machine reaches a decision. If there is a bug in the software 
of an AI system, it is currently not always possible to track it down; this 
is likely to create public concern if the system’s decisions have potentially 
grave consequences for individuals.13 If we are sentenced to a term in 
prison, recommended for surgery, or even given a poor credit rating, we 
would expect the reasons to be accessible to us  –  and contestable by 
us. If such decisions were entirely delegated to an algorithm, we would 
be entitled to feel uneasy, even if presented with compelling evidence 
that, on average, the machines make better decisions than the humans 
whose positions they have usurped.
Integration of these AI systems has an impact on everyday life  –  and will 
become more intrusive and pervasive. Records of all our movements, our 
interactions with others, our health, and our financial transactions, will be 
in the cloud, managed by a multinational quasi-monopoly. The data may 
be used for benign reasons (for instance, for medical research, or to warn 
us of incipient health risks), but its availability to internet companies is 
already shifting the balance of power from governments to the commercial 
world. Employers can now monitor individual workers far more intrusively 
than the most autocratic or control freak traditional bosses. There will be 
other privacy concerns. Are you happy if a random stranger sitting near 
you in a restaurant or on public transportation can, via facial recognition, 
identify you, and invade your privacy? Or if fake videos of you become so 
convincing that visual evidence can no longer be trusted?
The pattern of our lives  –  the way we access information and ent-
ertainment, and our social networks  –  has already changed to a degree 
that we would hardly have envisioned twenty years ago. Moreover, AI is 
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just at the ‘baby stage’ compared to what its proponents expect in coming 
decades. There will plainly be drastic shifts in the nature of work.
Clearly, machines will take over many jobs in manufacturing and retail 
distribution. They can replace many white-collar jobs: routine legal 
work (such as conveyancing), accountancy, computer coding, medical 
diagnostics, and even surgery. Many ‘professionals’ will find their hard-
earned skills in less demand. In contrast, some skilled service-sector 
jobs  –  plumbing and gardening, for instance  –  require non-routine 
interactions with the external world and so will be among the hardest 
jobs to automate.
The digital revolution generates enormous wealth for an elite group of 
innovators and for global companies, but preserving a healthy society will 
require redistribution of that wealth. There is talk of using it to provide 
a universal income. The snags to implementing this are well known, 
and the societal disadvantages  –  such as diminished labour incentives 
–  are intimidating. It would be far better to subsidise the types of jobs 
for which there is currently a large unmet demand and for which pay 
and status is unjustly low. It would surely be a win-win transition if 
those who worked in call centres or Amazon warehouses could find 
alternative employment in roles where human qualities like empathy 
were properly valued.
It’s instructive to observe (sometimes with bemusement) the spending 
choices made by those who are not financially constrained. Rich people 
value personal service; they employ personal trainers, nannies, and butlers. 
When they’re elderly, they employ human caregivers. The criterion for 
a progressive government should be to provide for everyone the kind 
of support preferred by the best off – the ones who now have the freest 
choice. To create a humane society, governments will need to vastly 
enhance the number and status of those who carry out care-giving roles; 
there are currently far too few, and even in wealthy countries caregivers 
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are poorly paid and insecure in their positions.
The lifestyle enabled by AI seems benign  –  indeed enticing  –  and 
could in principle promote Scandinavian-level satisfaction throughout 
Europe and North America. Moreover, citizens of these privileged nations 
are becoming far less isolated from the disadvantaged parts of the world. 
Because information technology (IT) and social media are now globally 
pervasive, rural farmers in Africa can access market information that 
prevents them from being ripped off by traders, and they can transfer 
funds electronically.
Recall, however, that these same technologies mean that those in regions 
of the world without developed industrialised economies are aware of 
what they are missing, decreasing geopolitical stability, and that they 
prevent still-poor African nations from undercutting Western labour costs 
to build capital. Developments in artificial intelligence and information 
technology will have numerous benefits for the already relatively well 
off, and indeed some for the global poor, but they nonetheless threaten 
to exacerbate global inequality.
The long-term imperative
How far ahead can we plan? There is a seeming paradox here.
For medieval Europeans, the entire cosmology – from creation to 
apocalypse –  spanned only a few thousand years. And most of our Earth 
was terra incognita. But despite their constricted horizons in both space 
and time, they left a visionary legacy: masons built cathedrals, adding 
bricks to vast edifices that would take a century to finish, and which still 
inspire us almost a millennium later.
We’ve now mapped the Earth  –  and domains far beyond it. And we 
know that we’re in a cosmos whose past and future are measured in 
billions of years. But despite our enhanced understanding of the natural 
world, and control over it, our planning horizon is shorter than it was 
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for our forebears: it rarely stretches beyond a decade or two.
At first sight it seems paradoxical that our hugely extended conceptual 
horizons  –  in both space and time  –  have been accompanied by 
shortened planning horizons. But there’s a clear explanation. Despite 
living in turbulent and uncertain times, medieval people expected their 
children and grandchildren to live similar lives to their own. In contrast, 
we fully expect drastic changes in the backdrop to human lives, from 
one generation to the next. The unpredictability of the future is used 
as an excuse for downplaying long-term planning  –  even in contexts 
like population growth and global heating, where we can predict with 
at least some confidence beyond 2050.14
To meet the needs of the present  –  especially those of the poor  – 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs: these are the goals set by the 1987 Brundtland Report to the 
UN.15 Environmental degradation, unchecked climate change, population 
growth, and unintended consequences of advanced technology could 
trigger societal catastrophe. But there’s a collective failure to plan for the 
long term, and to plan globally.
We all surely want to sign up to reach this goal in the hope that by 
2050 there will be a narrower gap between the lifestyle that privileged 
societies enjoy and that which is available to the rest of the world. This 
can’t happen if developing countries mimic the path to industrialisation 
that Europe and North America followed. These countries need to leapfrog 
directly to a more efficient mode of life. The goal is not anti-technology. 
More technology will be needed, but channelled appropriately, so that 
it underpins the needed innovation. The more developed nations must 
get there too.
There are signs of hope. Polls show, unsurprisingly, that younger people, 
who expect to survive most of the century, are more engaged and anxious 
about long-term and global issues. Calls to effective philanthropy remind 
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us that urgent and meaningful improvements to people’s lives can be 
achieved by well-targeted redeployment of existing resources towards 
developing or destitute nations. Wealthy foundations have real traction 
(the archetype being the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, which has 
had a massive impact, especially on children’s health)  –  and even they 
cannot match the impact that national governments could have if there 
was adequate pressure from their citizens.
And we shouldn’t downplay the role of the world’s religions  –  often 
transnational communities that think long-term and care about the global 
community, especially the world’s poor.
This is the first era in which humanity can affect our planet’s entire 
habitat: the climate, the biosphere, and the supply of natural resources. 
Changes are happening on a time-scale of decades. This is far more 
rapid than the natural changes that occurred throughout the geological 
past; on the other hand, it is slow enough to give us, collectively or on a 
national basis, time to plan a response  –  to mitigate or adapt to a changing 
climate and modify lifestyles. Such adjustments are possible in principle 
–  though there is a depressing gap between what is technically desirable 
and what actually occurs.
To respond effectively to the next century’s challenges, and set humanity 
in good stead for the centuries that follow, governments need to prioritise 
projects that are longer-term than those born from the typical political 
perspective. That will require a widespread cultural change, but this, in 
turn, can and must be prompted by the efforts of a few. On that note, I 
give the final word to the great anthropologist Margaret Mead: ‘Never 
doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed, citizens can change 
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In all probability, future generations will outnumber us by thousands or millions to one. 
In the aggregate, their interests therefore matter enormously, and anything we can do to 
steer the future of civilisation onto a better trajectory is of tremendous moral importance. 
This is the guiding thought that defines the philosophy of longtermism. Political science 
tells us that the practices of most governments are at stark odds with longtermism. But 
the problems of political short-termism are neither necessary nor inevitable. In principle, 
the state could serve as a powerful tool for positively shaping the long-term future. In this 
chapter, we make some suggestions about how to align government incentives with the 
interests of future generations. 
There is likely to be a vast number of people who will live in the centuries and millennia to come. Even if Homo sapiens survives 
merely as long as a typical species, we have hundreds of thousands 
of years ahead of us. And our potential is much greater still: it will be 
hundreds of millions of years until the Earth is sterilized by the expansion 
of the Sun, and many trillions of years before the last stars die out. In 
all probability, future generations will outnumber us by thousands or 
millions to one; of all the people who we might affect with our actions, 
the overwhelming majority are yet to come.
 These people have the same moral value as us in the present. So 
in the aggregate, their interests matter enormously. Anything we can do 
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to steer the future of civilisation onto a better trajectory, making the world 
a better place for those generations who are still to come, is therefore 
of tremendous moral importance. This is the thought that defines the 
philosophy of longtermism.2
Political science tells us that the practices of most governments are 
at stark odds with longtermism. This may seem obvious. After all, gov-
ernments are run by and for presently existing people; future generations 
have essentially no political representation, and even in the face of the 
catastrophic risk to future generations posed by climate change, governments 
the world over have failed to effectively respond. But the problems of 
political short-termism are even more substantial than they appear. Elected 
officials usually operate on 2-5 year time horizons, failing to look ahead 
even into the problems of the next decade. Estimates of the financial 
impacts of legislation typically extend to just a few years to a decade,3 and 
politicians are rarely able to allocate time to agendas which do not bear fruit 
until after the next election. In addition to the ordinary causes of human 
short-termism, which are substantial, politics brings unique challenges of 
coordination, polarization, short-term institutional incentives, and more.
Despite this relatively grim picture offered by political science, the 
problems of political short-termism are neither necessary nor inevitable. 
In principle, the state could serve as a powerful tool for positively shaping 
the long-term future. Governments collectively spend over US$25 trillion 
per year,4 and they are our best means of solving large-scale coordination 
problems. Moreover, research in legal theory and the social sciences shows 
us that countries’ laws and policies have a profound effect on moral norms 
and attitudes.5 The problem of aligning government incentives with the 
interests of future generations should therefore be a moral priority.
In this chapter, we make some suggestions about how we should best 
undertake this project. In Section 1, we explain the root causes of political 
short-termism. Then, in Section 2, we propose and defend four institutional 
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reforms that we think would be promising ways to increase the time horizons 
of governments: 1) government research institutions and archivists; 2) 
posterity impact assessments; 3) futures assemblies; and 4) legislative 
houses for future generations. Section 3 concludes with five additional 
reforms that are promising but require further research: to fully resolve 
the problem of political short-termism we must develop a comprehensive 
research programme on effective longtermist political institutions.
1. The Sources of Short-termism
The sources of political short-termism can usefully be divided into three 
major categories.6  Epistemic determinants of short-termism are features of 
political actors’ state of knowledge that prevent (even properly-motivated) 
actors from adopting appropriately longtermist policy. Motivational 
determinants of short-termism are features of political actors’ goals and 
motivations that lead (even well-informed) actors to wrongfully discount 
the future. Institutional determinants of short-termism are features of 
political actors’ institutional context that strip the political means from 
(even well-informed, properly-motivated) actors who could otherwise 
adopt more appropriately long-termist policy, or which make political 
actors less well-informed or less well-motivated. A lesson of this section 
will be that the causes of short-termism are myriad, and are ideally 
combated through a variety of reforms targeting different determinants.
The most widely cited epistemic determinants of short-termism involve 
rational discounting of future impacts because of a lack of information 
about the future.7 When political actors are more uncertain about the 
possible benefits of an action due to uncertainty about causal mechanisms,8 
the future state of the world, the preferences of future people, or the 
security of political commitments,9 then the expected value of those 
actions decreases relative to actions whose benefits materialise in the 
short term, which tend to be more certain.10 Over longer timelines, 
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these problems proliferate, leading to greater discounting. While this 
discounting is rational, it could be reduced by increasing the availability 
of high-quality information about the future.
By contrast, irrational discounting primarily stems from cognitive 
biases and attentional asymmetries between the future and the nearby 
past. Cognitive biases include actors’ tendencies to respond more strongly 
to vivid risks than to information acquired from abstract, general social 
scientific trends,11 as well as excessive optimism about their ability to 
control and eliminate risks under situations of uncertainty.12 The attention 
that political actors pay to the future and to the nearby past are asymmetric 
in that many simply forego the task of making predictions about the future 
and instead choose policies which have worked in the recent past. (As 
a topical example: when confronted with COVID-19 decision-makers 
may have assumed that the risks were similar to those posed by SARS 
and MERS, and based policy on that assumption, rather than making 
forecasts based on the properties of the novel coronavirus itself, such 
as its basic reproductive number and case fatality rate.) This is because 
predicting the future takes cognitive effort, but the past performance 
of policy is readily observable.13 Voters have this bias too. It is easier for 
voters to base their decision on recent, observable track records than by 
gauging a candidate’s preparedness for novel potentialities. Incumbent 
politicians know this, and therefore prioritise visible, short-term benefits 
which they can point to come their re-election campaign.
The literature on motivational determinants of short-termism has been 
dominated by discussion of political actors’ apparent positive rate of pure 
time preference (our tendency to value near-term benefits more highly 
than distant benefits). While there is little consensus on the strength, 
shape, and malleability of political actors’ time preferences, there is broad 
consensus that political actors have a positive rate of pure time preference 
and that this is a significant source of short-termism.14 Political actors’ 
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motivations are also made more short-termist by both self-interest and 
relational partiality. If political actors act to benefit themselves or their 
friends, family, or community, they will tend to privilege the interests of 
their contemporaries over future citizens, who are neither their friends, 
family, community, or themselves. Finally, numerous cognitive biases 
make political actors less motivated to care about the future, including 
problems of procrastination15 and invisibility: our tendency to ignore 
problems that are not directly in front of us.16
Among institutional determinants of short-termism, election incentives 
are the most widely discussed.17 Politicians strongly desire to be reelected – 
and parties desire to increase their immediate reputation – motivating 
them to prioritise policy which results in very near-term, visible benefits 
for which they can publicly take credit, while hiding or deferring costs. 
Politicians are also dependent on various firms and other bodies, whether 
for direct financial support or because they hold some other kind of 
influence. Where these bodies have short time-frames, and therefore short 
auditing durations, they exert pressure on political actors to use short 
auditing durations too.18 And short auditing durations are institutionalised 
in numerous areas of policy. Performance indicators with short-term 
goals and positive discount rates, inadequate credit-tracking over longer 
time-frames,19 and budget windows with short time-frames all incentivise 
political leaders to shift benefits to the short-term and costs into the future.
Beyond auditing incentives, there are also various pressures on careful 
deliberation. The 24-hour media cycle forces political actors to react 
to political issues almost instantly. Political polarisation significantly 
detracts from careful, collective deliberation due to the pressures to be 
uncooperative. Omnibus bills have further adverse effects on deliberation 
in that they are passed or rejected long before they can be carefully 
discussed in full. All of these pressures are particularly acute on issues 
with long time-scales, because there the situation is most epistemically 
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precarious, meaning there is more that can be contested as well as an 
even greater need for deliberate reflection.
The problem of time inconsistency also looms large among institutional 
determinants of short-termism.20 A lack of strong commitment devices to 
ensure that governments will act on past promises leads to low levels of 
trust in long-term policy proposals.21 When voters and influential elites 
cannot trust governments to act on their past commitments, they will 
oppose future-benefiting policy promises which might be reneged, as 
well as investment in future-benefiting policy which might be diverted 
to other ends. Finally, even when everything else goes well, institutions 
may simply be too weak to reliably bring about long-run outcomes or 
they may be plagued by collective action problems that undermine 
successful coordination.
2. Proposals
Responding to a variety of sources of short-termism across numerous 
areas and levels of government requires a variety of solutions. To illustrate 
the kinds of solutions we think would be viable responses to short-
termism, and to advocate for these solutions in particular, we focus on 
four reforms: In-government research institutes and archivists, futures 
assemblies, posterity impact assessments, and legislative houses for the 
future. The first three are relatively moderate reforms that we think can be 
implemented right away, and which have strong evidential support. The 
last reform is much more tentative, but symbolises the kind of radical and 
highly under-researched reform we think longtermist political reformers 
should aspire to over the coming decades and centuries.
In-government Research Institutions and Archivists22
Many sources of short-termism can be ameliorated through the pro-
duction of digestible, widely-available, legitimate, and high-quality 
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information about future trends and the future effects of policy. We 
therefore propose that existing national governments invest in the creation 
of many new in-government research institutions with the express purpose 
of information-gathering and information-sharing about issues of long-
term importance. They should be tasked with producing periodic, public 
reports that (1) chronicle long-term trends, (2) summarise extant research 
to improve its accessibility by the legislature, (3) analyse the expected 
impacts of policy, and (4) identify matters of long-term importance that 
fall outside of the political business cycle.
Various in-government futures research institutions have existed 
throughout the world, with varying degrees of success, including in the 
US and Singapore. Singapore’s Centre for Strategic Futures has been 
influential in the civil service, and has improved the nation’s receptivity 
to low probability, high impact events, such as global catastrophic risks.23 
The Office of Technology Assessment existed in the US from 1972-95, 
during which time it produced 750 studies on a broad range of issues 
from health science to space technology. A 1990 study by the Carnegie 
Commission on Science, Technology, and Government found that OTA 
reports were ‘useful’ to ‘very useful’ to 91 percent of congressional staff, and 
one analysis found that the OTA’s 1980s studies on synthetic fuels ‘helped 
secure approximately US$60 billion in savings.’ 24 The OTA’s elimination 
by the US Congress likely had a direct and harmful effect on the ability of 
congress to think constructively about future problems, and a number of 
policy writers and members of congress have advocated for reinstating it.25
Well-designed in-government futures research institutions can sig-
nificantly reduce four major sources of short-termism. They can increase 
the appeal and robustness of long-term policy initiatives by decreasing 
collective ignorance about the future state of the world and about policy 
causation. They can reduce irrational discounting due to vividness effects 
and optimism bias by increasing the salience of possible future trajectories. 
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They can increase motivation to act for the long term among political 
leaders by bolstering liability mechanisms such as public disapproval and 
elections through the distribution of information to the general public. 
Finally, well-designed in-government research institutions are partially 
insulated from the institutional features that create a short-term ‘political 
business cycle’, allowing them to resist pressures to allocate agenda time 
only to short-term considerations.
The best in-government research institutions will generally be struct-
urally and functionally independent of existing government offices, 
with the power to set their own research agenda, in order to insulate 
them from the political business cycle. It may also improve institutional 
independence to identify recruitment mechanisms which do not rely 
on the judgment of politicians, such as by tasking relevant professional 
associations with selecting researchers. The institutions must be given a 
very broad mandate – to report on all matters of long-term importance – 
both to ensure comprehensiveness and to give them the flexibility to 
adapt to changing circumstances over long periods of time. They should 
continuously engage with relevant academics and professionals from 
a range of backgrounds through incoming visits, paid consultancies, 
interviews, and events. Successful institutions might further be empowered 
to require reading and response from the legislature, ensuring that their 
advice is not ignored. Finally, in-government research institutions must 
work to improve the absorptive capacity of government, identifying and 
improving ways of summarising and packaging expertise so that it is 
readily usable for governmental decision-making.26
Futures Assemblies
To reduce the damaging influence of polarisation, short-term institutional 
incentives, and motivational failures, we propose the creation of a novel 
representative, deliberative, and future-oriented body: the futures as- 
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sembly. Futures assemblies are permanent citizens’ assemblies with 
an explicit mandate to represent the interests of future generations. As 
citizens’ assemblies, they are deliberative bodies of citizens who are 
randomly selected from the populace to provide non-binding advice to 
the national government on issues of long-term importance.
While no government has ever instituted a futures assembly similar to 
what we propose, citizens’ assemblies have been employed for consultation 
and information-gathering purposes throughout the world. One of the 
most high-profile such initiatives was Ireland’s 100-member Citizens’ 
Assembly, which was established in 2016 and tasked with considering 
questions related to abortion, fixed term parliaments, referenda, population 
ageing, climate change, and gender equality. The deliberations of the Irish 
assemblies provoked a referendum to remove Ireland’s constitutional ban 
on abortion and substantially shaped Ireland’s Climate Action Plan.27 
The UK government’s Select Committees have used citizens’ assemblies 
on several occasions, most recently hosting a 110-member citizens’ 
assembly designed to explore public views on strategies for reaching net 
zero emissions by 2050.28
Such real-world experiments, along with armchair evidence and 
a growing literature of ‘laboratory’ experiments suggest the promise 
of futures assemblies. Like in-government research institutes, futures 
assemblies would combat short-termism by providing permanent allocated 
agenda time to the consideration of the long-term future, providing 
a deliberative policy environment that is insulated from short-term 
institutional pressures. Because futures assemblies are explicitly tasked 
with the sole mandate of producing recommendations on behalf of 
future generations, we should expect that they will be much more long-
term-focused than ordinary citizens.29 While research institutes excel at 
producing high-quality information, citizens’ assemblies excel in three 
other areas. First, because membership in a citizens’ assembly does not 
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depend on election or successful fundraising, citizens’ assemblies can 
almost completely eliminate short-term incentives from elections, party 
interests, and campaign financing. Second, citizens’ assemblies have a 
demonstrated aptitude for reducing partisan polarisation and creating areas 
of consensus on matters of great uncertainty and controversy to enable 
timely government action.30 Third, citizens’ assemblies are statistically 
representative of the populace, positioning them uniquely to serve as 
a legitimate voice for the people. As a consequence, recommendations 
from futures assemblies will have an authority close to that of a consensus 
statement from the general population. Governments can ignore their 
recommendations only at a costly risk to their reputation.
The most promising futures assemblies would be relatively large (50-
250 members) to ensure demographic representativeness and resistance 
to corruption from interests groups. To further aid against corruption and 
ensure representativeness and minimal resignations, assembly members 
should be paid a high salary, for example commensurate with the typical 
salary for members of the national legislative body. Assembly members 
should be empowered to call upon relevant experts, and to convene expert 
summits on matters of long-term importance. Full-time terms should be 
long enough for assembly members to build expertise but short enough 
to guard against disruptiveness and interest group capture, which we 
suggest is about two years. Ideally, assemblies would be empowered to 
set their own policy agenda, to further prevent capture by government 
interests, and their deliberations would achieve a very high level of 
publicity, to better enshrine their recommendations as legitimate and 
informally binding on the legislature.
Posterity Impact Statements
Posterity impact statements are another strong mechanism for creating 
political liability and gathering high-quality information about the long-
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run effects of policy. These reports are functionally an extension of the 
environmental impact statements required by many governments for 
policy proposals with a potentially adverse impact on the environment. 
Our proposal is to require posterity impact statements on all proposed 
legislation with significant effects that occur beyond the ordinary two 
to four year policy window.
Environmental impact assessments (EIAs) are required throughout 
North America, Europe, and Australia. They are required of militaries,31 
developers,32 state and local agencies,33 and national governments.34 
Typically, EIAs are required when certain triggering conditions are met, 
such as when an action is likely to impact water, heritage sites, and other 
environmentally-zoned areas. As part of the EIA, the party assessed must 
identify and commit to a plan for reducing the adverse environmental 
impact of their actions. If the party fails to conduct an accurate EIA or 
to make good on their mitigation plan, they can be held legally liable 
for environmental damages.
While posterity impact assessments (PIAs) are a much newer idea, 
they are not entirely without precedent. The UK’s 2020 Wellbeing of 
Future Generations Bill, started in the House of Lords by Lord John 
Bird, requires all public bodies to ‘(a) publish an assessment (“future 
generations impact assessment“) of the likely impact of the proposal on 
its well-being objectives, or (b) publish a statement setting out its reasons 
for concluding that it does not need to carry out a future generations 
impact assessment’ upon proposing any change in public expenditure 
or policy.35 The impact statements must assess the impact of policy on 
‘all future generations… at least 25 years from the date’ of publication, 
and include a statement of how any adverse impacts will be mitigated.
PIA requirements combat uncertainty about policy causation by re- 
quiring legislators to thoroughly research and publicise the long-term 
effects of their proposed policy for the opposing political party to scru- 
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tinise. They also hold legislators liable for the long-term effects of their 
decisions. Depending on the scheme, the associated liability mechanism 
can be “soft” in that it relies only on informal punitive and reward mech-
anisms, such as the embarrassment associated with putting forward 
a bill with harmful long-term effects, or it can be “hard” in that it is 
backed by formal sanctions, such as the requirement that legislators pay 
an insurance premium to cover expected damages. Both hard and soft 
liability mechanisms impose costs on legislators putting forward bills 
with adverse long-term effects, and so incentivise policymakers to be 
proactive about mitigating long-term harms. Ideally, they would also 
reward legislators putting forward bills with beneficial long-term effects, 
since these benefits may otherwise be unknown to legislative proponents 
or covered up by detractors. One simple such mechanism would allow 
expected benefits to offset a bill’s expected future costs.
Posterity impact statement requirements should have triggering con-
ditions and enforcement mechanisms which ensure that they are required 
in any conditions where posterity is affected, positively or negatively. 
The bill in front of the House of Lords ensures that PIAs are triggered on 
appropriate occasions by making them universally required, but there 
are various other triggering conditions that may suffice: PIAs could be 
required on submajority vote of the legislature, or upon order of a court. 
Ideally, PIA policy should require a zero rate of pure time preference and an 
open-ended assessment period. Significant impacts on future generations 
should not be treated as null merely because they are centuries away; we 
should ignore these effects only when there is no reason to think they 
are more likely on the proposed policy than its alternative.
Legislative Houses for Future Generations
The three reforms just proposed have been relatively moderate, soft-
power political reforms with payoffs that are potentially quite large. The 
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reason for this is straightforward: moderate, soft-power reforms can 
feasibly be implemented immediately and have a lower likelihood of 
being repealed when the government changes hands. The recent examples 
of Hungary’s (2008-2012) and Israel’s (2001-2006) Commissioners for 
Future Generations suggest that more powerful institutions that hold veto 
or other similarly decisive powers are currently too partisan to survive 
an election cycle.36 To pave the way for the powerful future-oriented 
institutions that longtermism recommends, we may first need to engage 
in more modest reform efforts to signal the importance of the long term 
and lay the groundwork for more vigorous possibilities.
Over the coming decades and centuries, however, longtermists should 
consider much stronger institutional reforms that can transform govern-
ments into the kinds of institutions that can positively shape the future 
on very long timescales. While it is currently difficult to imagine exactly 
what sorts of institutions could do this, we propose one possibility: an 
upper house in the legislative branch of government devoted exclusively 
to the wellbeing of future generations.
In the system we envision, bicameral national legislatures would be 
constituted by a lower house focused on attending to the interests of 
the people who exist today and an upper house focused on attending to 
the interests of all future generations. Legislation may be proposed in 
either house, but must be passed by both houses to become law. Thus, 
each house would provide a check on the other, ensuring that neither 
future-oriented nor present-focused legislation can be dominant. A strong 
constitution providing basic rights and freedoms to both presently-existing 
and future people would provide another strong backstop against the 
tyranny of either house.
Two major questions are relevant to the design of a successful legislative 
house for future generations: who serves?, and how do we ensure they 
have the right incentives? While we cannot provide conclusive answers 
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to these questions, we have some preliminary ideas about what design 
might work well. Random selection of legislators from among voting-
eligible citizens may provide the best mechanism for deciding who 
serves, given its aforementioned elimination of short-term incentives 
from elections, party interests, and campaign financing, as well as its 
ameliorative effects on industry corruption and partisan polarisation. A 
subset of the legislators might be selected at random from among eligible 
experts, stratified by area of expertise, in order to ensure technocratic 
competence across a range of issues.
To ensure that the House has the right incentives, we suggest three 
further mechanisms. First, the House should have objective and concrete 
long-term performance metrics which are set in close deliberation between 
the House and an informed and non-partisan body, such as an independent 
research institution for future generations. These metrics should be 
updated regularly to correct for prediction errors and new developments. 
Second, the sole constitutional mandate of the House should be to set and 
pursue the achievement of long-term performance metrics. This would 
have some effect on the way House legislators conceive of their work 
and on the kinds of public justifications they can offer for their actions: 
any justification given to the media or in proposed legislation must cite 
concrete performance metrics. Third, the House should employ backwards 
pensioning: the pensions of House legislators should be determined some 
specified number of decades in the future, based on the House’s long-
term impacts. One obvious way of evaluating the House’s impacts is by 
the extent to which objective performance metrics have been satisfied 
in the decades after their rule. An alternative evaluation mechanism 
would adjust pensions based on the retrospective attitudes of the future 
generations house in power at that future time. In this case, the reward 
scheme could have an intergenerational chaining effect. In deciding the 
pensions of past legislators, each house would be incentivized to consider 
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how their pension choice will be evaluated by those who will in turn 
reward them, decades into the future, thus providing incentives for every 
house to consider the long-term impacts of their decisions. Regardless 
of how pensions are decided retrospectively, the mechanism suggests an 
age limit on selected legislators to make it probable that they each live 
long enough to collect and enjoy their adjusted pensions.
This proposed reform is speculative, and to work effectively it would 
require both robust future-oriented research institutions and a long-
term-orientated culture stronger than we find in any modern nation. 
Nonetheless, we hope that it symbolizes the kinds of powerful and 
imaginative political reforms that we should aspire to in the years ahead, 
and serves as fodder for much-needed additional research on longtermist 
institutional reform.
4. Future Directions
We have proposed several longtermist institutional reforms that can be 
implemented in the near-term future – in-government research institutions 
and archivists, futures assemblies, and posterity impact statements – and 
we have gestured at the more radical (but we think entirely warranted) 
reform of even having a separate, future-oriented division of government.
While the reforms proposed are significant, and will help to put society 
on a better long-term trajectory, we see this discussion as being merely 
a first step on a long path toward truly longtermist political institutions. 
The movement for longtermist political reform will require substantial 
advocacy. It will also require much more research. Other promising 
possibilities which require further research include longer election cycles 
to reduce perverse election incentives,37 novel commitment mechanisms 
to enable longer-term decision-making, extra votes for parents to use 
on behalf of their children (or “Demeny voting”),38 taxation for long-
run negative and positive externalities, and broader long-term pay-for-
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performance incentive schemes such as tying public pensions to national 
performance. Because the literature on political short-termism is young 
and still relatively conservative, there are likely to be many more promising 
possibilities that we have not yet uncovered.
The indeterminacy of the future and the complexity of policy systems 
can cause a sense of vertigo when considering the possibility of longtermist 
institutional reform. But the sorts of societal change that the more en- 
lightened of our forebears envisaged – the suffrage of women and people of 
colour, or the protection of the natural environment – must have seemed 
no less giddying. Even if future generations can never truly participate 
in our political system, through progressive changes to our political 
institutions we may one day give them the consideration they deserve.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Lessons from the British Welfare State  
for Future Generations Legislation
by 
Lord John Bird mbe
Co-Founder, The Big Issue
To best ensure the wellbeing of future generations we must look to the successes and fail-
ures of past future generational thinking. The greatest expression of this is the creation 
of the British welfare state. The welfare state was created to address the iniquities of 
unemployment, poor housing, poor education and poor nutrition for future generations. 
It was a poverty alleviation programme of the deepest kind. Unfortunately, because the 
welfare state was so limited in its ability to create the change that was sincerely desired, 
over 70 years later we are now living with the costs of its failures. This chapter outlines 
the failures of the British welfare state and argues that we could do much better in the 
future if we follow the Welsh example of institutionalizing future-oriented thinking in 
governments across the globe. It concludes with some reflections on the future we could 
achieve if we ensure that laws are fully and forensically assayed on their long-term future 
impacts, along with an introduction to the Well-Being of Future Generations Bill before 
Parliament which may be able to help get us there.
If we want to ensure the wellbeing of future generations it is essential to look at former future generational thinking. A great example of this is 
the creation of the British welfare state. One reason we need to improve 
future generational thinking in government is because we have not got 
the future right in the past. We extrapolated poorly understood trends 
of the time into the future rather than thinking clearly about what would 
actually be needed.
I was born two years before The Future began. I was a part of a future 
generation. The future then, launched in 1948, was called The Welfare 
State. It still exists in parts, the NHS probably the most famous part of it, 
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still clinging on with its ‘Health for all’ mantra. The educational dimension 
clings on also. But neither the NHS nor state education has brought the 
health or the education for all that was promised over seventy years ago.
Being a baby of the future in 1948 when the welfare state was put 
together with a rather ad hoc, well intentioned mixture of middle class 
prejudice, sentimental attachment to the poor, and shoddy intellectual 
tools, was to face a future that was always going to be lumpy.
The welfare state was created to address the iniquities of unemploy-
ment, poor housing, poor education and poor diet. It was a poverty 
alleviation programme of the deepest kind; something that had never 
been attempted in the UK before. Because that social creation was so 
limited in its ability to create what it sincerely desired, over seventy years 
later we are now living with the costs of its failures.
We have a social security system that does not provide security; a 
health service so full of people who have passed through poverty that 
it is almost full – a vast sponge absorbing those whose condition is the 
result of generations of poverty thinking and poverty living.
One of the first things the architects of the welfare state failed to address 
was the enormous class division that existed in British society at the 
time. Britain was an incredibly poor country for most of its occupants. 
You lived hand to mouth, in poor housing, with poor hygiene and poor 
food. Over half the living accommodation of the working classes was 
substandard. A large part of the working population was illiterate, lacking 
the education and skills of the middle and upper classes.1
It was a world that was demanding reform. The vast majority of people 
worked in manual jobs that did not lead to an improved lifestyle through 
promotion and skill enhancement. Workplace accident and injury was 
rife. Diseases related to the extraction and manufacturing industries – 
coal, steel, construction – were normal. You went to a form of work that 
made you ill.
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The welfare state was set up specifically to aim for a new future 
without the above list of human failures. But it did not address the 
deeply entrenched nature of poverty and the deep psychological problems 
living in poverty throws up. Possibly one of the most criminal missed 
opportunities in creating the welfare state was in education. The reform 
of education led earlier to extending the age at which a student could 
leave school from 14 to 15. The creation of secondary modern education 
for the majority was the result. But the creaming off of about 11 per cent 
of high-achieving working class students into grammar schools laid the 
basis of social divisions that we are still suffering from.2
The future was largely planned to have an unskilled or semi-skilled 
working class that carried out manual labour until they were too worn 
out to continue. Today, with about 70 per cent of government and 
parliamentary time, as well as that of local authorities, given over to 
dealing with the collateral damage thrown up by poverty, you can spot 
a result of poor future planning.
If you were to question the vast number of people in prison, the 
working poor, those on long-term unemployment through health or a 
lack of jobs, those that fill up our A&E departments, you would find out 
that they did poorly at school. Probe further and you will find that their 
parents, and their parents’ parents, likewise did not excel at education.3
Our existing poor are largely the grandchildren left behind by the future 
generations planning of the welfare state. They are those who were not 
skilled-up at school or through training and higher or further education; 
those who were only offered manual, health-eroding jobs; those who 
were not given the chance of self-improvement, the self-improvement 
that was offered to those who passed their eleven-plus exam and moved 
into grammar school.
The law of unintended consequences abounds. It has resulted in a 
largely under-educated, under-skilled workforce moving towards a world 
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where manual labour and semi-skilled jobs are being whittled away, and 
where jobs demand more skill rather than less.
You can’t entirely blame the welfare state for its failings. What an 
enormous task it would have been to completely upskill the majority 
of working class kids. And bear in mind that the culture of education 
would also have had to be instilled into home life for it to take root. You 
would have had to break the previous generation’s own prejudices against 
education that existed in many working class homes.
There would have had to be an enormous reeducation among parents as 
much as among children, teachers and school heads. The kind of energy 
and resources needed would have had to be massive. Hence the desire 
to have a transition from manual labouring into new kinds of jobs was 
never really fulfilled. Britain really did win the war and lose the peace, 
in the fullest sense.
The UK on its back
The UK after the war was on its back. It owed the US treasury billions of 
dollars. The debt accumulated through fighting the Second World War 
was not finally paid off until 2005. With poor housing, poor health, 
poor education and poor jobs, how would it be possible to get out of this 
trap? The country’s roads, rail and distribution networks were antiquated 
and ill-fitting the requirement of modern industry. Its basic nationalised 
industries had suffered through under-investment by their former owners 
and were full of Victorian working practices and machinery.
How could it get out of this trap when the government did not invest in 
new industries but kept the old industries of extraction and manufacturing 
going on in the same way? None of the basic industries would have 
survived without government subsidies that were introduced in the First 
World War and persisted until the mid 1980’s when Margaret Thatcher 
brought them to an end.
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The US taxpayer, frightened of Soviet expansion into Europe and the 
far East, invested in recovery. France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and others 
were given money through The Marshall Plan to get their economies back 
working. Germany, Italy, and Japan spent the money they received on 
creating new industries and new jobs. Germany in particular upskilled 
its workers and concentrated on improving education. The UK was 
also given Marshall Plan support, but they spent it on maintaining their 
empire and creating the welfare state.
As part of a former future generation I am determined that our work 
on behalf of future generations does not make these same mistakes.
The COVID-19 pandemic has thrown up many problems that reflect 
on the inheritance left by the welfare state experiment in the postwar 
years. The fragility of the NHS is one. Because the NHS has had to pick 
up the social as well as the health bill of poverty and an aging population, 
it has always operated at near full capacity.
Many of the problems that it must deal with today are the problems 
of a class system that was never removed by the welfare state. This class 
system is a division between the well fed and the nutritionally deficient. 
It is between the well remunerated and the underpaid, working poor. 
Between the adequately housed and the poorly housed. Between the 
highly educated and the under educated. It is between a world full of 
wellbeing and a world where wellbeing is a luxury.
By looking closely into the entrails of former legislation for future 
generations we might well learn to do better. Can we do better?
In 2015 Wales passed their Well-being of Future Generations Act. The 
act places a duty on all public bodies in Wales to create and carry out 
long-term wellbeing objectives, and establishes a Future Generations 
Commissioner to ensure compliance with the mandate.
I look at this act with interest. Could it stop the persistent and predictable 
failure of the poor due to a lack of education and social opportunity? 
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Could it address the uglinesses thrown up by the social divides between 
the comfortable at the struggling discomforted?
Could the Welsh example help with the rejuvenation of cultural and 
political thinking that embraces social justice, and not mere wishful 
thinking and hope?
If we had a Future Generation commission in the UK in 1948 would 
it have been able to see the dangers of creating a low wage economy, 
based on manual jobs that were likely to disappear in a generation? Of 
an under-skilling of working class people, starting at their schools and 
ending in their typically dead-end jobs that were all that was on offer 
once they were old enough to join the workforce?
Would it have been able to suggest an alternative course to creating a 
low wage, low investment economy, that ends up with a service economy 
that will now see hundreds of thousands out of work, post pandemic?
The Welsh example and the history of the welfare state show us that a 
completely new mindset needs to be embedded in the political process.
They show that short-term thinking cannot be allowed to hold such 
political sway; that decisions in the present must anticipate the social echo 
they cast forward. I am convinced that if we can introduce acts to the rest 
of the world based on the kind of thinking behind the Welsh example, 
we can finally make securing the wellbeing of future generations a reality.
One of the things that first drew me to the Welsh Future Generations 
act was its fit with the kind of work The Big Issue had been groping 
towards. We had become increasingly aware that however many people 
we helped out of homelessness there were always more to take their 
place. Homelessness was often created almost at birth; a kind of perverse 
birthright. When you look at the ingredients that make up most peoples’ 
homelessness there are normally failures in early life – around family, 
education, employment and a lack of wellbeing.4
We became more obsessed with trying to break the constant flow of 
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people, failed by the welfare state, who were now coming to us. Prevention 
became an increasing interest. What would you need to do to prevent 
people becoming homeless? What would you have to improve in society 
to achieve that end?
It all came back to government. It all came back to legislation. We noted 
that when The Big Issue started in the early 1990s there was a very large 
amount of very young people sleeping rough in London. Thousands 
who had left their homes and fallen homeless, reduced to begging and 
sometimes stealing or selling themselves as sex workers. We wanted to 
know how they had come to sleep in doorways.
The answer was changes in social security provision made in the late 
1980s. In order to get young people moving from the home they shared 
with parents who were on social security, the state stopped their benefits. 
Up until then sixteen to eighteen year-olds were given their own benefit, 
even if they lived at home with their unemployed or sick parents.
In one fell swoop they stopped the benefits, and stopped children 
making a contribution to the family purse. Hence many left or were 
thrown out. And thousands of them slipped into homelessness. This was 
the corollary of trying to get young people ‘moving’, not understanding 
that it would lead to a vast increase of young people becoming homeless.
What became apparent to me was the need to actually get into parliament 
and try to influence legislation. Too many times I was being described 
as someone who knew how to ‘think outside the box’.
Of course, you need people thinking outside the box if the box doesn’t 
work. But the box is where laws and acts are created. It was there that 
change could be made to curb the unintended consequences destroying 
part of a generation of young people and get things moving in the right 
direction. So I applied to join the House of Lords as a prevention-leaning 
crossbencher, allied to no party. I was determined to stop injurious 
legislation that often harmed those who most needed our help.
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Becoming aware of the future generations work of the Welsh government 
was a great source of joy. Here Wales was leading the way, showing that 
government was capable of real long-term vision.
The future we could have
What do I want for future generations? What do I want life to be like 
for all? Certainly, I want to end the kind of housing that I was born into. 
Slums, the kind I lived in, have gone, only then for poorly made housing 
to become the new slums. Thousands upon thousands of slums were 
pulled down in the 1950’s only to be replaced by social housing that was 
substandard and poorly thought through. Those also have been pulled 
down. High-rise hells were put up that destroyed community life. We 
have to ensure we do not go down the road of putting up cheap housing 
for short-term use.
For future generations, I want to see the end of the 35 per cent of 
children leaving school having failed in their education. There to fill up 
the working poor jobs of today.
I want us to make sure that children are not left outside of social 
provision, so that when they get to school they are bound to fail.
Future generations cannot thrive unless we address the most pressing 
environmental issues along with the social. Among other things, good, 
freely available education will ensure that nature is understood and 
treated better by all. We have to bring nature and the environment into 
the lives of the many. At the moment it does not appeal to many because 
poverty closes down relationships with matters of little direct relevance 
to one’s immediate survival.
If we embrace environmental issues and make them central to our lives 
this becomes a device for social and educational enhancement. Nature 
is a vital means of lifting people out of the throwaway, cheap consumer 
tastes of today.
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But most crucial is to bring a mindset change, a mindset change that 
the Welsh future generations legislation has found hard to instigate. 
Changing minds about education and social justice, and about the need 
to think long-term, are the biggest obstacles. Politicians and legislators 
have to understand that no law should be accepted that poses risks to 
the wellbeing of posterity. That is an uphill struggle.
It is a struggle that we cannot avoid. It was the same kind of struggle 
that was necessary for my parents’ generation, who could not necessarily 
see the advantages of education, and who believed that the lives of their 
children would simply be a reproduction of their own lives.
We have to work hard to ensure that laws are fully and forensically 
assayed on their future impacts, and at the same time concentrate on 
changing the minds of those who must deliver; in government or in 
local authority. 
I certainly do not have a blueprint for the future that is more than a 
sketchy affair. But I do believe that if the importance of long-term thinking 
can be enshrined in law, then we can finally begin a full appraisal of long-
term effects to bring about a different future for the coming generations.
As the case of Britain’s welfare state shows us, the path to long-term 
thinking is not easy. There are many pitfalls. We must accept the fact that 
the road to hell is paved with good intentions. That the founding mothers 
and fathers of our welfare state started from the best of intentions; to stop 
tomorrow being a poor repeat of yesterday and today.
That is why I have proposed the Well-Being of Future Generations 
Bill, a bill inspired by the Welsh example and for which we must rally to 
become an act. Among other things, the Well-Being of Future Generations 
Bill follows the Welsh Act in placing duties on public bodies to set and 
work towards long-term wellbeing goals, and in establishing a Future 
Generations Commissioner for the UK to oversee UK policy and duties. 
It requires ministers to publish risk assessments and trend reports, 
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and establishes a Joint Parliamentary Committee for the Future to hold 
government ministers accountable for short-termist decision-making.
For if today is not passed through the prism of tomorrow then a debris 
of social dislocation for future generations to wade around in will be 
our only legacy. Concerns for Future Generations are seen by some as a 
luxury. As if we can’t afford to factor the future into today.
Imagine what it would have been like if we had the sagacity back in 
1948 to not burden the future with so many failed lives. Where poverty 
ruins the taste of living for too many. Where the just-about-managing 
and the working poor live their lives in the shadow of democracy and 
never in its full light.
The Welsh Future Generations Act is one of the most important pieces 
of legislation enacted in modern times. Its commitment to the new-born 
and the unborn, to future generations, makes it a standard for governments 
around the world.
Such a commitment cannot be dodged. With our current world turning 
into a very large tub of toxic waste, our seas and our air poisoned with 
pollutants, it is clear what damage poor concepts of the future can do.
Of course, we need to redouble our efforts to clean up the place that 
we live in. But we also need to rally for the future to ensure our legislators 
don’t destroy tomorrow for the short-term gains of today.
I entered parliament to get rid of poverty. Poverty is the waste product 
of poor politics and poor laws. It is the waste product of a society that 
has not imagined the damage that can be done by doing the wrong 
thing to tomorrow. I am sure you are as sick as me of wading around in 
the debris of past poor thinking. That is why we have to embrace future 
generations today.
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CHAPTER SIX
The Challenge of Effective Long-term Thinking in the  
UK Government and the Critical Role of Philanthropy
How good is central government at long-term thinking? This is a question that has long occupied the minds of senior civil servants, if 
not their ministers. Successive efforts have been made over a long period 
to strengthen the government’s capacity and capability to undertake 
long-term work, with some notable individual successes. Taken in the 
round though, it still represents an area of significant systemic weakness 
by 
Lord Robert Kerslake




This chapter looks at the challenges to effective long-term thinking in government and the 
efforts that have been made to overcome them. It explores how a single philanthropist, 
George Peabody, was able to pioneer a brand of practical long-term thinking that has 
made a lasting impact in tackling poor housing and poverty in London. While success in 
tackling long-term challenges such as inequality and climate change depends on having 
good government, Peabody’s example shows that philanthropy has a vital part to play. To 
the extent that the charitable sector outperforms government in its long-term vision, it 
can fill in the gaps left by government action. Charity can also lead by example, taking 
large philanthropic risks to provide proof in principle for its aims. And it can show gov-
ernment how to evade the grip of the “political business cycle,” by creating independent 
bodies insulated from the troubles of the present day, by employing long-term commitment 
mechanisms to ensure that long-term plans are not abandoned in times of great urgency, 
and by placing small bets on promising policy proposals to see whether they bear out, and 
then scaling these proposals when the they prove to be successful.
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as the recent challenges of responding to the coronavirus pandemic have 
demonstrated. Even where good long-term analysis has been made, it 
has rarely been translated into action.
If the public sector struggles with the challenge of long-term thinking, 
the incentives for the private sector to do this are, if anything, even less. 
Much has been written about the distorting effect of the undue focus 
on annual profits and shareholder returns, so there is no need for me to 
repeat this here.1
Given these challenges to long-term thinking in both the public and 
private sector, it often falls to the charitable and community sectors to 
take the lead on this.
In this chapter I want to look at the challenges to effective long-term 
thinking and the efforts that have been made to overcome them. I will 
also explore how a single philanthropist, George Peabody, was able to 
pioneer a brand of practical long-term thinking that has made a lasting 
impact in tackling poor housing and poverty in London.
While success in tackling long-term challenges such as inequality and 
climate change depends on having good government, philanthropy (and the 
charitable sector more broadly) has a vital part to play. We should properly 
recognise its value as a resource when we are planning for the future.
1. The Problem of Long-term Planning in Government
I should start my critique of the government’s long-term planning by 
saying first how much there is to admire in our civil service. At its best 
it combines great intellect, skill and agility in serving the government 
of the day.
The UK has an impartial but not independent civil service. Contrary 
to most perceptions, the vast bulk of civil servants are not involved in 
giving advice to ministers but in the delivery of public services such 
as providing employment support and benefits, running prisons and 
73
THE CHALLENGE OF EFFECTIVE LONG-TERM THINKING IN THE  
UK GOVERNMENT AND THE CRITICAL ROLE OF PHILANTHROPY
collecting taxes. Total numbers of civil servants fell quite sharply during 
the period of austerity under David Cameron’s coalition government and 
only began to rise again under Theresa May as the country geared up to 
leave the European Union.2
The combined effect of a constrained capacity and a rightful focus on 
the needs of ministers lies at the heart of why the civil service struggles 
to sustain the necessary focus on long-term thinking.
I have never met a minister who isn’t a minister in a hurry. They 
recognise that their government is on a short electoral timescale – five 
years at most – and that they themselves are likely to be on an even 
shorter timescale in their current ministerial role. There is, in short, an 
enormous pressure to deliver on the demands of the day and deliver on 
their manifesto commitments. This gives their work the urgency and 
focus needed to overcome immediate obstacles, but it also makes them 
much less invested in long-term considerations. Long-term targets may 
be set with the best intentions, for example on reducing child poverty, 
but the focus is almost always on responding to the here and now. The 
civil service recognises this and deploys its resources accordingly. Any 
resources for future thinking have to be scraped from what is left over 
after the immediate demands of government are met.
There is an added challenge here in the centralised nature of government 
in the UK. According to the OECD, we are one of the most centralised 
countries in the developed world, with powers and funding much less 
devolved.3 Ironically, according to work by the UK2070 Commission 
which I chair, we are also one of the most regionally unequal.4 This 
centralising of power results in an overburdened centre, with far more 
of the decisions that might be taken locally elsewhere ending up on the 
desks of ministers and civil servants. This in turn adds a further squeeze 
on the capacity for long-term strategic thinking.
It is important to recognise the initiatives that have been taken in 
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government to develop long-term thinking, most notably, the Government 
Office for Science’s Futures team, Horizon Scanning Programme team 
and Foresight project teams.
Foresight project teams work across government departments and 
with experts and academics to identify where new or emerging science 
can inform policy. The projects need to have a strong science or research 
element. Last year was the twenty-fifth anniversary of the publication 
of Foresight’s first panel reports. In that time Foresight projects have 
informed government strategies on a wide range of issues including 
ageing, the seas, obesity, flooding and wellbeing. A number of these have 
been particularly influential.
Taken in the round, though, the impact on government has been at best 
uneven. At times, particularly when Sir David King was the chief scientific 
advisor, hugely influential. At other times, much less so. A good example 
of this was the work on flooding, published in 2004, but investment in 
flood prevention was only increased belatedly after many further instances 
of severe flooding.5 The importance of thinking about the future is in 
theory recognised by the government as fundamental to policymaking. 
In reality it is much less clear. The effect of the Foresight work has been at 
best sporadic rather than embedded in government processes.
While there are challenges in the way that the government approaches 
the long term, the charitable sector has often performed much better. As 
I aim to show, the relative successes of the charitable sector have much 
to teach government actors.
2. Lessons from the Charitable Sector: The Story of George Peabody
A striking example of what it is possible to achieve is found in the life 
and work of the London-based American merchant banker George 
Peabody (1795-1869). He has justly been termed ‘the father of modern 
philanthropy’. His benefactions were aimed at good causes that lay outside 
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the scope of both American and British public authorities at the time. Their 
total value exceeded £1.7m – a vast sum in the mid nineteenth century.
Peabody can be seen as the first major American philanthropist. In 
his birth country he founded initiatives that were centred on education, 
museums, libraries and scientific research, while in his adopted city 
of London he decided to tackle the desperate shortage of healthy and 
affordable working-class housing.
The third child in a family of eight, George Peabody was raised in 
modest circumstances in a small town in Massachusetts. He left school 
at the age of eleven to begin an apprenticeship in a general store; despite 
his later wealth and success he always regretted his meagre schooling. 
In 1831 he wrote: ‘Willingly would I now give twenty times the expense 
attending a good education could I possess it, but it is now too late for me 
to learn and I can only do to those that come under my care as I could have 
wished circumstances had permitted others to have done by me,’ 5 When he 
founded the first Peabody Institute in his home town in 1852 he provided 
it with a motto – ‘Education: a debt due from present to future generations.’ 
He achieved much in his long career, but the brevity of his school days 
clearly influenced his approach once he was able to give away large sums 
of money to benefit others.
From an early age he vowed to become a philanthropist if he prospered, 
and through diligence and enterprise he rapidly established himself as a 
successful businessman. His initial letter to his London trustees in 1862 
included words outlining his objective: ‘… from a comparatively early 
period of my commercial life I had resolved in my own mind that, should my 
labours be blessed with success, I would devote a portion of the property thus 
acquired to promote the intellectual, moral, and physical welfare and comfort 
of my fellow-men, wherever, from circumstances or location, their claims upon 
me would be the strongest.’6
He went into partnership with Elisha Riggs who was fifteen years his 
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senior but had been impressed by the younger man’s abilities. Operating 
first from Georgetown and later from Baltimore they bought and sold 
goods from merchants who imported much of their stock from England 
and continental Europe. George Peabody saw opportunities to negotiate 
the sale of American cotton in Lancashire and to buy wool, linen and 
other dry goods from Britain and ship them to America. Between 1827 
and 1837 he made five trips to Europe, steadily increasing the volume of 
business conducted by his firm. Before crossing the Atlantic for the first 
time he made a will; out of a total of $85,000, about one twentieth was 
to go to good causes. He made a second will in 1832 and this time the 
proportion of his growing wealth intended for philanthropic purposes 
had increased to a quarter.
In 1838 he opened an office in the City of London and from that date 
he made London his permanent home, eventually giving up the dry-
goods business and becoming a full-time investment banker. America was 
undergoing vigorous westward expansion and funding was needed for 
the construction of new railroads and canals. Peabody invested heavily in 
several such ventures and also assisted individual States when they were 
raising capital through the issue of bonds. His office in Moorgate became 
a meeting place for visiting American businessmen and he did much to 
strengthen Anglo-American relations. When the Great Exhibition took 
place in Hyde Park in 1851, he lent money to facilitate the USA’s display 
of inventions and manufactured goods. He supported a project to lay a 
cable under the Atlantic to link Britain and America.
3. The London Housing Crisis and the Peabody Trust
By the middle of the nineteenth century London was expanding rapidly, but 
living accommodation was wholly inadequate for a rising population and 
the situation was made worse by the clearance of large areas to enable the 
building of railway termini. The public authorities took no responsibility 
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for the provision of housing; unscrupulous private landlords charged 
extortionate rents for grossly overcrowded and unhealthy dwellings. 
Local government was ill-equipped to deal with the impact of the capital’s 
growth – it was in the hands of several hundred ‘vestries’, each covering 
only a small area. Their principal responsibilities were streets, sewers, 
firefighting and open spaces. In 1855 the first London-wide authority, 
the Metropolitan Board of Works (MBW), was set up, but its powers and 
funding were limited and it was appointed rather than elected, so the 
board lacked accountability and was generally unpopular.
In the years that followed, Peabody decided that he needed to take 
responsibility for London’s housing crisis. The founding of the Peabody 
Trust was announced in the British press in March 1862, with its mission 
to ‘ameliorate the condition of the poor and needy of this great metropolis,’ and 
it received widespread acclaim. Its first estate opened in Spitalfields in 
1864 and within six years others were completed at Islington, Shadwell, 
Westminster and Chelsea. They were all designed by Henry Astley Darbishire 
(1825–1899) who served as the trust’s sole architect for the next quarter-
century. Although the flats were not self-contained – tenants had to share 
water closets and sinks with neighbours – they were a vast improvement 
on the common lodging houses or slum tenements which had previously 
been the only option for many workers and their families. Rents were 
affordable, communal laundries were provided and the blocks of flats were 
grouped around courtyards to provide safe playing areas for children. At 
each estate a resident superintendent collected the rent, handled applications 
for new tenancies, inspected the shared sanitary facilities for cleanliness 
and generally kept good order.
The early efforts of George Peabody’s trustees met his approval, and in 
1866 he gave them another £100,000. When writing to them about this 
additional donation he stressed his wish for the trust to have long-term 
benefits for London and Londoners. He said:
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‘... it will form a fund the operation of which is intended to be progressive 
in its usefulness as applied to the relief of the poor of London ... without 
exclusion in consequence of religious belief or political bias. It will therefore 
act more powerfully in future generations than in the present; it is intended 
to endure forever. A century in the history of London is but a brief period 
comparatively with the life of man, and should your successors continue 
the management of the charity as you have begun it, it is my ardent 
hope and trust that within that period the annual receipts from rents for 
buildings of this improved class may present such a return that there may 
not be a poor working man of good character in London who could not 
obtain comfortable and healthful lodgings for himself and his family at a 
cost within his means.’ 7
Peabody was not the first person to show concern about the capital’s 
housing shortage. Since the early 1840s a number of philanthropists had 
attempted to improve living conditions for Londoners on low incomes, 
Angela Burdett-Coutts and Lord Shaftesbury being among the pioneers. 
However, the housing of the working poor was such a vast problem that 
what was achieved before 1862 had been on too small a scale to have a 
noticeable effect. George Peabody’s gift was different.
The sum he gave was large enough to provide a significant number of 
dwellings from the outset, and it was an outright gift rather than a loan 
which would ultimately have to be repaid, or yield an income for the 
benefit of either the original donor or a group of shareholders. Other 
organisations usually aimed for a five per cent return on the original 
capital – hence the widely-used expression ‘five per cent philanthropy.’ 
Peabody’s trustees resolved at an early stage to fulfil the founder’s wishes 
by making the fund self-perpetuating, so that its benefits could be spread 
over several generations. George Peabody approved their proposal that 
the trust’s capital should produce a three per cent return – an impact 
investment that enabled the trust’s long-term growth, but which was 
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sufficiently far below commercial rates to ensure affordable housing prices.
It was George Peabody’s standard practice with all his benefactions to 
devote a good deal of time and preparatory thought to what he wished 
to achieve and how this could best be done. He selected his trustees with 
great care and began most new ventures with a fairly modest, exploratory 
donation. Once he felt confident that the trustees were moving in the 
right direction he would often increase the original sum to enable them 
to expand their work. Although he aimed to interfere as little as possible, 
he kept a close eye on progress. The itineraries for his occasional trips 
to America would include stops at places which had benefited from his 
generosity. In London he paid a personal visit to the second completed 
Peabody estate and expressed his satisfaction at the accommodation 
provided for residents.
George Peabody’s views were quite advanced for his time; he regularly 
stressed his wish to exclude both political and religious influence from the 
management of organisations that bore his name. The directions he gave 
to his London trustees stated that these principles should govern both 
the appointment of the board members and the selection of applicants 
for accommodation. When he founded the Peabody Education Fund in 
the USA – aimed at healing many of the divisions caused by the American 
Civil War – the money was intended to benefit schools in the southern 
states and improve the training of teachers. He stipulated that the fund 
was to benefit all races; this was at a date when the abolition of slavery 
throughout the USA had only just become law and was still fiercely 
opposed by many white Americans.
4. Peabody’s Long-term Legacy
Peabody died in November of 1869, but this did not stop his trust’s 
progress. By the mid 1870s there was a growing recognition of the need 
for legislation to permit slum clearance schemes in some of London’s 
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worst areas. The resulting Acts of Parliament gave the Metropolitan Board 
of Works the first powers of compulsory purchase. The sites it acquired 
with these new powers were offered to organisations or individuals 
willing to build ‘model dwellings’ to rehouse the slum tenants. Thanks 
to its financial strength, the Peabody Trust was able to buy more of the 
available sites than any other entity working with the MBW. The result 
was the construction of eight new estates and the provision of additional 
blocks at two existing ones. By the time Henry Darbishire retired he 
had designed nineteen Peabody estates, providing over 5,000 flats and 
housing more than 20,300 people.
In his will, George Peabody left yet more money to the Peabody Trust, 
making a total of half a million pounds given to provide affordable housing 
for Londoners. The present-day equivalent is roughly £55m.
The example set by Peabody was followed by many other philanthrop-
ists. Notable instances in the USA included the millionaires Cornelius 
Vanderbilt, John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie. In England the 
early success of the estates built with Peabody’s money inspired Edward 
Guinness, William Sutton and Samuel Lewis to set up similar housing 
trusts using their personal wealth.
George Peabody had an even closer influence over a friend and con-
temporary who – like George himself – never married or had children but 
made a large fortune from a successful business career. This man was Johns 
Hopkins (1795–1873) who, acting on advice from Peabody, left more than 
$7m in his will to found institutions in Baltimore which are today world-
renowned, including a library, a university and a hospital. A friend of both 
men later recalled a conversation in 1856 in which Peabody told Hopkins:
‘When aches and pains made me realise that I was not immortal, I felt, 
after taking care of my relatives, great anxiety to place the millions I had 
accumulated, so as to accomplish the greatest good for humanity. I ... formed 
the conclusion that there were men who were just as anxious to work with 
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integrity for the ... suffering and the struggling poor as I had been to gather 
fortune ... I gathered a number of my friends ... and proposed that they should 
act as my trustees. I then for the first time felt there was a higher pleasure 
and a greater happiness than accumulating money, and that was derived 
from giving it for good and humane purposes.’
Over 150 years after its foundation, the Peabody Trust, now simply 
known as Peabody, continues its mission to help people make the most 
of their lives. It is responsible for 66,000 homes across London and 
the south-east of England where 133,000 residents live. Its housing 
stock includes many new developments and today there is an emphasis 
on building high-quality homes which integrate seamlessly with their 
neighbourhoods. The redevelopment of St John’s Hill estate in Battersea 
and the long-term regeneration of Thamesmead in south-east London 
are just two examples. Properties have also been added to the portfolio 
through mergers with other housing providers. Sales of new dwellings 
at market price help to finance affordable housing; over 40 per cent of 
the homes built by Peabody in 2019–2020 were for social rent.
The charity’s activities have expanded far beyond the provision of 
housing and now cover a range of social purposes. Over 18,000 vulnerable 
people are helped through its care and support services and during 
2019–2020 it invested £9m in community activities across the Peabody 
Group. It also assisted over 1,100 people to find jobs and apprenticeships.
While Peabody has needed to grow and adapt to an ever-changing 
social and economic landscape, it remains true to its founder’s aspirations 
to ‘ameliorate the condition of the poor and needy ... and to promote their 
comfort and happiness.’ His foresight in setting up the Peabody Trust, his 
direction to his trustees that it should be self-perpetuating, and above all 
his generosity in giving away such a large sum of money, have ensured 
that the organisation continues to thrive. In George Peabody’s own words, 
‘It is intended to endure forever’
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5. Conclusions: Long-term Planning and the Role of Philanthropy
I started this piece with a critique of government planning and the idea 
that the government might learn much from philanthropy’s relative 
success at long-term planning. So what might the government learn 
from the charitable sector generally, and from the example of George 
Peabody specifically?
In some ways, it is perhaps inevitable that the third sector outperforms 
the first and second sector in its orientation towards the long term. Where 
the charitable sector is largely constituted by relatively impartial, altruistic 
ambitions, the incentives of governments tend towards benefiting the 
governed, and the incentives of markets towards benefiting buyers and 
sellers. In this way, the charitable sector is unconstrained by incentives 
to aid those who live today rather than the many who will live on our 
earth in the future, and is more easily able to adopt a long view.
To the extent that the charitable sector necessarily outperforms gover-
nment in its long-term vision, it is able to fill in the gaps left by government 
action. Here government can support philanthropic activity and help 
it to flourish, so that it can continue to fulfil its pivotal role. Charity 
can also lead by example, taking large philanthropic risks to provide 
proof in principle for its aims, in order to create the political will for 
government to then follow its lead – just as Peabody demonstrated the 
possibility of affordable housing before governments had the capacity 
to take ownership of the crisis.
But government is not helplessly at the mercy of short-term political 
incentives, and to the extent that it can learn from charity to improve 
its responsiveness to the needs of future generations, it ought to do so. 
The public sector can seek independence from the ‘political business 
cycle,’ by setting up institutes insulated from the political will and which 
can therefore adopt a long view. It can follow Peabody in employing 
trusts with extremely long time horizons, and by adopting other long-
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term commitment mechanisms to ensure that long-term plans are not 
abandoned in times of great urgency. Finally, government should adopt 
Peabody’s venture capital model of risk-taking, placing small bets on 
unusual but promising policy proposals to see whether they bear out, 
and then following through with large sums when the proposals prove 
to be successful.
If we have the sagacity to learn from the charitable sector and its many 
luminaries, including the great George Peabody, then we may reasonably 
hope that the fruits of our own labour, too, will manage to endure forever.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
A Little Bit of Funding Goes a Long Way:  
The APPG for Future Generations
It was 6:40pm on Monday the 22 January, 2018. It was a chilly day outside but I had made it through the long queue and was now warming up 
in an ornate room in the Houses of Parliament. The faces of long-dead 
politicians lined the wood-paneled walls and stared down at a crowd of 
about forty people who were packed into a room that should have held 
no more than thirty. At the front of the room, across a sea of expectant 
faces, two students from the University of Cambridge, Tildy Stokes and 
Natalie Jones, were announcing the launch of the All-Party Parliamentary 
Group for Future Generations.1 The part of the memory that stands out 
by 
Sam Hilton
Co-coordinator, All-Party Parliamentary Group for Future Generations and  
Deputy Director at Charity Entrepreneurship, Research Affiliate, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk
This chapter, written in August 2020, tells the story of the founding of the All-Party Parlia-
mentary Group for Future Generations in the UK and details its achievements. The APPG 
Future Generations was founded by two Cambridge students, Tildy Stokes and Natalie 
Jones, in Autumn 2017. With the work of roughly one year of a full-time staff equivalent, 
the APPG supported the creation of Lord Bird’s Well-being of Future Generations Bill, 
launched an ongoing Inquiry on Longtermism in Policymaking, pushed the UK Parlia-
ment to set up a Select Committee on Risk Assessment and Risk Management and swelled 
membership to seventy-five UK parliamentarians. The APPG members list continues to 
grow, and it aims to have more than 10% of all parliamentarians in the APPG in 2021. A 
little bit of funding goes a long way: the APPG has ambitious plans to continue pushing 
for a world where decision-makers at all levels of government fairly consider the interests 
of all future generations and can effectively plan for the long term.
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most vividly was the face of Tildy’s mother Dinah. She was standing at the 
back with a look of intense pride as she watched her daughter stand up to 
speak and kickstart a project that would soon be making political waves.
Let’s rewind a bit. Back in early 2017, members of two Cambridge 
student societies, the Future of Sentience Society and the Wilberforce 
Society, had written an academic paper titled Rights and Representation 
of Future Generations in United Kingdom Policymaking. They believed 
that the future matters a lot. They were concerned both with their future 
as young students in an increasingly short-termist society, and the future 
of all generations: our children, grandchildren and beyond. They made 
the case that if we want to build a prosperous future – or even if we just 
want to prevent a disastrous future arising from catastrophes brought 
on by climate change, war or emerging technologies – then we need 
to improve politics. We need a political system that cares about future 
generations and can plan long-term. The paper itself is quite a dry read, 
but it did make a few concrete policy suggestions.2 One of those was for 
the creation of an All-Party Parliamentary Group for Future Generations.
An All-Party Parliamentary Group (or APPG) is a group of UK par-
liamentarians (MPs and Peers) that meet to discuss a particular topic. There 
are APPGs on all sorts of things, from American Football to Zoos. They have 
a formal status in parliament, but no formal powers or formal funding, 
and many of the more active ones are funded by charities or companies. 
The paper suggested that an APPG for Future Generations ‘may be a 
useful stepping stone to eventual institutionalisation of intergenerational 
justice in Parliament’.
And so Tildy and Natalie, setting their sights beyond the degrees for 
which they were studying, decided to turn the idea into reality with support 
from the University of Cambridge’s Centre for the Study of Existential Risk. 
They spent their summer break in 2017 talking to everyone they knew 
who worked in policy, seeking connections to Members of Parliament. 
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They reached out to me, then just a lowly civil servant, and I doubt I was 
much help. But they forged ahead and the APPG was officially registered 
at a meeting in October 2017. And that is how I found myself in that room 
for the launch in parliament on that dreary Monday evening.
January 2018 to March 2019: The power of funding
When I was asked to write this chapter, the idea was to provide readers 
with a case study of what can be achieved, with a bit of grit and funding, 
towards creating a more future-focused political system.
Of course, you can’t just buy political change, at least not in the UK. 
But a choice bit of funding to the right person with the right mission can 
get the wheels of politics moving. I was impressed by what had been set 
up by Tildy and Natalie, but they had exams and academic deadlines on 
the horizon, and limited capacity. And so I offered encouragement and 
help for them to seek out a small grant for someone to run the APPG. 
We raised £28,000 through the Centre for Effective Altruism and the 
Berkley Existential Risk Initiative.
I didn’t expect to be the person running the APPG, but it took a 
while for the money to be found and by the time they were hiring I 
was available to take on the role. And so there I was, in March 2019, 
wandering the corridors of power with a small grant to cover my salary 
and asking myself the questions I asked Tildy and Natalie a year ago: 
how to organise a bunch of parliamentarians interested in the long term 
to drive political change?
March to April 2019: Making plans
In March 2019 the APPG had twenty-three parliamentarians on the 
member list. The secretariat, Tildy, had good relationships with a number 
of parliamentarians including Bambos Charalambous MP (chair) and Lord 
Bird (co-chair). Events were organised every three months, and poorly 
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attended by parliamentarians (although external guests were plentiful).
The £28,000 was to be split between myself, Sam Hilton, working 
four days a week, and my colleague, Caroline Baylon, working one day 
a week. Not a lot of funds but it would do for getting started.
Our somewhat floridly-expressed mission was: ‘To provide impartial 
education, support and advice to Parliamentarians to assist them in ensuring 
that the UK Government takes into account the rights of future generations 
and is effectively addressing existential and catastrophic risks.’
And our theory of change was simple: Grow the APPG + Research 
policy + Campaign → Policy changes
We were ready to go. Parliament on the other hand had different priorities. 
Parliament was preoccupied with Brexit, Brexit and more Brexit. There 
was a minority government. Brexit views did not neatly cut across party 
lines and MPs were rebelling, switching sides or forming new parties left, 
right and center. Every vote from every MP mattered. 2019 was to see more 
government defeats in parliament than in any other year, the controversy 
of parliament being unlawfully prorogued, and a general election. It was 
in this context that we made our plans. In March and April we met with 
our officers and developed the three core pillars of our work:
Pillar 1 – Growth: Events and building the profile and members list
We knew that our APPG was essentially an unknown force in politics. We 
needed to establish its reputation in parliament, build its members list, 
run events that attracted parliamentarians, and get them talking about 
the future and how to make policy for the long term.
Pillar 2 – Research: An inquiry into longtermism in UK policymaking with 
Bambos Charalambous MP
Under the shade of carefully cultivated trees in the large, glassy entrance 
hall of Portcullis House (where MPs have their Westminster offices), we 
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met with Bambos Charalambous MP, the APPG chair.
Bambos was a new MP, having been elected for Labour in Enfield 
Southgate in 2017. He was, and still is, keen to make as much of a difference 
as possible. He is always curious and has wide-ranging interests across 
policy topics — including an interest in technology, science and the 
future to go with his love of science fiction. He was keen to understand 
how we might build a parliament that works for the long term.
To meet his interest, and our own need for direction, we would launch 
an inquiry into ‘long-term policymaking’. We would pull together a steering 
committee of MPs, run events, bring expert speakers into parliament, 
learn where long-term policymaking works well and produce a report 
setting out how to orient policy to the future.
Pillar 3 – Campaign: The Today for Tomorrow campaign for a Future Gen-
erations Act with Lord Bird
We met with APPG co-chair Lord Bird and his team in a modern meeting 
room that was an extension to the 19th century buildings of Darwin 
College, in Lord Bird’s home town of Cambridge.
In early life John Bird ended up homeless and wanted by the police 
for petty crimes. He eventually found work in publishing and went on 
to found The Big Issue magazine to help give work opportunities to the 
homeless. For these achievements he was made a Lord. He is ambitious: 
his aim is to eradicate poverty in the UK. To do this he believes the UK 
needs a less short-termist political system that can work preventatively 
and stop people from sliding into poverty.3
We discussed plans for a UK-wide Future Generations Bill to tackle 
political short-termism. Based on the existing model in Wales, this 
would mandate politicians and civil servants to factor the long term 
into their plans and put a Future Generations commissioner in place to 
oversee it. We would work closely with Lord Bird and his team to draft 
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a Future Generations Bill and push it over the parliamentary hurdles 
until it became law.
April to November 2019: The Brexit Era
Throughout 2019 we found that parliament (especially the commons) 
was distracted by the Brexit back-and-forth and lacked the time to stop 
and think about the fact that they never make time to stop and think 
about the future. We put on a few events which attracted a few attendees 
but didn’t seem to generate huge interest.
And so a lot of the early days of the APPG was spent in research, 
writing and planning with the hope that this work would be useful later 
on. We carried out interviews for our inquiry, made connections with 
other aligned interest groups and worked with Lord Bird’s office to draft 
a UK Future Generations Bill, which he then laid as a Private Member’s 
bill in the House of Lords. We reached out to members of the House of 
Lords to build support for the bill.
I wouldn’t exactly regard those few months as a huge success, but in 
November 2019 when the Brexit stalemate ended with a general election, 
we noted that both the Labour party and the Green party had added a 
‘Future Generations Bill’ to their manifesto. Neither party came to power, 
but the direction we were pushing in was clearly of interest to some 
in Westminster.
December 2019 to March 2020: Growing interest
The new year was better. Brexit was now “getting done” and there was a 
new parliament with new MPs keen to find ways to make useful change. 
We hosted a number of events to kick off the new year including an AGM 
which saw more than fifty parliamentarians fill out a packed Committee 
Room, and a fancy reception to formally launch the campaign for the 
Future Generations Bill. We prepared a series of inquiry sessions in 
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which our members would interview experts about how to make policy 
work for the long term. In the two months following the election the 
number of MPs who were members of the APPG more than doubled 
(from sixteen to thirty-five).
Of course maintaining that level of momentum and interest would have 
been challenging even without COVID-19 hitting the country in March.
March to June 2020: Coronavirus times
The pandemic came and we adapted. We moved our meetings online. 
The campaign for a Future Generations Bill was put on hold as Lord 
Bird shifted his attention to making sure The Big Issue business, and 
the UK’s homeless, survived the pandemic. We shifted our attention to 
policy related to future risks. We researched risk management policy 
in the UK. We got press attention for Lord Rees, one of our officers and 
early members, and founder of the Centre for the Study of Existential 
Risk. We successfully requested a House of Lords Select Committee on 
Risk Assessment and Risk Management.
Measuring our success
I have told you the story of who we are, what we did and what happened. 
But what does this mean and how can we measure it? In May 2020 we 
wrote up and quantified our efforts and impact:
From 05 March 2019 until 05 April 2020, running the APPG for Future 
Generations cost £38,000. Most of this went to funding one full-time 
staff equivalent.
We grew. Over those dates the number of parliamentarian members 
grew from twenty-three to seventy-five with a fair spread across the Lords 
and Commons and across political parties. Over that time we ran eleven 
events with increasing frequency and popularity.
We researched. The bulk of our research was fed into the Inquiry 
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on Longtermism in Policymaking, that has yet to be written up. But we 
also did shallow dives into emerging technology regulation, managing 
extreme risks, AI, autonomous weapons, biosecurity, COVID-19, climate 
change and nuclear weapons. We used this to support a range of actors 
with policy development, all of whom have given positive feedback on 
the usefulness of our support. Those we supported include civil servants 
working on AI policy and longtermist policy, academics at the Centre 
for the Study of Existential Risk at the University of Cambridge and the 
Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford and other policy 
actors such as the School of International Futures and Alpenglow.4
We campaigned. The Future Generations Bill campaign has had traction 
with private members bills laid in both the Lords and the Commons; over 
seventy MPs and forty peers have expressed support for the campaign and 
there has been significant press attention. We also tried, unsuccessfully, 
to further influence manifestos pre-election. And as mentioned, we 
succeeded in pushing parliament to set up a Select Committee on Risk 
Assessment and Risk Management to make the UK better prepared for all 
risks, pandemic or otherwise, national or global, in light of COVID-19. 
And we have started campaigns that are yet to reach fruition such as 
pushing for a debate on refocusing security from a ‘national security’ 
framing to a ‘human security’ framing.
There are some signs that this work is contributing to changing where 
politicians focus their attention. As well as the aforementioned manifesto 
commitments, we have seen the use of the term ‘future generations’ 
increase roughly 2.5 times in parliamentary debates since the creation 
of the APPG, including a 40 per cent increase over the funded period.
How does this make a better future?
Policy influencing is a slow process that takes time and grit, and it 
sometimes just doesn’t succeed. It needs people, and funders, who can 
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work flexibly to grasp opportunities as they appear and adapt plans to 
an ever-changing political climate, and yet combine this agility with 
consistent movement in the right direction.
Over the last year and a half the APPG for Future Generations has had 
one significant success: getting parliament to set up a Committee on Risk 
Management. This will be a year-long project where relevant experts 
from the House of Lords will research this topic, have the power to call 
government actors to give evidence, and make recommendations to the 
government. About 40 per cent of Select Committee recommendations 
are implemented, and given COVID-19 and the uncontroversial nature 
of this work, I expect the government to be relatively receptive.
Beyond that, the bulk of our work has been to build momentum. The 
waves that Tildy and Natalie started are making bigger waves. And where 
this all goes next we have to wait and see. The APPG members list has 
grown and continues to grow, and we hope that in 2021 we can have more 
than 10 per cent of all parliamentarians in the APPG. We have ambitious 
plans to keep pushing for a world where decision-makers at all levels 
of government fairly consider the interests of all future generations and 
can work and plan for the long term. And we are optimistic that, with 
our one full-time staff member and a little bit of funding, we will one 
day make this ideal a reality.
I am optimistic. Politicians across the political spectrum know that 
democracy is short-termist. And although they have many pressing issues 
to deal with, they recognise that short-termism needs addressing. Making 
a better politics that works for future generations has broad appeal, there 
is a huge potential to make change and an ever growing movement of 
actors working hard on the issue.
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Biosecurity, Longtermism, and  
Global Catastrophic Biological Risks
The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated that high-consequence biological events can threaten human populations and human lives, 
while also undermining economic and political stability. It is not the 
first global pandemic the world has faced, and it won’t be the last. We 
by 
Jaime Yassif
Senior Fellow, Nuclear Threat Initiative Global Biological Policy and Programmes
The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the devastating impacts that high-consequence 
biological events can have on human lives, economic wellbeing, and political stability. While 
national and global leaders are rightly focused on saving lives and fostering economic recovery, 
now is also the time to strengthen international capabilities to prevent and respond to future 
high-consequence biological events – which could match the impact of the current pandemic 
or cause damage that is much more severe. COVID-19 should prompt global leaders to 
take bold action to reshape international institutions and make significant investments to 
reduce future pandemics and globally catastrophic biological risks. In working toward these 
goals, we must maintain a broad perspective about the potential sources of such risks. While 
naturally emerging novel pathogens can cause significant harm, engineered or synthesised 
pathogens have the potential to pose even greater risks. To address these risks, the biosecurity 
community should work with longtermist communities to prevent catastrophic laboratory 
accidents with engineered pathogens, and to prevent the exploitation of the legitimate global 
life science and biotechnology enterprise by malicious actors. It will be equally important 
to address the root causes of potential future bioweapons development and use by states 
and other powerful actors – including by strengthening the capabilities of international 
institutions to prevent and deter these activities. Now is the moment to accelerate progress 
and build wider coalitions around the shared goals of reducing global catastrophic biological 
risks and building a safer world now and for the long term.
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can reasonably anticipate more severe events in the future – including 
those that could pose a catastrophic or potentially an existential risk to 
humanity. Global catastrophic biological risks (GCBRs)1 are biological 
events that could have devastating, population-wide consequences. 
Existential risks (X-risks) are the most extreme risks, and are defined as 
ones which can seriously undermine the long-term potential of human 
civilisation or threaten its very survival.2 With the current focus of global 
and national leaders on biological risks, now is an opportune moment to 
strengthen partnerships across the biosecurity and longtermism-focused 
communities to cement an emphasis on protecting future generations 
in prevention and response preparedness plans.
Unfortunately, the world is woefully unprepared to cope with severe glo-
bal pandemics, and COVID-19 has highlighted many of the vulnerabilities 
long warned of by biosecurity and public health communities. While 
decision-makers are rightly focused on saving lives and fostering economic 
recovery, now is also the time to strengthen our capabilities to prevent 
and respond to future high-consequence biological events, which could 
be orders of magnitude more severe. 
1. COVID-19 as a Warning Shot
We can think of the COVID-19 pandemic as a warning shot.3 4 5 The 
global spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus is causing the continued loss 
of human life around the world, along with economic disruption and 
political instability. However, this crisis also offers an opportunity for 
those working to reduce global catastrophic biological risks.6 First, the 
COVID-19 pandemic expands the Overton Window7 on high-consequence 
biological threats, by helping leaders understand that they are possible and 
even likely, and by concretely illustrating their devastating consequences. 
It is now much easier to talk about GCBRs than it was as recently as one 
year ago. There is greater understanding of how a biological event can 
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rapidly spread to every continent, with the potential to infect 40 to 70 per 
cent of the global population – while having a case fatality rate8 exceeding 
that of a bad seasonal flu, and causing significant economic and political 
damage. Second, COVID-19 demonstrates the importance of proactive, 
flexible preparedness for novel and unanticipated pathogens – not only 
the need for rapid development of vaccines and therapeutics, but also 
for capacity to rapidly scale public health and non-pharmaceutical 
interventions in response to high-consequence biological events that 
could escalate into a GCBR-scale event. This type of preparedness gives 
leaders the necessary tools to save lives and prevent disease transmission 
during very large events that can overwhelm the capacity of conventional 
health systems. The bottom line: COVID-19 has exposed vulnerabilities 
and is creating a window of opportunity to make the case for sustained 
investment and focused work to build capacity to prevent, detect, and 
rapidly respond to GCBR-scale events.
The lessons of COVID-19 should prompt global leaders to take bold 
action to establish new financial instruments and reshape international 
institutions to reduce large-scale biological risks. There are now opp-
ortunities to drive significant institutional changes which can meaningfully 
reduce GCBRs – including outcomes that would have been much more 
difficult to achieve even a year ago. For example, the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative (NTI) recommends establishing a high-level coordinator in 
the United Nations9 dedicated to bolstering preparedness for high-
consequence biological events, including those that could reach a GCBR 
scale. This senior official would be responsible for staying abreast of 
emerging biological risks and iteratively testing and strengthening UN 
and World Health Organisation (WHO) capacity to marshal an effective, 
integrated response to biological events from a range of sources. It is 
also important for leaders at the highest levels of government to identify 
weaknesses in pandemic preparedness capacity and build specific fin-
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ancing for reducing catastrophic biological risks into their budgets.
Finally, it’s important for national and global leaders to adopt new 
strategies and develop operational capabilities for early detection and 
proactive response to high-consequence biological events and GCBRs. 
This includes adopting clearly-defined sets of triggers to drive early, 
anticipatory action which can quickly contain disease outbreaks that 
could otherwise escalate exponentially. This work should also include 
development of effective strategies and capabilities for deploying in- 
terventions at scale to reduce mortality, block chains of transmission, 
and gather actionable information about population-level transmission 
dynamics to guide an effective response.10 Had these systems and tactics 
been in place for COVID-19, hundreds of thousands of lives might have 
been saved; it is important to start building these capabilities now to 
prepare for the next major global biological event. This type of anticipatory 
planning can help facilitate an important paradigm shift: it helps public 
health professionals and leaders conceptualise and develop the capacity 
for plan B when conventional health systems become overwhelmed 
and other approaches will likely be needed to save lives and prevent 
further disease transmission. This type of planning can also help bridge 
the divide between current operational capabilities, which are already 
straining to cope with COVID-19, and the tools and systems that the 
world would need to marshal an effective response to a much more 
severe GCBR-scale event.11
These changes will not come easily. Translating this crisis into impactful 
action will take steady attention, advocacy, and focus. Biosecurity-focused 
organisations and experts will need to engage in a sustained effort to ensure 
that international organisations and national leaders make the necessary 
institutional adjustments and sustained investments to empower them 
to prevent, detect and respond to GCBR-scale events. 
Biosecurity leaders must continue to emphasise that COVID-19 is not 
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the first global pandemic we’ve faced, that it won’t be the last, and that 
we can reasonably anticipate events in the future that are equally severe 
or potentially orders of magnitude worse. We must also remind public 
health, security, and national leaders that these events can originate 
from a variety of sources – not only naturally emerging novel infectious 
diseases, but also deliberate and accidental releases.
2. The Most Significant Sources of GCBRs
While naturally emerging novel pathogens can cause severe damage – as we 
are currently experiencing with SARS-CoV-2 – engineered or synthesised 
pathogens have the potential to pose an even greater risk of a biological 
event with devastating global consequences. We must maintain a broader 
perspective about the most significant potential sources of GCBRs and 
X-risks. This question can be broken down into two components: (1) 
the types of pathogens or biological agents that pose the greatest risks, 
and (2) the types of scenarios that could lead to a GCBR-scale event or 
an existential threat. 
A commonly held view among longtermist communities is that states 
pose the greatest risk of creating a GCBR. The reasoning behind this 
argument is that states have the greatest available resources and access to 
talent, and so their capabilities are effectively unconstrained. In terms of 
intent, states are generally motivated by the rational pursuit of political, 
military, and economic goals – none of which are well served by deliberately 
causing a GCBR or existential bio-risk. However, perverse incentives can 
arise from competition for influence and resources within bureaucratic 
structures which can drive development of bioweapons even if national 
political leadership does not support that goal. It is also possible that 
states could be interested in developing a biological doomsday device 
as a means of deterrence in cases where nations cannot obtain a nuclear 
weapon or conventional means of deterrence. 
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At NTI, we understand the importance of reducing the likelihood that a 
state would deliberately or accidentally cause a GCBR, and we are working 
to address the root causes of potential bioweapons development and/or use 
by states and other powerful actors. Over the past two years, our work has 
included: developing actionable recommendations to reduce the potential 
for bioweapons programme proliferation; galvanising international support 
for actions to reduce GCBRs through a series of tabletop exercises at the 
Munich Security Conference and through high-level engagement with 
United Nations leaders; and developing new mechanisms to financially 
strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which embodies 
the global norm against bioweapons development and use.
To accurately assess risk, it also is important to avoid prematurely 
discounting non-state actors as a potential source of a GCBR or X-risk. 
First, it should not be assumed that sophisticated non-state actors would 
be unable to create a biological agent that could cause an event of this 
scale. Rapid, globally distributed technology advances are continuing to 
lower the barriers to the synthesis and engineering of pathogens and other 
biological agents – thereby enabling a wider range of actors to engage 
in this type of work.12 Second, with respect to intent, it is not difficult 
to imagine a non-state actor with an apocalyptic mission that might be 
aligned with the pursuit of weapons capable of causing catastrophic 
damage to humanity. There is publicly available evidence that these types 
of groups do exist. For example, the Aum Shinrikyo cult, which is widely 
viewed as an apocalyptic group, pursued the development of chemical 
and biological weapons and made multiple failed attempts at launching 
large-scale chemical and biological attacks in Japan in the 1990s.13 In 
aggregate, these considerations lead NTI to the view that work to reduce 
biological threats posed by non-state actors can also have significant 
value for reducing GCBRs and X-risk, and we are actively working with 
international partners to do so. 
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3. Reducing GCBRs and Associated with Technology Advances
As noted, emerging biological risks associated with rapid technology 
advances are a key driver of growing GCBRs and X-risk. To reduce 
these risks, the international community will need to fill several key 
gaps. First, it’s important to establish a shared international perspective 
– or set of norms – for dual-use bioscience research: norms about how 
to determine whether dual-use research and development activities 
should move forward and how to weigh the perceived benefits of the 
work against the potential safety or security risks.14 Second, it is vital to 
develop new approaches for governments, funders, the private sector, 
academic researchers,15 and publishers to act on these norms. This includes 
developing and executing clear and effective governance mechanisms to 
oversee dual-use bioscience work from early-stage design and funding 
decisions, through project implementation, and on to publication.16 
NTI is prioritising this work because it can help prevent the exploitation 
of the legitimate global life science and biotechnology enterprise by 
malicious actors. Our work includes catalysing new approaches to man- 
aging access to the goods and services needed to engineer and synthesise 
biological agents,17 accelerating investments and innovation in biosecurity,18 
and preventing the public dissemination of information hazards.19 If 
successful, these approaches could constrain the capabilities of malicious 
actors, including sophisticated non-state actors. While we appreciate 
that no single intervention in this arena will create a fail-safe protection 
against catastrophic biological risks, we are working to develop the 
critical elements of a layered defence that, in aggregate, significantly 
reduces them.
4. Reducing Intent to Develop or Use Biological Weapons
Reducing biological risks posed by states and other powerful actors is 
challenging work. One key element involves influencing the intentions of 
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these actors to shape their cost-benefit calculation. This means building 
stronger international capabilities to reduce dangerous misperceptions 
about bioscience and biotechnology activities in other countries, in 
order to avoid arms races. It is equally important to bolster deterrence 
and accountability for any violation of the international norm against the 
illicit development or use of biological weapons. To achieve these goals, 
it is critical to enhance transparency about bioscience and biotechnology 
research and development. This would help increase clarity and avoid 
unwarranted suspicions about the capabilities and intentions of legitimate 
programmes around the world. It is also important to develop more robust 
international capabilities for investigating the source of a biological event 
of unknown origin during a crisis.20 
Currently, the WHO is empowered to conduct public health invest-
igations, and the United Nations Secretary-General oversees a mechanism 
for investigating alleged state use of biological and chemical weapons. 
However, there is no mechanism for evaluating events that fall between 
these two poles, or when there is a lack of clarity or suspicion about the 
event source. This latter type of mechanism might have been useful in 
addressing recent accusations about the origins of COVID-19 – in an 
internationally credible, evidence based, and transparent manner. Finally, 
in the event of a clear violation of international norms, the international 
community should have stronger accountability measures in place so that 
states and other powerful actors have reason to believe that they would be 
held accountable for developing or using biological weapons. 
5. Working Together to Reduce GCBRs
To achieve the ambitious agenda of preventing and responding to fut-
ure pandemics and GCBRs, we need all hands on deck: focused and 
consistent effort by talented and energetic experts; creative thinking 
to develop innovative solutions to hard problems; political will; and 
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financial resources. It will be important to build bridges and common 
cause across communities – including between national and global 
leaders, the security sector, the conventional biosecurity community, and 
communities focused on longtermism and protecting future generations. 
This begs the question: how can longtermist experts and biosecurity 
partners achieve buy-in from more conventional leaders and decision 
makers on the goal of reducing GCBRs?21 
First, it will be important to bridge these communities and build a 
mutual understanding that bio-risk reduction policies and operational 
response capabilities must focus not only on near-term crises but also on 
protecting future lives. NTI has been successful in bringing a focus on 
GCBRs to conventional meetings of foreign policy and national security 
decision-makers, including by convening an annual tabletop exercise at 
the Munich Security Conference and co-leading an event on GCBRs at 
the World Health Assembly. These and other efforts, such as the Clade 
X exercise by the Johns Hopkins University Centre for Health Security,22 
are invaluable and should be expanded. 
Second, we should consider aligning arguments about future lives 
more explicitly with simultaneous and related discussions about the 
X-risk associated with climate change. For example, the ‘extinction 
rebellion’ language that is being used by the growing, global movement 
of climate change activists clearly demonstrates that there is concern 
around the world about human extinction risks and momentum behind 
the growing movement to prevent that future. There is an opportunity 
to forge connections between this widely recognised global effort and 
work to reduce catastrophic and potentially existential threats associated 
with pathogens and other biological agents.
The sustainable development community should also be recruited to 
the GCBR cause in light of aligned interests in protecting and improving 
the quality of future lives, and the concomitant desire to guard against 
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the risk that GCBRs could significantly set back progress on achieving 
sustainable development goals. In our work at NTI, we have found that 
to make progress on reducing specific global catastrophic biological 
risks associated with technology advances, it is important to align with 
the development community around common interests: technology 
advances can support economic growth, bolster public health and help 
defend against pandemics and GCBRs. However, they also pose a great 
risk – if deliberately or accidentally misused – of causing a catastrophe 
that undermines those very goals.
Third, more attention must be paid to building a diverse set of next-
generation biosecurity leaders who are thinking both near-term and 
long-term. The Emerging Leaders in Biosecurity Initiative23 and 80,000 
Hours24 are both doing valuable, impactful work in this area. More 
programmes along these lines, and with greater global reach, would be 
tremendously valuable in continuing to advance this goal. 
Finally, a more geographically, racially, and ethnically diverse group 
of stakeholders and leaders from different policy backgrounds should 
be included in the development of catalytic actions to reduce GCBRs 
and X-Risks. Low-income countries and under-served populations have 
much to lose in the face of emerging potentially catastrophic risks, and 
they should be regularly included in work to reduce them. The inclusion 
of more diverse perspectives in these discussions is likely to lead to 
more effective and creative solutions, which are workable for both the 
developing and developed world. Moreover, fostering a more diverse 
international coalition in support of GCBR reduction work will pay 
dividends, as it has the potential to build political will and drive progress 
within multilateral fora, such as the Biological Weapons Convention and 
other parts of the UN system.   
Recent efforts to bridge the biosecurity and longtermist communities 
have already begun to bear fruit, and this partnership is helping gain 
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traction for GCBR and X-risk-reduction goals among the broader national 
security, global public health, and development sectors. Now is the 
moment to accelerate progress and build wider coalitions around the 
shared goal of building a safer world now and for the long term.
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CHAPTER NINE
Utilising Insurance for  
Climate Risk Reduction in the UK
In September 2015, while speaking before an audience at Lloyd’s of London, ‘the bedrock of the insurance industry’, the Bank of England’s 
Governor Mark Carney called climate change the ‘Tragedy of the Horizon.’
He explained: ‘We don’t need an army of actuaries to tell us that the 
catastrophic impacts of climate change will be felt beyond the traditional 
horizons of most actors, imposing a cost on future generations that the current 
generation has no direct incentive to fix. That means beyond the business cycle; 
the political cycle; and the horizons of technocratic authorities, like central 
banks, who are bound by their mandates … In other words, once climate change 
by 
Lord Des Browne
Vice-Chair, Nuclear Threat Initiative and Co-founder and  
Chair, Executive Board, European Leadership Network
The insurance sector has an abundance of expertise, money, and perspective which it might 
bring to the mitigation of and adaptation to climate change and other catastrophic risks. 
However, the unique characteristics of the insurance sector remain largely unleveraged as 
a policy tool. This chapter describes the advantages policymakers can gain by leveraging 
the capabilities of the insurance sector in risk management. The insurer’s role as a finan-
cial shock absorber is relatively well appreciated, but their role as risk engineers is less so, 
and offers a largely untapped pool of expertise in risk modelling, pricing, prevention, and 
behavioural incentives. This chapter also characterises the current hurdles to cooperation 
between government and insurers, including the evolution of siloed institutions, and the 
systematic neglect of long-term risk. It then identifies actions for government, the insurance 
sector, civil society, and philanthropists to improve collaboration and increase their collec-
tive influence. Of particular emphasis is the role of philanthropic investment in subsidising 
insurance products to make them available in developing nations.
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becomes a defining issue for financial stability, it will already be too late.’1
According to one recent study, climate-change-driven disasters acc-
ounted for 91 per cent of the 7,255 major disasters between 1998 and 
2017.2 In 2017, there were losses of around US$340 billion from extreme 
weather events alone, over half of which was uninsured. In the most 
vulnerable regions, for those least equipped to recover, losses were almost 
completely uninsured. Arguably, such disasters are already a defining issue 
for financial stability in the countries most exposed to climate change.
However, to Carney’s point, it is apparent that the recent economic 
and humanitarian costs associated with this recognisable upward trend 
will be but a drop in the (much warmer) ocean when measured over 
centuries, rather than decades. Without intervention, climate change in 
the centuries ahead will be less a defining issue for individual economies, 
and more an existential issue for the global economy and human societies 
as we know them. 
In 2019, four years on from his remarks at Lloyd’s and this time add-
ressing the UN’s Climate Action Summit, Carney emphasised the vital 
role of insurance in smoothing the transition to a 1.5-degree world: 
‘[The insurance] sector brings three things: expertise, money and perspective 
and those are all crucial in helping society adjust to the reality of that transition.’3
Horizon scanning, long-termism, fostering resilience, and understanding 
and offsetting the impact of catastrophic risks are in the insurance 
industry’s DNA. 
This chapter highlights the need for those who set public policy, 
including the government, and those who seek to influence policy, 
including philanthropists, to understand and engage with the unique 
capabilities of the insurance sector in order to more effectively evaluate, 
mitigate, reduce vulnerability to, adapt to and build resilience against 
climate change. To this end, the chapter describes the advantages policy-
makers can gain by leveraging the accumulated capabilities of the insurance 
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sector in risk management, along with the current hurdles to cooperation 
between the government and insurers. It then identifies actions for the 
government, the insurance sector, civil society and philanthropists to 
improve collaboration and increase their collective influence.
1. Missed Opportunities: A Matter of Mindset
The management of risk is a shared responsibility. The National Risk 
Register sets out the ‘likelihood and potential impact of a range of different risks 
that may directly affect the UK.’4 Increasingly, it is common in publications of 
this nature for authors to deploy exhortations to non-government entities, 
including business, to coordinate with the public policy community 
to prevent and mitigate identified risks. For example, the UK National 
Biological Security Strategy5 states that ‘preventing biological risks … is not 
something that (the government) can do alone.’
An HM Treasury policy document from March 20206 emphasises the 
shared nature of risk management, characterising the UK government’s 
role as insurer of last resort. It describes the purpose of government 
intervention in this respect as, in substantial part, helping improve the 
market for insurance and providing protection against risks where the 
private sector is unable to provide full insurance cover.
The unique contribution that insurance can make to modelling, assessing, 
and incentivising businesses’ transitions to more resilient behaviours is thus 
appreciated within the UK Government, but it is not yet fully appreciated 
in relation to climate change. The Home Office’s national strategy for 
countering terrorism, CONTEST,7 recognises that ‘the insurance industry 
has the potential to shape behaviour and improve safety, security and resilience’, 
with the sector placed uniquely to ‘better protect our economic infrastructure 
and to scale our ability to tackle terrorism.’
The unique and advantageous characteristics of the insurance sector 
remain largely unleveraged as a policy tool and this bias extends even 
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to those who seek to influence public policy. For example, despite the 
Committee on Climate Change’s eminent position of authority and 
leadership in the field of climate change adaptation and policy, nowhere in 
its encyclopaedic June report8 does it mention insurance or the resilience 
benefits of risk transfer.
There have been several recent, positive examples of cooperation from 
which lessons can be drawn. These include the relative success of Pool 
Reinsurance Company Ltd and Flood Re Limited, each a joint initiative 
between insurers and government, and ongoing discussions between 
insurers and government about the failure of the market to provide 
pandemic insurance. Generally, however, there is a frustration in the 
insurance sector that the government remains a relatively siloed institution.
In a recent CASS Business School webinar, this frustration was articulated 
by representatives of the insurance industry, who commented on the lack 
of consultation and appreciation of their experience identifying, modelling, 
managing and mitigating the already evident effects of climate change.
It is difficult to comprehensively explain why policymakers don’t 
engage more routinely with the insurance industry on risk. The most 
obvious reason is that these respective institutions have evolved over 
many years as independently functioning and siloed from one another. 
There has been no obvious reason to change the status quo.
In The Precipice,9 leading existential risk researcher Toby Ord identifies 
further reasons why such risks are neglected. Among them, he identifies 
two reasons revealed by political science.10 First, that ‘the attention of 
politicians and civil servants is frequently focused on the short-term.’ He 
argues that their thoughts and actions are set to respond to the election 
and news cycles, and consequently they find it difficult to turn their 
attention to a problem that won’t strike for several election cycles. Second, 
Ord reports that having raised the topic of existential risk with senior 
politicians and civil servants, he has encountered a common reaction: 
UTILISING INSURANCE FOR CLIMATE RISK REDUCTION IN THE UK
110
genuine deep concern paired with the feeling that addressing the greatest 
risks to humanity is ‘above my pay grade.’
Climate change risks prove a major challenge because they are not 
suited to our ingrained treatment of short-term and conventional risks. 
Both their scale and gravity is overwhelming and they therefore lose 
the competition for the attention of politicians and civil servants to 
comparatively trivial problems of immediate salience. A new paradigm 
of risk management is required.
2. Insurance as a Policy Tool: Money, Expertise, Perspective
Insurers are risk managers protecting society’s assets, but they are also 
long-term investors funding the economy, and they are influential in 
enabling and incentivising their private, corporate and government 
policy holders to change their behaviours. Given its money, expertise 
and perspective, the insurance industry is uniquely positioned to make 
substantial contributions to society’s understanding and management 
of climate change risk.
Money
A primary purpose of the insurance industry in providing capital to 
support response and recovery is the provision of financial resilience. 
‘Insurance, when put in place, provides financial resilience … it provides 
the flow of capital to support communities and infrastructure to recover from 
disasters. Without adequate insurance, the burden of paying for losses falls 
largely on individual citizens, governments or aid organisations, with significant 
impact upon already straining government budgets, and economic and social 
hardship for those affected … Countries with high insurance cover recover 
faster from disasters, and increasingly, governments are recognising the role 
and benefits of insurance in transferring risk from disasters. Yet there is a large 
and even widening “protection gap” of underinsurance.’11
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The phrase ‘protection gap’ is used to describe the difference between 
losses which were compensated by insurance (protected) and those 
which were not (unprotected). Estimates put uninsured losses from 
natural catastrophes globally at 70 per cent, a protection gap which has 
not meaningfully narrowed in decades. One of the biggest mistaken 
assumptions is that meaningful protection gaps are only a problem for 
developing countries, an assumption that is now less likely to be made 
in the wake of COVID-19.
Recent studies12 have provided evidence that countries with widespread 
market-based insurance coverage recover more quickly from the financial 
impacts of catastrophe. These studies repeatedly demonstrate that pre-
emptive investment in defences and adaptations is several times more 
financially efficient than traditional post-disaster financial assistance. 
In fact, post-disaster financial assistance often serves to disincentivise 
people, businesses and local governments from taking proactive mitigatory 
action, leaving the underlying vulnerability unchanged. 
As an indication of the payoff for countries able to lower their protection 
gaps, Lloyd’s of London estimates that a 1 per cent rise in insurance 
penetration can translate to a 13 per cent reduction in uninsured losses and 
over 20 per cent reduction in the disaster recovery burden on taxpayers.13 
Substantial macroeconomic benefits include increased investment and 
higher output – potentially up to 2 per cent of GDP. Finally, on the asset 
side of their balance sheets, insurers can be highly influential in bringing 
the realities of climate change into mainstream financial decision-making. 
Estimates of assets under management by the industry vary, but are in the 
multiple trillions, and environmental, social, and corporate governance 
investment strategies are emerging as the predominant methodology of 
insurers. An example of such a strategy may be resisting investment in 
companies with more than 30 per cent of their business associated with 
thermal coal mining or coal power generation. 
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Expertise
While insurers’ role as financial shock absorbers is relatively well app-
reciated, their role as risk engineers is less so. This is probably a significant 
factor in the industry being largely overlooked as a climate policy tool.
‘The insurance industry’s potential … is grounded in its near real-time 
vantage point of risk insight. Every day, countless companies have their risks 
underwritten and receive payments for claims; behind the scenes, the insurance 
industry churns and analyses data to understand which risk management 
practices are working and which are not. For the segments of risk where this 
potential has been realised, top insurers are considered risk engineering advisers 
that happen to provide insurance, rather than the other way around.’14
In national disaster-preparedness, insurers are a largely untapped 
pool of expertise in risk modelling, pricing, preventative measures and 
behavioural incentives to build socio-economic resilience to climate risks. 
Rigorous modelling, quantification and understanding of actual and 
potential catastrophic events are core competencies of insurance since 
they are necessary to generate an insurance product. These competencies 
enable insurers to incentivise and reward businesses and individuals 
who comply with accredited risk-reduction behaviours with a reduced 
policy premium. 
However, there is a notable discrepancy in the fact that an insurance 
company may have the data to indicate the likelihood of loss – allowing it to 
build understanding of how to prepare for and mitigate the consequences 
of a disaster – but does not have the legislative power to enforce active 
preparedness steps, nor the influence over necessary regulation.15
This disparity is well-documented by the insurance sector and by 
academia. One frequent suggestion is the improved use of insurers’ data 
and knowledge by national and local government in land-use planning 
and in developing zoning and building code regulations, standards, and 
construction requirements. Each of these elements are fundamental to 
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adapting to and mitigating natural disaster damage. Insurers’ expertise 
in risk appraisal makes them uniquely qualified to support the most 
cost-effective preventative and ‘Build Back Better’ initiatives. As noted by 
one recent report, ‘investment must be directed effectively, especially in the 
context of climate change adaptation. Expenditures that seem worthwhile over 
a 10 or 20-year perspective may not be justifiable over a longer horizon.’16
Perspective 
Related to the insurance industry’s expertise as risk engineering advisers 
is the perspective they are able to bring to the determination of where 
government involvement in the provision of insurance protection is 
necessary. Insurance works on the basis that the premiums of the many 
pay for the claims of the few. Given that so many people would be 
affected by them, the tail risks of long-term climate change are simply 
uneconomic for insurers to underwrite. Commercial insurance was not 
designed to be able to provide unlimited cover for risks which correlate 
nationally or even globally, as the COVID-19 crisis has demonstrated. 
The limits of the commercial market for such risks leaves government, 
and by extension the taxpayer, as the de facto ‘insurer of last resort’ when 
catastrophes occur. There is a large protection gap which only public 
finances can fill. This responsibility of government has been articulated 
specifically in the HM Treasury’s Government as insurer of last resort: 
managing contingent liabilities in the public sector.17 Contingent liabilities 
are risks the government ‘takes on that others cannot, both to protect the 
population and provide stability when unforeseen events occur,’ and are ‘an 
increasingly important policy tool to support economic growth and safeguard 
... the long-term sustainability of public finances.’ The National Risk Register 
lists at least ten ‘natural hazards’ clearly linked to climate change which 
are considered contingent liabilities for which the government is insurer 
of last resort. 
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The document makes a series of welcome recognitions and recom-
mendations about the importance of government providing guarantees 
to enable commercial insurance markets to develop around catastrophic 
risks to society. It uses the example of Pool Re, the UK’s state-backed 
mutual provider of terrorism insurance, to note that: 
‘By taking on the tail-end risk of a catastrophic event from the private sector, 
the government makes it possible for private insurers to re-enter the market 
… The Pool Re model has been successful in maximising the involvement of 
private insurance to enter the market, creating several layers of defence before 
the guarantee is called … These layers of defence have created a £10 billion 
buffer between an incident occurring and taxpayer money being called on.’
The Pool Re partnership represents an effective but underused method 
by which government can positively intervene in a market by partnering 
with insurers to build financial resilience to a complex, catastrophic risk. 
The partnership also fulfils the ‘expertise’ potential of the industry by 
leveraging its capabilities and amplifying them through protective security 
initiatives with academia, the Metropolitan Police and the Home Office. 
In the context of a coordinated national climate resilience strategy, the 
merits of this multi-stakeholder approach should be considered when the 
government undertakes to ‘consider its stock of contingent liabilities and 
investigate where it may be appropriate to expand the scope of current 
pooling schemes’, as recommended by the HMT policy document.
3. What Role Can Philanthropic Investment Play?
It is critical that civil society, a third pillar distinct from government and 
business, is actively engaged with climate change policy. A particular 
responsibility of civil society is to ensure that national policymaking 
does not neglect protection of the poor and vulnerable. This is especially 
crucial in insurance policy, which is complex and, in its implementation, 
can be damagingly discriminating. As Toby Ord notes in The Precipice: 
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‘When citizens are empathetic and altruistic, identifying with the plight of 
others … they can be enlivened with the passion and determination needed to 
hold their leaders to account.’ 18
Philanthropy involves the deployment of private financial resources 
(or time or initiatives) for the public good. There are leveraged synergies 
between philanthropic entities and the insurance sector, albeit of differing 
motivations and scales, in terms of money, expertise and perspective. 
This is the case particularly within the humanitarian and development 
aid context. Money can be directed toward building linked capabilities 
between government and insurers and toward making products more 
available and accessible to lower-income and developing nations. 
Investment in research to improve open-access climate risk data and 
models can remove barriers to such products, which are otherwise 
expensive to develop and often protected under proprietary or commercial 
licenses. For example, a consortium of philanthropic organisations recently 
supported the successful development of an open-source platform for 
climate risk modelling and risk-financing decision-making by the public 
sector and (re-)insurers in the Philippines and Bangladesh.19
Subsidisation of insurance products can help with bridging the insurance 
protection gap, where such products are beyond the means of the vulnerable 
to purchase. A recent study20 describes the successful scale-up of a livestock 
insurance programme in Kenya,21 for which there was insufficient demand 
initially, following subsidisation of the farmers’ premiums.
Many charities have expertise in humanitarian and development aid. 
Their expertise can be leveraged in the design of innovative insurance 
products for those in lower-income and developing nations. 
Micro-insurance is one such example. Similar to micro-finance, these 
innovative products can be used to insure vulnerable individuals. The 
World Food Programme and Oxfam partnered to successfully implement 
the R4 Rural Resilience Initiative in Africa, which integrates risk transfer 
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with risk reduction to increase the resilience of the poorest farmers to 
specific climate risks.22 
Parametric insurance products provide a timeliness and purpose 
flexibility well-suited to innovative applications for risk financing against 
climate-related disasters. In 2015, for example, Mauritania received a 
rapid payout of US$6m, triggered by drought metrics under the African 
Risk Capacity (ARC) programme, which successfully provided liquidity 
sufficient to mitigate a humanitarian crisis.23
The innovation of risk sharing partnerships, such as multi-sovereign 
pools, can support the insurability of nations unable to afford insurance 
products in the private market. For instance, the Caribbean Catastrophe 
Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) was a pioneer of such partnerships and 
‘has made successful disaster liquidity payments on a range of perils over the 
10+ years since its inception, most notably paying more than US$61m during 
the 2017 year of hurricanes that affected the Caribbean.’ 24
Despite such successes, these products have low penetration relative 
to their global potential. In the case of micro-insurance, this is due to 
a lack of tailored products, distribution channels and affordability. In 
the case of parametric and risk-sharing products, the limits come from 
challenges surrounding financial literacy and quality of data and models. 
Philanthropic entities offer a unique perspective, stemming from 
altruistic motivation. Several longtermist organisations, such as Longview 
Philanthropy, use evidence, reason and analysis to identify the most 
effective ways to do the most good. The philosophical movement that 
guides such organisations prioritises a long-term perspective in efforts 
to address existential risks such as climate change. Such a perspective is 
powerful in building risk literacy and influencing discourse in society. 
Promotion of and investment in risk literacy can increase insurance 
penetration and effectiveness by enabling society to identify risks, analyse 
response options and allocate ownership of risk management. 
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Furthermore, a recent CASS study highlights that a key ‘challenge with 
all insurance products is to improve their interaction with resilience measures 
in an integrated climate adaptation strategy,’ which should ensure that 
‘specific insurance solutions for financial protection also incentivise risk 
reduction and preparedness’.25 In this vein, the philanthropic perspective 
can also help strengthen the dialogue around initiatives, such as Build 
Back Better,26 with long-term resilience benefits.
The UK Government demonstrated early success in merging the 
political, business and philanthropic agendas. Between 2011 and 2015, 
the Department for International Development placed resilience to 
natural disasters at the heart of its development programmes, successfully 
supporting and implementing pioneering insurance tools to manage risk 
in countries across Africa and the Caribbean. With only a small fraction 
of its aid budget, the UK was able to set an international precedent that 
has since been adopted by other governments and development bodies. 
Since then, however, political attention to these promising insurance-
centric approaches to humanitarian and development aid has dwindled. 
As such, long-term philanthropic investment can play an important role 
in building capacity and ensuring transparency of engagement between 
governments and insurers to increase the resilience and adaptability of 
those vulnerable to climate change.
4. Conclusions: The Shift to a Long-term Perspective
Developing long-term domestic policy while responding to global climate 
change remains a formidable challenge. Securing our society’s future will 
require breaking political and economic reward cycles that incentivise 
short-termism at the expense of integrated long-term action and horizon 
scanning. Despite the fundamental psychological barriers that must be 
overcome, there is emerging evidence of willingness to shift towards a 
long-term perspective in UK policymaking with the formation of The 
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All-Party Parliamentary Group for Future Generations,27 whose role is to 
‘raise awareness of long-term issues, explore ways to internalise longer-term 
considerations into decision-making processes, and create space for cross-party 
dialogue on combating short-termism in policymaking.’
This direction of travel was reinforced by the recommendation of 
the House of Lords Liaison Committee ‘that a special inquiry committee 
be appointed “to consider risk assessment and risk planning in the context of 
disruptive national hazards” to report by the end of November 2021.’28 This 
decision was made in response to a proposal by Lord Rees of Ludlow that 
a special inquiry committee be set up to consider risk assessment and risk 
planning given that ‘the United Kingdom is at risk from major disruptive hazards 
which have the potential to cause significant human, economic, environmental 
and infrastructure damage.’
We are at the early stages of the realisation that the deployment of 
insurance as a policy tool can be effective in evaluating, mitigating, 
reducing vulnerability to, adapting to and building resilience against 
climate change.
The UK insurance market is world leading. Industry, government 
and civil society are natural allies. An alliance among them in respect of 
climate risks is a policy tool that we cannot afford to ignore.
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CHAPTER TEN
Ensuring the Safety of Artificial Intelligence
Technological innovation has been a key driver of human flourishing. The Green Revolution prevented the starvation of millions or even 
billions of people.3 However, technological innovation has also been a 
key driver of new and often unanticipated risks. In perhaps the most 
salient example of this, the development of nuclear weapons played a 
crucial part in the risks to humanity presented by the Cold War.4 Trying 
to predict and shape the impact of future technological innovations is 
one particularly promising way to improve humanity’s long-term future.
This chapter will focus on the long-term impact of artificial intelligence 
(AI) and the systems that employ it. Many single-purpose technologies, 




Technological innovation has been a cause of both great flourishing and great risk in 
the history of humanity. Artificial intelligence stands out among other forms of current 
technology as having particularly great promise and great risk given that it could one day 
perform every kind of intellectual work. This chapter makes the case that our work today 
to ensure the safety of artificial intelligence could have a significant long-term impact 
on humanity, and we should therefore begin this work now. It begins by explaining in 
historical context why progress on AI is likely to have a significant effect on the long-term 
future. Though the trajectory of this progress and the nature of its effects are uncertain, 
we can act today to meaningfully alter these for the better. We can do so by gathering 
information about AI progress and impacts, investing resources into the safe development 
and responsible deployment of AI, and working to resolve collective action problems that 
threaten to undermine these efforts.
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towards either being beneficial or generating risks respectively. I will 
argue that because AI can be applied to numerous problems,5 it has 
the potential to have an extremely positive impact on the future while 
also posing risks, with especially substantial risks if AI systems are not 
developed and deployed with care. 
What follows is an introduction to AI and AI policy, and the positive 
impact that AI safety work can have on the long-term future.
Section 1 provides some background on artificial intelligence and 
highlights that future AI systems have the potential to have very positive 
or very negative effects on humanity. Section 2 argues that even though 
the future trajectory of AI development is uncertain, we can take actions 
today that can meaningfully affect its trajectory for the better. Sections 
3 and 4 present two examples of interventions that can be undertaken 
now: gathering information about AI progress and impacts (Section 
3), and investing resources into the safe development and deployment 
of AI (Section 4). Section 5 argues that, to do this, we need to avoid 
situations in which companies or countries are incentivised to invest 
insufficiently into each of these efforts.
1. The past and future of artificial intelligence
There are many technologies with the potential to have a very large impact 
on humanity. Some of these, such as nuclear weapons and power plants, 
already exist. Others, such as Dyson spheres, exist only in the minds of 
science fiction writers. Artificial intelligence systems lie somewhere in 
between. During the 1970s and 1980s, most AI systems in development were 
instances of symbolic AI, which used explicit symbols and the manipulation 
of these symbols to solve complex problems. They applied deductive 
(that is, mathematical) rules to large bodies of information. People were 
highly optimistic about what symbolic AI could eventually achieve. This 
optimism may have been due in part to the fact that symbolic systems are 
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often good at things that humans find difficult. They can perform complex 
mathematics and logical inferences with relative ease, for example.6
‘Morevac’s paradox’ describes the observation that the kind of explicit, 
abstract reasoning tasks that are relatively difficult for humans to do – 
such as arithmetic operations involving very large numbers – are often 
relatively easy for computers. But things humans find relatively easy 
to do – such as identifying stop signs or playing computer games – are 
extremely difficult to replicate in a purely symbolic system.7 Although 
symbolic AI systems excelled at the former, they never mastered the latter 
and ultimately failed to live up to people’s early expectations.8
As funding in symbolic AI systems decreased in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, approaches based on artificial neural networks began to 
increase.9 Such neural networks are composed of artificial ‘neurons’ that 
take multiple values as an input and produce a single output that can 
serve as the input of one or more subsequent neurons in the network.10
Rather than executing a program as a series of manually-specified 
steps, neural networks are trained to do a task. They are presented with 
a problem, such as identifying objects in images, and have to learn what 
patterns to look for in order to correctly identify these objects.
Training methods include supervised learning, unsupervised learning, 
and reinforcement learning. In supervised learning, the model is given 
labelled data such as images, and must find the best function for predicting 
future data. In unsupervised learning, the model must identify similarities 
in data without labels. In reinforcement learning, the model can take 
actions that are associated with positive or negative feedback.
Compared with the earlier symbolic AI systems, neural networks are 
much better at the kind of intuitive tasks that humans excel at. This 
includes tasks like image recognition, playing games, fraud detection, 
translation, recommendations generation, and language generation.11
These systems are improving regularly not only in their capabilities 
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at specific, narrow tasks, but also in their abilities to learn a wider range 
of tasks. DeepMind’s AlphaGo achieved top human-level performance 
in the game Go, and its successor AlphaZero was able to be quickly 
trained to play not only Go but also chess and shogi.12 OpenAI’s GPT-3 
language model was able to achieve state of the art or near state of the 
art on many natural language processing benchmarks13 without being 
fine-tuned to a particular task.
The main factors in improving AI performance are computational 
power, algorithmic improvements, and more or better data.14 There are 
few reassurances about how long the trend of improved performance 
will continue or how sustainable improvements in these domains are. 
For example, some believe that increasing fabrication costs will cause 
a computational bottleneck in the next few years.15 But we may want to 
plan for a future in which improvements in AI systems continue, even 
if we’re not certain about the rate of improvement.
The future of artificial intelligence
Why do people think that improvements in AI are so important? Crucially, 
unlike other technologies, AI may in principle be able to do whatever 
intellectual work humans currently do.16 AI systems may be able to engineer 
buildings, prove theorems, provide education, analyse legal documents, 
write novels, discover new drugs, improve computer security, or produce 
new music. And they may eventually do each of these things more 
cheaply than the cost of human labour.17 Given sufficient information, 
a sufficiently general system may even have the ability to learn many or 
most of these tasks, despite not being trained on them specifically.
Future AI systems could be powerful in many respects. First, they could 
allow many existing tasks to become automated or partially automated, 
including knowledge work like legal research, medical diagnosis, and 
decision assistance.18 Second, they could allow for rapid improvements 
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in scientific and engineering domains, such as the development of life-
extending drugs or building design and materials. Third, they may be 
able to perform strategically important tasks like cyber-defence, military 
planning, and election misinformation at a superhuman level. We may 
come to entrust AI systems with a broader range of tasks and with more 
consequential tasks over time.19
The potential upsides of these systems are large. AI systems could help 
people lead richer lives. AI systems could make high-quality education 
available to most people in the form of AI tutors, they could ease day-
to-day administrative tasks in the form of AI assistants, they could aid 
in the development of pharmaceuticals and medical devices that extend 
and improve life, they could generate new and interesting forms of art, 
and they could speed up general economic growth in a way that would 
allow us to distribute more wealth to the global poor.20
These systems also come with risks, however. They could be used by 
bad actors to engage in large-scale misinformation or surveillance, to 
compromise critical systems, or to create realistic material for blackmail.21 
They could pursue their goals in adverse ways that their users do not 
intend (as developed in Section 4). They could cause alterations to the 
economy and to how information is produced that could lead to structural 
harms, for example from a loss of trust in reputable institutions or the 
entrenchment of existing social injustices.22
2. Improving the outcomes of AI under uncertainty
We have already seen promising but limited applications from AI systems; 
but the AI systems with the largest impact on humanity are likely to 
be the more capable systems developed in the coming decades. Given 
our uncertainty about the trajectory that AI research will take, can we 
meaningfully work on improving the outcomes around the development 
of future AI systems?
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Whether we should try to improve the prospects of a given technology 
doesn’t depend on how far away it is from being developed, but on how 
much leverage we can expect to have over its impact with the actions 
currently available to us. 
If a powerful technology exists today but we are sure we are unable 
to influence its trajectory in any way, trying to do so is clearly futile. 
If a powerful technology will exist far into the future but we are able 
to influence its trajectory with our actions today, doing so could be 
extremely valuable.
Typically, the more distant a given technological innovation is, the less 
valuable it is to try to improve its prospects. This is because the more 
uncertain we are of when and how something will be developed, the less 
leverage we have over its trajectory.23 Precise work to ensure that lunar 
colonies are built safely is unlikely to be of much value now because 
we don’t have a good enough idea of when and how such things will be 
built in order to meaningfully assist with safety work now. We also don’t 
know what the background political and economic circumstances will 
be nor how our current actions will affect them. Moreover, we are likely 
to have other and greater priorities in the time before the development 
of this technology.
It would be a mistake, however, to throw up our hands and assume 
that just because the trajectory of some technology is long and uncertain, 
there is nothing we can do to influence it. When we are making decisions 
under deep uncertainty, we can do things like:
1. Gather information about high-stakes outcomes: take actions to 
identify broad clusters of possible futures, their value, and our degree 
of influence over them.
2. Gather information about the technology: for example, about the 
technology itself and its impact.24
3. Identify and perform robustly good actions: take actions that improve 
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the situation in the highest-stakes outcomes, that leave more options 
open to us in the future, and that result in outcomes that are broadly 
good even if the outcomes of these actions are unlikely to be optimal.
This kind of decision-making under deep uncertainty has been explored 
more formally in the context of ‘robust decision-making’.25
Important developments in AI do not seem so far off or unpredictable 
that we cannot have any real influence on them. But they are also not so 
predictable that we can afford to ignore the heuristics of robust decision-
making. In the next three sections I will give some examples of actions 
that we can take to improve the prospects of future AI development.
3. Tracking the progress and impact of AI
When we are operating under uncertainty, the value of information 
increases. The more information we can gather, the more informed our 
future decisions will be. One of the key difficulties for anyone who wants 
to develop good policy for AI future systems is that we don’t have a clear 
enough picture of AI development and its future impact on society.
In order to get information about how future AI systems are likely 
to impact society, we need to develop infrastructure that can measure 
the impact of current AI systems on society and that can predict the 
impact of AI systems currently being developed. This involves tracking 
(i) improvements in existing systems across a range of tasks, (ii) what 
components are contributing to these improvements and to what extent, 
(iii) how safe and secure existing systems are relative to their capabilities, 
and (iv) how improved AI systems are impacting society via the economy, 
political institutions, and more.
We can roughly divide these uncertainties into those that are about the 
development of AI systems and those about the impact of AI systems.
The first source of uncertainty concerns the rate and nature of the 
development of AI systems themselves. There are a variety of machine 
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learning benchmarks that measure capabilities at specific tasks such 
as image recognition and natural language inference.26 It will become 
increasingly important to construct benchmarks that can measure more 
economically important tasks that require a broader range of skills to 
complete, and to construct benchmarks that can better measure the 
breadth and robustness of AI capabilities.
The development of standardised AI benchmarks that can capture 
the success of systems at economically and strategically important tasks 
is something that could be done by academics in collaboration with 
governments, non-profits, and industry.
The second source of uncertainty concerns the impact of AI systems. 
To give one example, there is currently much uncertainty about the 
impact that the incremental or sudden automation of important tasks 
could have on the economy and on society as a whole.27  How might 
the rapid automation of truck driving or paralegal work affect society?
We can gather information on the current and potential impact of 
automation and the best interventions for preparing a workforce that 
might need to adapt to these shifts. Governments and policymakers may 
want to improve their ability to track and respond to potentially rapid 
automation across industries.28 This is especially important because it 
is not guaranteed that automation will occur in an incremental fashion 
within specific industries: once key tasks have been mastered by AI, 
it may be possible to automate tasks across multiple occupations or 
industries at once.29
Another example of our uncertainty about the impact of AI systems is 
how often they are being misused and how often accidents are occurring. 
Governments, non-profits, and industry actors can take steps to monitor 
accidental harms from AI, such as deaths resulting from automated 
vehicles, major misdiagnoses by ML-assisted diagnostic tools, or failures 
in safety-critical AI systems. They could also take steps to predict and 
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track the malicious use of AI – though these may be harder to track in 
real time as bad actors attempt to avoid detection – and structural harms 
like labour displacement, rising inequity, or the erosion of privacy.30
Given this uncertainty, it will become increasingly important to measure 
the safety and security of AI systems as they play a more important role 
in society. This will be critical in the development of good standards for 
deployable AI systems. For example, NIST research currently focuses on 
how to measure the security and explainability of AI as part of its efforts 
to develop AI standards.31
Although work is increasingly being done to measure both the impact 
and the development of AI, there is still much more that can be done to 
decrease our uncertainty in these domains.
4. Work on the safe development and responsible deployment of AI
The safe development of AI
AI systems are ‘aligned’ with human values if their goals are in accordance 
with the intentions of the user and with the broader constraints set out 
by society as a whole, such as acting within the law.32 They are ‘safe’ if 
they are unlikely to cause accidental harm and are not easy to misuse.
Part of the reason that modern AI systems are not safe and aligned by 
default is that they are trained to carry out hard-to-specify tasks rather 
than executing simple algorithms. The method that the systems are using 
to execute these tasks after training is often not easy to identify even if 
one has full access to the model, and it is therefore difficult to predict 
whether it will behave as desired all the time or in unusual circumstances.33
For example, we may want a language model to avoid offensive language 
when writing children’s stories. But although we can take steps to reduce 
the likelihood of this, it is hard to eliminate the possibility entirely. 
Suppose we can find a way to remove specific offensive words from its 
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outputs. A lot of very offensive language does not require the use of 
such words. The phrase ‘unattractive people should not be allowed to have 
children’ doesn’t contain any particularly offensive words, but it is not 
the kind of standalone phrase we would want to see in a children’s story. 
Since we can’t predict what a language model’s training will cause it to 
output in response to a given prompt, it is hard to completely eliminate 
the possibility of this phrase appearing even in response to prompts not 
designed to elicit biased outputs.34
The more complex a task a system can do, the harder it is to predict 
precisely how it will carry out the task. The harder it is to predict precisely 
how a system will carry out a task, the more guarantees we need that it 
will not act in ways that are radically unexpected and harmful.
Ensuring that AI systems are safe and aligned increases in importance 
the more powerful AI systems become. It may also increase in difficulty: 
it could be especially difficult to ensure that systems are safe if they are 
more capable than humans across a range of domains.
AI safety is a field that is trying to make safe and aligned AI by reducing 
the likelihood of things like unsafe exploration and ‘reward hacking’35 
– a system’s pursuit of specified goals through undesired means – and 
finding ways to align AI systems with what humans want.36 It includes 
specific proposals for this, such as ‘AI safety via debate’,37 in which ML 
agents learn human reasoning and values by adversarially training to 
debate various questions. Since humans judge the outcomes of these 
debates, the ML agents must learn what reasoning and considerations 
the humans find compelling in order to win.38
We can strengthen the AI safety discipline by funding independent 
safety research at non-profits and academic institutions.39 Governments 
can also incentivise industry actors to invest more in safety work by 
creating international guidelines for safe AI development or rewarding 
industry actors that invest heavily in safety.
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The responsible deployment of AI
In addition to safe development, we must deploy AI responsibly. Responsible 
deployment of AI involves at least four things. 
First, it involves developing ways of testing whether systems are suff-
iciently safe and aligned and releasing those systems with due care, for 
example by incrementally releasing models in order to get information 
about accidents, misuse, or systemic harms that might result from them40 
or releasing model cards alongside the models that describe possible 
limitations, biases and misuses.41 Second, it involves taking steps to 
ensure that the model cannot be stolen or misused by bad actors. Third, 
it involves contributing to a safety-oriented development environment 
that doesn’t incentivise a race to the bottom on safety (as discussed in 
the next section). And fourth, it involves ensuring that the economic 
benefits generated by AI systems are distributed universally.42
Responsible deployment of AI systems may be able to help us tolerate 
some deficiencies or setbacks in the work on safe development by ensuring 
that no one deploys systems until the safety research has caught up with 
their capabilities. 
Safe development of AI systems may help us to tolerate some deficiencies 
or setbacks in responsible deployment, by ensuring that the systems 
being deployed are not likely to result in accidents, even if there is not 
yet a good governance structure in place that can prevent such systems 
from being deployed at all.
Industry, governments, non-profits, and academia can all contribute 
to the safe development and deployment of AI systems. For example, 
governments can fund research and support new solutions to ensure 
safe AI deployment, such as global regulatory markets for AI safety.43
The best safety solutions will be rooted in a deep understanding of the 
economic and political threats to safe and aligned AI. This is the subject 
of the next and final section of this chapter.
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5. Preventing collective action problems
One possible threat to the safe development and responsible deployment 
of AI are collective action problems. Collective action problems are 
situations in which the collective would be better off if everyone cooperated 
with one another, but it is in each individual’s interest not to cooperate. 
Many of the challenges facing those who want to develop AI safely can 
be characterised as collective action problems.
First, let’s consider the collective action problems that companies 
face. Work on the safe development and responsible deployment of 
more capable AI systems is costly in time and money. In most industries, 
companies are incentivised to invest in safety by market incentives, 
liability laws, and regulation.
These three types of incentives also apply to companies developing 
AI systems, but they appear to be weaker here than in other industries. 
Consumers are less likely to be able to evaluate the safety of AI products 
initially, which weakens market incentives to develop them. It is unclear 
how current liability laws will apply to AI systems, and smaller companies 
may not have the funds required to pay for harms they are held liable 
for. Regulators often don’t have the kind of knowledge of AI systems that 
is required to construct effective regulation, and may find it difficult to 
keep up with the pace of change in AI development.44
Developing safe products is more valuable to companies than developing 
unsafe products, all else being equal. But developing safe products requires 
an investment of time and money that companies might not want to incur 
if their competitors do not. After all, it’s often beneficial for companies to 
release their products sooner and be first to market.45 So it can be in the 
interest of each individual company to defect: to underinvest in safety 
in order to put more resources into releasing their product sooner. This 
can be true even if each developer would much prefer to compete in an 
environment in which developers must all invest more resources in safety.
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In this kind of “race to the bottom” on safety, raising the bar on what 
companies must invest in safety can result in a situation where each 
company is strictly better off. By raising the bar for everyone, each 
company would expect to create a more valuable end product without 
adopting a competitive disadvantage relative to the low safety investment 
scenario. But how do we raise the bar on what companies must invest in 
safety? This is the collective action problem for AI safety in industry.46
This problem is compounded by the fact that similar collective action 
problems exist between governments and their regulatory bodies. Gov-
ernments have an incentive to support the development of more capable AI 
systems by companies within their borders, since these systems likely drive 
economic benefits. But the AI systems that are developed by a company 
in one country can have wide-ranging effects in other countries that are 
difficult for them to prevent. For example, a system that is designed in 
one country can be used to create convincing political misinformation 
that is primarily targeted at the citizens of another country.
It is therefore in the interest of all governments and regulators to agree 
to a minimum set of standards for the safe development and responsible 
deployment of AI systems, since this reduces the likelihood that accidents 
or misuse involving AI will negatively affect them, without reducing their 
relative advantage when it comes to developing their own AI capabilities. 
This requires international cooperation on the safe development of AI.
There are steps we can take to increase the likelihood of cooperation 
on the safe development of AI internationally and across industry. These 
include identifying opportunities to collaborate on shared research 
projects,47 increasing the transparency into AI development, and increasing 
levels of trust that others are developing AI safely.48
Identifying and dismantling collective action problems that get in the 
way of safe AI development is one potentially robust way to improve the 
trajectory of AI.
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6. Conclusion
At the beginning of this chapter I noted that technological innovation 
has been a cause of both great flourishing and great risk in the history 
of humanity. I then argued that what could set artificial intelligence 
apart from other forms of current technology is that it may be able to 
perform all kinds of intellectual work. If this promise is realised then 
the potential upsides of AI for humanity in the long term could be 
extremely high, but so could its long-term potential to be misused 
or to create serious unintentional harm if it is not developed safely. 
There is still much uncertainty about both the trajectory and the timeline 
of AI development. This can make work to improve the prospects of AI 
development seem intractable. However, there can still be robustly good 
steps available to us even in situations of great uncertainty. Work to track 
the progress and impact of AI, progress on the problem of safely developing 
and responsibly deploying AI, and actions that reduce collective action 
problems around the safe development of AI all seem like plausible 
candidates for robustly good steps in AI development.
My goal in this chapter has not been to offer specific advice for those 
interested in working on or investing in these areas: resources for this 
exist elsewhere.49 Instead, I have tried to show that ensuring the safety of 
artificial intelligence is something that could have a significant long-term 
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Why do so many burning issues of the day seem to catch us unawares and turn into rapidly escalating crises?1 Are there ways to improve 
our decision-making processes, and to increase our chances of dealing 
with problems preemptively to avoid the most negative outcomes that 
might threaten the very future of humanity? How could we spur change 
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This chapter discusses the challenges of inserting long-term thinking into the way we deal 
with current affairs and decision-making. The fact that our decision-making remains 
mired in short-term considerations is not an accident. Human individuals and societies 
have built-in constraints — biological, psychological, political and institutional — that 
make operating in a fully rational and far-sighted manner very difficult. But taking the 
long term into account is not only preferable, it is imperative due to increasingly mounting 
catastrophic and existential risks. This chapter considers various political reforms as 
solutions to short-termism, and argues that while such reforms are imperative, they are 
also insufficient. What is ultimately needed is a deep cultural change that  empowers 
and even compels us to factor the long term into the very fabric of our lives. To this end, 
a new cultural tradition is proposed for the whole of humanity, one which reminds us to 
be custodians of this planet and its long-term potential so that we can together ensure 
a viable, open, aspirational future.
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with current affairs and make decisions. The challenges stem from 
many different sources and achieving improvement will be far from 
straightforward: The fact that our decision-making processes remain 
short-sighted and mired in short-term considerations is not an accident. 
Human individuals and societies are faced with several built-in constraints 
– biological, psychological, political and even institutional – that make it 
very difficult for us to operate in a fully rational and far sighted manner.
It must be said, however, that our standard operating procedures have 
served us very well. We have harnessed the forces of nature and built 
systems of bewildering complexity. In the process, almost the whole of 
humanity has grown more prosperous and secure. Life expectancy has 
soared, and individuals have been empowered almost throughout the 
globe. Our collective progress is hard to deny, and to a degree this success 
has become a factor that blinds us to considering alternatives, even as 
evidence mounts that the current course of action is not sustainable.
Indeed, our success has been built on a way of life that is now eroding 
other pillars of our well-being and potentially even our species’ existence. 
Climate change is advancing rapidly, and the biosphere is under alarming 
strain. Exciting technological advances are bringing significant gains and 
potential solutions to many problems, but we know from history that 
such progress also always results in new and often entirely unanticipated 
problems and sometimes great dangers.2 At the same time the very 
complexity and interconnectedness of our economic, social, political and 
technological systems creates new risks.3 Consequently, the probabilities 
of global catastrophic risks are mounting.4 Our propensity to focus on 
the issues of here and now is jeopardising the quality and perhaps the 
very existence of our long-term future.
Our current approach to decision-making is part of the problem. It 
seems clear that it is ill-suited to dealing with the mounting challenges. 
The action-reaction cycle that we see today is conducive to international 
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conflict and results in suboptimal responses to other challenges and 
problems. At the same time, our current approach acts as an incubator of 
sorts for systemic risks; instead of solving them, it generates and prolongs 
them while making us blind to their very existence.
To get out of the present rut we need more long-term oriented thinking, 
analysis and planning. The road to better decisions based on more 
appropriate time frames will not, however, be easy. The limitations in 
our biology, psychology, politics and institutions practically ensure the 
continuation of short-termist and suboptimal policies and responses in 
our current affairs. We should, however, bear in mind that there are also 
legitimate forms of short-termism.5 We exist in, and can therefore only 
act in, the moment in time in which we find ourselves. The challenge 
is to devise forms of politics and institutions that embed long-term 
considerations into our everyday comings and goings.
To chart an alternative way forward, this chapter seeks to expand the 
notion of ‘current affairs’. As the old saying goes, ‘the urgent crowds out the 
important’ in politics. We must appreciate that current and urgent issues 
may often not be the most important after all, and at times we must prioritise 
long-term issues even if they may not seem pressing in the moment.
Those who have written on the topic of short-termism have often 
proposed reforming our institutions to address the problem.6 Such reforms 
are useful and indeed necessary, but for them to work as intended we 
need a mindset change, and that can only be achieved by a fundamental 
cultural shift, one that I will argue for in the conclusion to this chapter. 
But before proceeding any further, a brief note concerning long-termism 
is in order. In business, a strategy that spans one to ten years is often called 
a long-term strategy. In politics, as will be argued later, the time frame 
can be even shorter. This chapter departs from an understanding of long-
term futures as having a lower bound of a generation – approximately 
twenty-five  years. On many issues, a longer time frame is called for. In 
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terms of our current politics and decision-making, a shift to this scale 
would be a revolutionary change.
1. The Garden of Forking Paths
In 1941, the Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges published a short story 
called The Garden of Forking Paths. It involves the idea that instead of 
choosing between alternative futures that preclude all others at the point 
of taking a decision, humans in fact create an infinite number of different 
forking realities in their lives. His story inspired multiverse theories, and 
it can also serve as a point of departure for this chapter. Following Borges; 
for humans, our futures, even the faraway ones, come to us one event and 
decision-making point at a time. We experience our lives as an endless 
chain of moments and decision points, seamlessly flowing one after another.
Our way of experiencing the flow of time as ‘one damn thing after 
another’ is natural: as was already noted, we mainly exist in the moment 
that we can experience through our senses and can only physically interact 
with the world as it is here and now. This seems obvious, even banal, but 
it yields two important insights that are relevant when thinking about 
our current decision-making.7
Firstly, on the positive and empowering side, this observation opens 
pathways in the form of long causal chains for effecting long-term change. 
Human agency matters, and if exercised with foresight and wisdom it can 
be used to foster desirable long-term futures – and to avoid undesirable 
ones. Through our imagination we can gain a kind of access to the future 
and envision alternative realities, assess their likelihood and desirability, 
and act accordingly.8 We can also conduct research and analysis that 
might give us a better understanding of current trends and their long-
term effects and trajectories. We can extrapolate current trends but 
should keep in mind that not every issue of significance grows linearly 
or is easily foreseen.
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Secondly, however, this observation reveals the daunting complexity of 
choice. The future is generated one step and choice at a time. One need 
not subscribe to the multiverse theory to appreciate how over time this 
results in decision trees of bewildering intricacy even in our personal 
lives, let alone on a global level. Yet we need not, and indeed must not, 
remain passive passengers on our way to our rendezvous with the future. 
We should prune this garden of forking paths to our advantage and chart 
a course that is as beneficial as possible, while seeking to avoid outcomes 
that could turn out to be catastrophic.
The call to optimise our global decision tree opens two problematic 
elements, however. When thinking about the paths pursued, we must 
always ask to whom they are beneficial. Issues of debate can very rarely be 
tackled purely analytically. Most of these issues are also inherently political 
and thus involve – and to a degree also revolve around – the interests and 
power of key actors. Indeed, the vested interests at stake often skew the 
process. The issue is never that of policy optimisation, but rather that the 
eventual policies and the framing of the issues are an outcome of a political 
process that is always in the final analysis a struggle for power and for the 
eventual nature of solutions chosen. Any choices made will generate both 
winners and losers and it is erroneous to view them as questions of policy 
optimisation void of politics and struggle for power. In fact, it is hard to 
envisage a long-term future that would be equally beneficial to everyone. 
The distribution of relative gains and the competition concerning who gets 
to call the shots is the bread and butter of politics. This applies at both the 
domestic and global level and the short and the long time frame.
The second problem is that this naturalised flow of time may blind us 
to the possibilities of forging a path to desired long-term futures. This is 
partly because we simply lack a sufficiently sophisticated understanding 
of our world and the ability to try and effect desired change with a 
high enough degree of certainty. But perhaps more importantly, we are 
TRAVERSING THE GARDEN OF FORKING PATHS MORE WISELY
140
often blinded by current events, unable to see beyond the situation at 
hand. Related is the so-called ‘normality bias’, the idea that we anchor 
our expectations of the future so firmly in the status quo that we find it 
difficult to fully comprehend possible catastrophe.9 As will be argued 
below, this is increasingly a threat to the prosperity and even the very 
survival of humanity.
Fostering decision-making that considers long-term challenges and 
effects would be rational and desirable. There is evidence that individuals 
who postpone immediate consumption in favour of long-term investments 
fare better than those who operate on a more short-term and hedonistic 
outlook.10 It seems reasonable to expect the same at the level of society. 
But taking the longer time frame into account is not only preferable, it is 
imperative. Toby Ord has argued that catastrophic and even existential risks 
from causes such as unaligned AI, climate change tail events, nuclear war, 
and several others, are rising.11 In his assessment, the odds of a disastrous 
outcome for humanity – defined as the extinction of the species or a 
drastic and terminal curbing of its potential – within this century could 
be as high as one in six. This figure obviously comes with a very high 
degree of uncertainty but even a significantly lower risk of catastrophe 
would be unacceptable.
It is simply irrational to continue ignoring these risks. Yet the bad 
news is that policymaking is never fully rational. The idealised version 
of decision-making prevalent in many rational choice theories does not 
in fact capture the messiness of real human decision-making processes 
(this was of course never the point of these theories to begin with). 
Herbert Simon famously coined the term ‘satisficing’ to capture the fact 
that most of the time people settle for decisions and outcomes that are 
‘good enough.’ 12 But what might seem good enough in the short-term can 
prove disastrous in the long-term. The law of unforeseen and unintended 
consequences often prevails.
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2. The biological constraints and political and institutional dilemmas
Causes of irrational long-term decision-making abound, and find their 
roots in many features of human life. One such cause stems from the hectic 
pace of everyday politics. Even in normal times a player in this game is 
often rushing after the ever-present now. The essence of this dynamic 
has already been captured by Whiting, writing five decades ago (1972, 
236): for a bureaucrat, ‘tomorrow’s problem can be taken up next week but 
today must still be devoted to yesterday’s agenda. Unfortunately, the today 
is always with us; next week never seems to come.’ 13 My own experiences 
working for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland seem to verify 
this observation. Although I was initially hired to conduct long-term 
strategic thinking and planning, my presence was soon seen as a spare 
resource to be used in tending to other more immediate items on the 
ministry’s agenda. I do not complain, as the experience of being closely 
attached to the policy process was very rewarding, but the experience 
seems to suggest that diplomatic services do not really know how to use 
slower forms of long-term thinking in their own, much faster processes. 
Foreign policy is not all crisis decision-making, yet the civil servants are 
chronically short of time: they simply have too much on their plate.14 
Increasingly all government departments all over the world are hindered 
by the same problem. The standard operating procedures are short-
termist by nature and prone to deviating from the ideal of rationality.15 
Our increasingly crisis-prone world compounds the problem, inviting 
and forcing us to shrink our time horizons at a time when it would be 
more important than ever to expand them. We are stuck in a reactive 
crisis-management mode where we are even less able to see the bigger 
picture and think of the long-term challenges and the consequences of 
our actions. One needs only to look at our responses to the COVID-19 
pandemic and its effects on our national and international politics to 
see the point.
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But the seemingly pressing nature of our current affairs is not the only 
factor ensuring suboptimally short time frames. As a species, Homo 
sapiens is practically hardwired not to be able to think about issues in 
the long term. Our ancestors operated in an environment that mainly 
consisted of issues of immediate benefit or danger. As a consequence, 
as a species, we have evolved to think and act accordingly. Indeed, we 
often tend to forget that humans are only one mammal among many 
in the world. We have evolved culturally very rapidly but biologically 
we have remained largely intact for the last 40,000 to 50,000 years. It is 
not an exaggeration to say that biologically we are an incredibly large 
and unwieldy host of hunter-gatherers that have been thrust into the 
bewildering complexity of the 21st century.
Luckily, biology is not the only thing that bears on evolution. Ever 
since the advent of writing, we have been able to transcend the cognitive 
limits of single individuals or even generations, passing on information 
over vast distances and long time periods. This has enabled a rapid rise 
in science and technology and the many benefits they bring – benefits 
we often take for granted. Through this cultural evolution we have 
been able to develop increasingly complex systems of national and 
international governance. But at the same time, those systems have not 
been able to reliably produce just and effective solutions to humanity’s 
greatest problems. 
On the contrary, our politics and political decision-making remain 
short-sighted and often mired in zero-sum games. To begin with, the 
basic organisational unit in the world is still a sovereign nation state, 
although the issues we face increasingly know and respect no boundaries. 
Moreover, our propensity to think in terms of national welfare and security 
is increasingly at odds with the common fate of humanity. The GDP might 
be a good metric for keeping tabs on economic output within a certain 
segment of the world, but it is clearly insufficient as a guiding principle 
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for our collective responses. To be clear, I am not advocating abolishing 
nation states, as they remain indispensable reservoirs of political authority, 
competence and legitimacy, but an outlook more attuned to our common 
challenges is clearly called for.
A related problem is that the time horizons of governments often stem 
from their expectations concerning how long they expect to be able to 
govern and how their policies might affect their chances of getting reelected 
or, in the case of authoritarian regimes, keeping hold of power.16 This 
means that, though usually short, time horizons are not uniform across 
governments. To give two extreme examples, the Communist Party of 
China assumes that it will be in power indefinitely – and to a degree it 
operates accordingly: it currently has development plans for the country 
that span up to the year 2049, the centenary of the party. By contrast, at 
the time of writing (summer 2020) the US President Donald Trump is 
fighting for his political survival and does not show any propensity for 
thinking beyond the tweet at hand.
It is hard to generalise on these time frames, at least without more 
systematic research on the topic. Yet it seems safe to conclude that most 
governments are thinking in  time frames of months and years, not 
decades, let alone generations or millennia. Even in the Chinese case it 
can be argued that despite their rhetoric of decades-distant goals, their 
actual decision-making often reflects the needs of the moment – chiefly 
their short-term economic ascent. 
3. Conclusions: The need for a cultural change
A change to the way we make decisions is clearly called for. The challenges 
and risks are rising and the need for this change is increasingly urgent. 
Yet the analysis here points to a grim conclusion: the inadequacy of our 
current policies and decision-making seems to be hardwired into our 
biology and institutions. The escalating crises are inviting us to reconsider 
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the ways we run our current affairs and to better prepare for the future, 
but there is no guarantee that humanity will embrace the right change 
in time to avert catastrophe.
Does this mean that we are doomed? The call to orient policy more 
to the long-term is old hat. If this would come easily or naturally to 
us, surely the problem that a lot of people already recognise would be 
solved by now?
This indicates that there are structural factors impeding the change. 
But what humans have created, they can also amend. Parliamentary 
committees for the future are often praised as potential solutions. My 
own country, Finland, is known for having a Committee for the Future 
at its parliament. The role of the committee should not be dismissed.17 It 
is imperative that these perspectives are brought to bear on our political 
debates. At the same time, the parliament, and perhaps the committee in 
particular, is simply too far removed from the day-to-day policymaking 
to make a crucial difference.18 We also know that this is a typical problem 
with governmental foresight processes, and in any case they often do not 
hold a long enough perspective. Although the objectives behind these 
efforts are commendable, the outcomes leave a great deal to be desired.
The persistence of these difficulties has led some people to become 
exasperated with the lack of foresight and wisdom in our politics and 
to start flirting with the idea of authoritarianism as a potential solution. 
Yet there is very little evidence that authoritarian governments are more 
interested in the far futures or even in the well-being of their own people 
than democracies.19 Indeed, here I echo the words of Winston Churchill, 
who famously argued how ‘it has been said that democracy is the worst 
form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried 
from time to time’. The sensible way forward will not be a turn towards 
authoritarianism, however enlightened a form of authoritarianism it 
might purport to be, but making our democratically elected leaders more 
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attuned to the long-term consequences of their decisions.
This turn has already been advocated in the case of leadership.20 
Addressing the leaders is a good start but it will not be enough on its 
own if the incentive structures of our current politics remain intact. In 
democratic systems especially, leaders will not be empowered to take 
the long-term point of view more into account without popular support. 
And gaining that support entails an electorate that would both demand 
and reward responsible long-term thinking and policies and punish the 
lack of them.
This is easier said than done and in order to get there we need cultural 
change. We must all learn to take the long-term much more seriously 
and factor it in at the very fabric of our lives. This fundamental mindset 
change could only begin to be achieved by alerting people to their 
responsibilities. The so-called 10,000 Year Clock – an art installation, 
currently in production, consisting of a clock designed to tick for 10,000 
years – is one such prompt. The aim is commendable, though the clock 
remains at least in its present guise more a gimmick and perhaps even a 
distraction than a solution to the problem at hand.21
A better solution might be to adapt the Canadian tradition of ‘The Ritual 
of the Calling of an Engineer’ in which engineers are bestowed with iron 
rings to remind them of the heavy responsibility their profession entails. 
We should consider adapting this tradition to the whole of humanity. 
Let us call it ‘The Stone Ring of Longtermists’ and it should be given to 
every individual at birth to signal that we, the currently living, are not 
here only at and for our own leisure but that we are also the custodians 
of this planet and its long-term potential and that each and every one of 
us should feel that responsibility and act accordingly.22
To that end, three words should be inscribed on the ring: ‘viable’, 
‘open’, and ‘aspirational’. They would refer to three basic rules of thumb 
that should be observed by humanity going forward:
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1. Keep the long term viable. Deal with the current threats we face 
and know of (and even those we are not aware of) so that we can avoid 
catastrophe for humanity and this planet.
2. Keep the long term open. Avoid choices and decisions that would 
constrain our freedom in the future. In particular, we should retain the 
ability to undo and ‘unchoose’ things and we should therefore avoid 
undesirable lock-in technologically, economically or politically.23 Obviously, 
we can never fully walk back developments and decisions taken but we 
should retain the ability to undo the most harmful or negative aspects of 
said choices, should we so desire. In addition, we cannot infer with any 
certainty the preferences of future generations apart from the fact that most 
probably they would like to exist and get to realise their own potential. 
This, too, underlines the importance of the first two rules of thumb.
3. Finally, keep the long term aspirational. We need long-term thinking 
not only to avoid bad outcomes or even outright catastrophes but to 
envisage and realise positive and just futures for us all, including future 
generations.
Most importantly, we must embrace the long term in all aspects of 
life. It is only by doing so that we can successfully traverse the garden of 
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